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Abstract
This thesis is a study of two sets of literature on capitalism, gender, and emotion. Firstly, it
explores the writings of the Wages for Housework (WFH) movement – a network of
Marxist feminist activist groups, founded in 1972, whose activity was centred on women’s
reproductive labour. Secondly, this thesis draws on the body of writing on emotional
labour. Coined by Arlie Hochschild in 1983, this term describes the work of producing
emotional states in another person. While WFH were attentive to emotional aspects of
reproductive labour, their writings mention emotional labour only in passing. Hochschild’s
work concentrates on emotional labour in particular service occupations, but neglects
broader issues of social reproduction.
Synthesising these bodies of work, I introduce the concept of emotional reproduction,
thus applying the WFH perspective to the theme introduced by Hochschild. Emotional
reproduction denotes processes across waged and unwaged forms of labour, intended to
enhance the relative emotional wellbeing of a recipient, to the extent that they are able to
participate in waged labour. These processes often take place in the private sphere, and
are constructed as a typically feminine activity. I argue for the importance of understanding
these processes as a form of labour, which is integral to capitalist social reproduction. 
Through the notion of emotional reproduction, this thesis offers an account of
gendered subjectivity. It highlights the construction of gendered and historically specific
forms of skill, which are essential for emotional labour. I argue that the feminised skill for
emotional labour tends to be exploited, in both waged labour and in many family
arrangements. This labour, however, is simultaneously made invisible through the
hegemonic understanding of subjectivity as personal autonomy, which obscures modes of
emotional dependency. 
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The final two chapters of the thesis outline the political perspective of a Marxist
feminism focused on the constitution of collective subjectivity through the refusal of
emotional labour. Through the demand for the abolition of gender and the family, I offer an
account of what resistance to current forms of emotional reproduction might look like.
These involve contesting contemporary understandings of family, as well as building our
collective capacity for other types of sociality. 
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Introduction
This thesis is a study of feminist writings on work, emotion, and reproduction. I draw on the
writings of Wages for Housework (WFH), a Marxist feminist movement founded on the
premise that work coded as feminine is a central but structurally disavowed and devalued
aspect of capitalist societies. The WFH activists were interested in the political potential of
reproductive labour – that is, the work that goes into maintaining and replacing the labour
force, and ensuring the general wellbeing of people. This work includes both generational
replacement, such as pregnancy and child care, and the daily work of cooking, cleaning,
doing laundry, and caring for the sick, disabled, and elderly. It also includes the work of
building communities and social relations. A less visible form of this labour is emotional
care, for which women have been made largely responsible. The central claim of this
thesis is that reproductive labour has a pivotal emotional aspect, which is essential for
reproduction of the workforce and for producing modes of sociality and subjectivity. This
work, as the WFH authors knew, includes the work of soothing children and providing
company for the elderly, but also the work of providing emotional comfort for partners,
family members, and friends, and maintaining intimate forms of sociality. This work is
commonly known as “love.”
The past few years have seen a revived interest in Marxist feminist thought and
issues of social reproduction, across academic and activist communities.1 Reproduction is
being rediscovered as a central terrain of anti-capitalist struggle. Taking up the legacy of
1 The large body of work developed around the concept of social reproduction testifies to this interest within
the academic sector. See for example Bakker and Gill (2003), Luxton and Bezanson (2006), and 
Bhattacharya (2017). With regards to WFH, several essay collections have been published over the last 
decade, including James (2012), Federici (2012, 2018a, 2018b), and Dalla Costa (2019). However, 
Louise Toupin’s 2018 book and Christina Rousseau’s 2016 PhD thesis remain, to my knowledge, the only
book-length secondary literature on WFH. These texts are more historical in nature and explore the 
experience of the participants in WFH, whereas my research is based on the theoretical and political 
perspective presented by WFH members in their writings.
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Marxist feminist works from the late 1960s until the early 1980s, this new wave of writing
and activism aims to bring theories of reproductive labour into debates on the
contemporary organisation of work under neoliberalism. This means expanding the focus
on unwaged domestic labour, prevalent in much of the theoretical writings from the 1970s,
to include various forms of waged employment in the reproductive sphere. Reproduction is
an expansive field, consisting of the totality of the activities that sustain the lives of people
under capitalism, and maintain their capacity to work. Reproduction, then, comes to
occupy a contradictory position in capitalist economies, where it is necessary for the
continued functioning of capitalist value production yet simultaneously devalued; geared
towards the preservation of people’s capacity to labour yet often excluded from the waged
work place and the formal economy. It spans people’s unwaged work in their homes and
some types of work associated with the public sector, such as teaching and nursing.
Increasingly, the term reproductive labour names the growing service economy and waged
domestic work. Across these often disparate parts of the landscape of contemporary
capitalism, people are working, with or without a wage, to ensure the relative wellbeing of
themselves and other people. While incredibly common and mundane as a type of work,
this activity has often been made invisible in economic and political analysis, including
Marxist writings and organising. The task of the Marxist feminist tradition, in which I place
my own research, is to make this work visible in order to struggle against its current
organisation. 
One reason for this neglect of reproductive work is that it tends to fall
disproportionately on the shoulders of women, often without adequate remuneration or
recognition. The capitalist economy is thus dependent on people doing this work of caring
for each other for free, or for the low wages associated with reproductive service work.
This work is often understood as unskilled, naturally feminine, and therefore women’s duty
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which should be carried out with little or no monetary reward.2 It is often relegated to the
so-called private sphere, and as such it is disavowed and excluded in modern economic
and political discourses. Decades of feminist writing and agitation has begun to undo some
of this privatisation.3 Yet reproduction is still construed as primarily the responsibility of “the
family,” a social unit that is constructed as the opposite of the capitalist sphere of work –
our haven in a heartless world. Such privatisation of the burden and cost of reproductive
work, as well as the construction of a low-waged service economy, serve to maintain
women’s subordinate position in a supposedly post-feminist era in which most formal
constraints on women’s independent existence have been removed. It makes women
responsible for the wellbeing of others and undermines their financial and material
independence, while simultaneously constructing them as the subjects most suitable for
this work, thus perpetuating the existence of a gendered division of labour. 
This thesis pays particular attention to the emotional aspects of this process. While I
argue that it is important to think about the connections between the material aspects of
care and its emotional side, I will focus on what I call emotional reproduction. This term
names the forms of work that go into maintaining people’s emotional wellbeing, and their
ability and willingness to continue to engage in capitalist forms of labour, often despite the
considerable emotional strain produced by this work. Here, I draw on the concept of
emotional labour, and specifically the feminised kind of emotional labour that is oriented
towards “affirming, enhancing, and celebrating the wellbeing and status of others” (MH
165). Thinking about emotion across waged and unwaged sectors, I want to emphasise
the work that goes into sustaining some degree of emotional wellbeing in people. I thus
draw on a tradition of feminist writings on emotion initiated by sociologist Arlie Russel
2 This is supported by numerous studies. See for example England, Budig, and Folbre (2001), Charmes 
(2015), and Folbre (2017).
3 In what follows, I use the term “privatisation” to indicate how reproductive labour is constructed as an 
individual responsibility and relegated to the private sphere. 
10
Hochschild’s classic 1983 book The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling.
In this text, Hochschild traces a shift in capitalist economies, in which the growing service
economy relies on the increased commodification of our emotional capacities. She does
this through a study of flight attendants, a traditionally feminised profession that not only
involves serving food and drinks but perhaps most centrally functions to instil a sense of
safety and emotional comfort in airline passengers. From this paradigmatic example,
Hochschild draws out a theory of the importance of emotion across a number of service
jobs, which are increasingly central in capitalist economies in Europe and North America.
Following Hochschild, there have been numerous empirical studies of emotion in a broad
range of work, primarily within the disciplines of sociology and management studies.4
Within Marxist feminist theory, however, there have been few sustained attempts to
understand emotional labour as a particular aspect of reproductive labour.5 In her 2011
essay “On affective labor,” WFH co-founder Silvia Federici suggests that emotional labour
must be understood in the context of historical materialist feminist theories of reproductive
labour, as well as the work of Hochschild. Neither in Federici’s essay nor elsewhere in the
WFH literature, however, do we find a WFH theory of emotional labour. This thesis is an
attempt to develop such a theory.
In my use of the concept of emotional reproduction, I wish to both invoke and
reconfigure Hochschild’s term emotional labour. By using this concept, I want to point to a
broader process than that usually described in accounts of emotional labour, and to
include activities that would normally not be considered work. These activities may
nonetheless contribute to the general emotional wellbeing of people, and should thus be
politicised within the conceptual framework of reproduction. Like social reproduction more
4 Some examples include James (1989), Smith (1992), Hall (1993), Leidner (1993), Wharton (1993), Pierce
(1996), Paules (1996), Taylor and Tyler (2000), Korczynski (2003), Bolton (2005), Brannan (2005), 
Dowling (2007), and Simpson (2007).
5 Notable exceptions include Weeks (2007), Bromberg (2015), Oksala (2016), and Whitney (2018). 
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broadly, emotional reproduction operates across spheres of unwaged and waged work. I
therefore want to situate emotional labour within theories of reproduction, and in particular
the theory and strategy developed by WFH. This theory emphasised the essential
character of housework, and reproductive work more broadly, to the continued functioning
of capitalist societies. The WFH writers/activists asserted that the sphere of reproduction is
politically important and that the people engaged in this work occupy a potentially powerful
position in anticapitalist struggles. Their theory thus describes this work as both
indispensable to the reproduction of capital and the potential site of its disruption. In this
thesis, I argue that the emotional and subjective aspects of reproductive labour are central
to the disruptive potential of this work. My research centres on the question of how
emotional reproduction is tied to the (re)production of gender difference, and how it can be
mobilised in the construction of feminist subjectivity. 
Wages for Housework as method and perspective
Founded in the summer of 1972, WFH was an international network of feminist
organisations. At its peak, there were WFH groups in Italy, the UK, Switzerland, Germany,
the US, Canada, Mexico, and Argentina. While the international campaign was disbanded
in 1977, some groups were active into the early 1980s (Toupin 2018: 96). In the UK, the
WFH campaign changed its name to Global Women’s Strike, and continues to operate to
this day. The theorists most commonly associated with WFH are Mariarosa Dalla Costa,
Silvia Federici, Leopoldina Fortunati, and Selma James, active in the Italian, American,
and British branches of the network. However, this thesis aims to go beyond these most
familiar names, and cover a broader range of writers and activists, including Wilmette
Brown, Ruth Hall, Giovanna Dalla Costa, and Margaret Prescod. Some of these authors
were involved in the groups Wages Due Lesbians (WDL) and Black Women for Wages for
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Housework (BWFWFH), which were autonomous from the main WFH groups but operated
within the WFH network. I wish to pay more attention to aspects of the WFH writings,
including sexuality and race, which are often written out of the standard narratives of the
movement (Austin and Capper 2018: 447). Additionally, I look at the collectively authored
manifestos, pamphlets and statements that the movement produced. While the writings of
Federici, Dalla Costa,6 James, and Fortunati continue to be central in my account of WFH,
I want to emphasise the collective character of this movement rather than to conflate the
WFH perspective with its best-known proponents. 
The movement drew its political and theoretical position from Dalla Costa’s essay
“Women and the subversion of the community,” first drafted in 1970 and published
(together with James’ essay “A woman’s place”) as the pamphlet Power of women and the
subversion of the community in 1972.7 In this essay, Dalla Costa laid the groundwork for
an autonomous feminist movement, which she argued would have an essential position
within the broader anti-capitalist left. With this text, Dalla Costa both drew upon and
departed from the writings of the Italian workerist tradition. She had been a member of the
workerist group Potere Operaio (Workers’ Power) up until then, and the WFH perspective
was strongly inspired by workerist thought. But her text also marked a certain distance
between the feminist movement and the workerists. Workerism – a school of thought that
became prominent in the early 1960s – stemmed from a re-reading of Marx’s writings on
the basis of the primacy of working-class activity. Its central figures included Mario Tronti,
Raniero Panzieri, Romano Alquati, and Antonio Negri. Contrary to Marxisms that focused
on capital as the cause of development, workerist theory staged a methodological
inversion in which the activity of the workers was seen as the fundamental driver of
6 Hereafter, the name Dalla Costa will refer to Mariarosa Dalla Costa unless otherwise specified. 
7 The authorship of “Women and the subversion of the community” is contested, and often both Dalla 
Costa and James are credited as its authors. In the 1973 and 1975 editions, the essay is signed by both 
of them. Additionally, James claims to have written several parts of it (SRC 43). Dalla Costa, however, 
argues that the essay was written by herself based on discussions with James and one other person 
(WSC 47-48). For a longer commentary on this issue, see Barbagallo (2016: 47-49).
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change in capitalist society (Tronti 2019: 65). Through the workers’ inquiry, a method
which encouraged workers to investigate their own working conditions, these writers aimed
to develop a theory adequate to the task of locating potential sites of struggle and
antagonism between workers and capital (Cleaver 1979, Wright 2002). For the members
of WFH, however, this included not only the factory work explored by the workerists, but
also all the (often unwaged) work that goes into reproducing labour power. They criticised
the workerists for being overly concerned with locating the technologically advanced
vanguard, without recognising the potential power held by supposedly “backward” sections
of the working class, including those without formal employment. The WFH movement
thus staged an important intervention into workerism, and leftist movements more broadly,
which tended to conceive of “work” as that which happened in the factories (Cleaver 2019:
xi, SRC 100, NYWFHC 229). 
Despite this critique of the workerists, however, the WFH writers continued to draw
on workerist methods. They were interested in finding an account of capitalist society
which emphasised the collective agency of those who are engaged in reproductive work.
In this, they shared the workerist methodological move which, as Harry Cleaver writes,
emphasised that every analysis must be two-sided, from the perspective of the workers as
well as that of capital (1979: 64). What has been characterised as the “optimistic”
character of workerism and its offshoots (Vishmidt 2015: 8), can thus instead be seen as
an emphasis on the political usefulness of theory insofar as it helps us locate potential
sites at which capitalism can be disrupted and workers can claim a more autonomous
power. In this thesis, I draw on the conceptual methodology of the workerists, in order to
locate possible sites of struggle. Federici uses the term “struggle concepts” – that is,
concepts that name and produce antagonistic relations (NYWFHC 16). I share the WFH
commitment to theory that is informed by the needs of political struggle and conceptual
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work aimed at constituting and enhancing antagonistic subjectivity. 
More broadly, I try to employ a historical materialist conceptual methodology, in
which there is no clear-cut distinction between the “logic” of capital and its historical
development.8 Using concepts should always involve trying to locate the historical
conditions of their appearance, as well as their usefulness for political movements. A
concept can only ever describe a partial reality. The material conditions in which we situate
such concepts should draw our attention to their necessary incompleteness, and therefore
call for the need for other concepts. In this way, historical materialist theory moves
between more abstract and more concrete levels, without losing its focus on the socio-
historical conditions which gave rise to the phenomena it wishes to describe (Marx 1993:
100-101). These conditions, moreover, are not the result of individual agency but rather
stem from the organisation of (re)production, a system within which people’s needs are
met within various relations of power. While these needs are partly grounded in the
biological life of human organisms, such as our need for food and shelter, they can only be
met in historically specific ways. Moreover, the constitution of various ways to meet those
needs also gives rise to new needs. What constitutes a “need” is thus historically specific
and varies according to the classed, racialised, and gendered assignment of people to
various categories in society. This thesis questions contemporary constructions of those
needs and the material, subjective, and emotional organisation of the labour that is
necessary to meet them. 
In trying to locate potentials for resistance and collective agency, I have also
developed a method that foregrounds the most useful reading of a text. Somewhat
contrary to standard academic practice, then, I do not seek so much to criticise these texts
as to find a reading that can be productively utilised for political organising. In highlighting
8 For a Marxist feminist discussion on logic and history, see Arruzza (2015a, 2015b), Farris (2015a), and 
Manning (2015). 
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what I think is useful for a contemporary feminist struggle, I have inevitably left out other
possible readings, some of which would be more critical and perhaps more pessimistic,
although not less “correct.” I am thus not interested in finding the most “accurate” reading
of the group of texts under study in this thesis, but rather aim to read generously and
sometimes against the grain of the texts themselves, in a way that I hope will be helpful for
the collective project of constituting historical materialist feminist sites of resistance. In
reading these texts as both theoretical statements and activist texts, my goal is to produce
an account of emotional reproduction that gives a fuller view of social reproduction as a
site of struggle. 
This method is consistent with the writings of WFH members themselves. Their aim
was to produce theoretical and political concepts that could be utilised in their movement.
For them, one of the key struggle concepts was that of work. While some Marxist feminists
have opted to use the vaguer term “activity” to describe unwaged reproduction (Gonzalez
and Neton 2013), I think it is important to use the concepts of work and labour across
waged and unwaged spheres, both because of their analytical value and because they
facilitate certain forms of struggle. The WFH project was fundamentally one of struggling
against various forms of work. Following Kathi Weeks, I use work and labour
interchangeably, thus not drawing a conceptual distinction that critiques work but
maintains labour as a desirable activity, or places labour in the domain of the public or
commercial and work in the private sphere (as Hochschild does in The managed heart).
Weeks points out that such distinctions risk preserving the moral valuation of work/labour
that the antiwork political project strives to undo (2011: 15). As Marjorie DeVault argues,
the current usage of the term work emerged from the spatial and temporal distinctions
inherent in “masculine” work under capitalism, in which the work place is separated from
the home, which is constructed as a sphere of leisure. For women, however, this
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conceptual distinction is blurry, as the home is a sphere of both work and leisure, thus
conflating the experiences of the two terms. Thus, DeVault suggests, the term work is not
wholly adequate for describing the activities of reproduction (1991: 5-6). However, Weeks
writes that “[w]hat counts as work, which forms of productive activity will be included and
how each will be valued, are a matter of historical dispute” (2011: 14). Following Weeks’
approach, I think of the term work as a way of contesting the current organisation of
activity, resources, and needs. At the risk of over-extending the concepts work and labour,
I am interested in the political potentials of naming what is usually understood to be
“leisure” as labour. This is because, as many Marxist feminists have pointed out, a
woman’s work is never done (WL 46, Morton 1971). For the members of WFH, using the
term work was an essential aspect of their politics, enabling us to “call work what is work
so that eventually we might rediscover what is love and create our sexuality, which we
have never known” (RPZ 20). Until then, however, it is necessary to name our love as
labour. 
The concepts of work and labour have a multitude of definitions, often involving
notions of effort and conscious activity, which is aimed at transforming a certain material.
In trying to expand this definition, I want to challenge some pre-conceived notions of work.
One important aspect of this is to question the association of work with active and
conscious engagement with a material. What if we could think of work beyond the
distinctions between activity and passivity? As the active has historically been considered
a masculine principle, I ask whether such associations serve to make invisible much of the
work that women have been tasked with. Similarly, the conflation of labour with conscious
activity seems to value the mind over the body. As emotions are often constructed as
passive states that come to inhabit a body, against the rational mind (Lupton 1998: 85-86),
these associations of the terms labour and work seem to render the term emotional labour
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an oxymoron. Finally, I want to suggest that emotional labour cannot properly be
understood as either material or immaterial, but should be conceptualised as a subjective
involvement that spans material, bodily, psychic, and social labour processes. I use the
concept of work to describe processes that are unfree or involuntary, in the sense that we
are compelled to do them in order to satisfy our needs and those of others. This means
that these processes could potentially become non-work, through their disconnection from
the conditions that compel us to perform them. While what we may legitimately call labour
might always involve a product of some kind, this product will not always be recognisable
as a “thing” separate from its producer. Similarly, all labour may involve effort on the side
of the labourer, yet such exertion might appear as merely a natural expression of the
labouring subject. In emotional labour processes, in particular, the result of such work is
often invisible as a product, and thus comes to appear as an aspect of the personality of
the worker. As Sophie Lewis argues, in such forms of labour “a feminized person’s body is
typically being further feminized: it is working very, very hard at having the appearance of
not working at all” (2019a: 59). 
The risk here is that the terms labour and work become so encompassing that they
are rendered almost meaningless. This problem has often been noted specifically in
conjunction with the term emotional labour – a problem which has been described as
“concept creep” (Beck 2018: np). In response to this, some writers on emotional labour
want to limit the use of the term to the context for which it was initially developed – the
waged service industry (Bolton 2005: 55). While being wary of such conceptual creep, in
which “emotional labour” comes to describe an ever-wider set of interactions, I think it is
necessary to point out that emotional labour is an expansive type of work, that is
potentially an aspect of a number of different activities. Most importantly, emotional labour
of some kind is often an aspect of reproductive labour, so that it becomes hard to
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disentangle emotional labour as a separate work process. Both reproduction and emotion
are inherently expansive concepts, because of how the satisfaction of need span a whole
range of activities. I thus argue against a priori distinctions between these terms and their
opposites. Rather, I am interested in the political potentials of naming processes as work,
and how such naming can transform our understanding of both those processes and the
concept of work itself. 
The distinction between work and non-work is a political distinction that is open to
challenge. In the 1970s, as more women started to enter the waged work force, the
feminist movement also started naming various activities that women carry out in their
homes as work. This allowed them to denaturalise domestic labour as well as point to the
similarities between the tasks they performed within their waged work and the tasks they
had been carrying out in their homes. For WFH, such denaturalisation and comparison
were key benefits of their use of the term work. Their use of the term allowed for
interventions into leftist discourses, and for the use of labour tactics in the sphere of
unwaged work. It also created analytical space for the shifting terrain of what has been
constituted as “women’s work,” where many tasks were increasingly performed for a wage.
Hochschild, carrying out her fieldwork for The managed heart during the period WFH
campaigners were most active, captured the process of women’s supposedly natural
capacity for emotion being increasingly commodified in the growing (waged) service
economy. She traced this backwards into the home, naming this capacity in its unwaged
form as “emotion work.” However, she was mainly interested in what she saw as the
problem of the commercialisation of a previously “private” capacity, which she thinks of in
terms of the increasing management control of, and alienation from, our capacity for
feeling (MH 19). Using the WFH method of applying the term work to critique the
supposedly non-alienated sphere of the home, I question Hochschild’s distinction of
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emotional labour and emotion work, which seems to posit emotion work as inherently
freer. The term emotional labour, as I use it, is a conceptual and political tool for
challenging the association of emotion with non-work and the spontaneous expression of
our authentic selves. 
While writing this thesis, I became increasingly interested in our understandings of
such selves. This text can also be read as a critique of certain understandings of
subjectivity, in particular (neo)liberal understandings of the self as a sovereign,
autonomous individual ruled by rational decision-making. This theme has been a concern
for feminist theory for quite some time. Feminists have questioned the construction of
(implicitly masculine) selfhood as independent, rational, “self-made” subjectivity.9 In this
thesis, I want to emphasise the emotional aspect of this construction, which I argue is
based on the construction of its opposite – the feminised subject of emotional labour.
Combined with an emphasis on the private sphere as the “proper” place for emotion under
capitalism, such constructions serve to maintain notions of gender complementarity and
heteronormative family forms. It is thus bound up with a particular construction of the
social, which I argue is entangled with the material organisation of home and waged work.
This focus on the construction of the subject and sociality also helps us understand our
subjective investments in maintaining the current system – how we work to (re)produce a
way of organising the world that fundamentally limits the satisfaction of our needs and the
expansive potentials of our desires. 
Since the prime of WFH, women’s economic and social status has changed quite
drastically. As Fordist governance has been widely replaced by post-Fordist economic
organisation and a neoliberal state, the status of women’s labour has shifted, as has the
notion of “women” as a collective subject. The writings of the WFH movement are of their
time – seeking to intervene in feminist and leftist debates of the 1970s. Thus, in using
9 See for instance Lloyd (1984), and Pateman (1988). 
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these materials, I am not suggesting that they are automatically applicable to the current
situation. Rather, I am interested in the spirit of WFH as a political project. This thesis
outlines the WFH project as it emerged in the 1970s, but also seeks to update and expand
its vision. 
The limitations of the WFH project are geographical as well as historical. The WFH
authors were primarily interested in the working-class household in the European and
North American countries in which WFH was active. This thesis shares this limitation,
while acknowledging that reproductive labour has become an increasingly global issue.
Through this spatial limitation, I also take a particular organisation of the household as my
object of critique, one that is often presented as universal but is in fact deeply classed, and
racialised as white. “The family” as an object of critique is primarily a white phenomenon,
even though it affects people of colour in various ways. It is also bound up with the project
of reproducing nation-states where whiteness is part of the national imaginary. While I
cannot more than gesture towards this entanglement of gender, social reproduction, and
white national projects,10 I want to note that the normative household as presented in this
thesis is a highly specific one. Indeed, only at an abstract level can we speak of “the
family.” It is a construct that is simultaneously material and ideological, but with radically
different material effects across society. 
This thesis is a theoretical account of emotional reproduction. It deals with political
concepts and theories. The first two chapters provide a general overview of the relevant
literature, while the remaining three chapters are more oriented towards working out an
original theory of the gendering of emotional reproduction. However, I will analyse and use
the texts of WFH and Hochschild throughout the thesis. Thus, this thesis is unconventional
in its structure insofar as there are no separate sections for methodology, theory, literature
10 On this topic, see for instance Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1989), McClintock (1995), and Farris (2015a, 
2017). 
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review, and data analysis. While I draw on many interview-based studies, this thesis deals
with concepts, texts, and theory rather than presenting empirical research on the theme of
emotional reproduction. The aim of this research is to develop a theoretical perspective
that can explain the persistent gendering of emotionally reproductive labour in the
contemporary moment. I hope to provide analytical tools that can contribute to the political
discourse on emotional labour and social reproduction. 
The purpose of this thesis is thus not so much to give an account of WFH theory,
history, or activism, but rather to reconstruct a WFH perspective that can usefully be
applied to the theme of emotional reproduction. While many of the descriptive elements of
the WFH writings are specific to the historical era in which they were written, I have
chosen to start from the WFH perspective because it is still relevant for understanding
reproduction today. This perspective, I argue, consists of four key points. Firstly, WFH is
an antiwork perspective. It criticises the organisation of labour across waged and unwaged
spheres. Going beyond the orthodox Marxist critique of the exploitation of industrial labour
through the wage contract, it emphasises the capitalist reliance on reproductive labour
across market, state, and domestic spheres. Secondly, the WFH perspective uses this
antiwork stance to explore constructions of identity. Reading identity as both precondition
and product of differentiated and hierarchical labour processes, it challenges naturalised
understandings of gender and sexuality. Thirdly, the WFH perspective implies a critique of
power, as it reads power differentials as the outcome of historically specific forms of
labour. Drawing on workerism, it also suggests that the people made responsible for
reproductive labour hold a potential power, which can be activated through the refusal of
such work. Lastly, WFH holds that women’s liberation will not come from their engagement
in waged labour, but through the refusal of the current organisation of labour in both
waged and unwaged spheres. The logical conclusion of the WFH perspective, as I argue
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in chapter five, is thus the abolition of the family as well as the abolition of gender as the
result of hierarchical and exploitative labour processes. 
The project of this thesis is to apply the WFH perspective to the theme of emotional
labour. The WFH writings are useful for understanding reproductive labour under
capitalism, especially in its unwaged form. They also help us understand how gender is
constituted as part of the process of such labour. Yet there is no explicit theory of emotion
in the WFH writings. Hochschild’s work, on the other hand, remains the most useful
account of emotional labour, and the production of emotion as part of commodified
services. Her writings, however, lack a focus on how these services form part of the wider
process of social reproduction. By synthesising these accounts, my aim in this thesis is to
intervene in contemporary debates surrounding social reproduction. Drawing on these two
sets of literature, I produce an original theory of emotional reproduction. Emotional
reproduction, I argue, is essential for understanding social reproduction more broadly, and
thus for challenging the organisation of gendered labour under capitalism. 
Chapter outline
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The topics of the different chapters are
overlapping, and certain themes will reappear several times across various chapters. The
first chapter broadly functions as a literature review, introducing the WFH writings on
reproduction. Here, I outline some key aspects of reproductive labour, many of which will
return in later chapters of the thesis. With WFH, I argue that the essential function of
reproductive labour in capitalist societies is to reproduce labour power. This type of
reproduction, then, is simultaneously the reproduction of people for themselves and as
bearers of the central commodity in capitalist economies. I look at the exploitation of
reproduction, and sketch the WFH strategy for resisting such exploitation. This involves
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the denaturalisation of reproductive labour, questioning the “private” character of this work
and the role of the state in maintaining the reproduction of the labour force, as well as
looking at the demand for a wage for currently unwaged reproductive work as a way to
challenge the social relations in which this labour is imbricated. 
The second chapter looks specifically at emotional labour and emotional
reproduction. This is a transitional chapter, which reviews some of the literature on
emotional labour, while also moving towards an original account of emotional reproduction.
I begin with critiquing a popular framework for understanding this work – the post-workerist
conceptualisation of “affective labour” as a part of the trend towards increasingly
immaterial labour. I contend that this argument, as presented by Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri among others, does little to help us understand the gendered nature of such
labour. I then turn to Hochschild’s writings on emotional labour and the body of work that
was inspired by The managed heart. Exploring conceptualisations of emotion in relation to
the self, I then look at emotional reproduction as an aspect of constructions of “love” and
care, including the work of caring for children and ensuring the reproduction of the class
system and the nation. In the last sections of this chapter, I return to the question of the
increased commercialisation of emotional labour. This chapter explores emotional labour
across unwaged and waged types of work, arguing that commercialised forms of work
cannot be understood outside of the context of the gendered organisation of unwaged
emotional reproduction.
The third chapter looks at the themes of reproduction and emotion from the
perspective of gender. Here I ask what role emotional reproduction plays in constituting
gendered subjectivity. The first section outlines the WFH perspective on gender, in relation
to the exploitation of reproductive work and the violence that is necessary to maintain such
exploitation. Then I return to Hochschild’s writings on emotion in its connection to
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normative femininity, and the role of emotional labour in constituting gendered hierarchies.
In the last section of this chapter, I ask whether the concept of emotional labour can help
us understand the persistence of gendered forms of subjectivity and labour in the
contemporary political moment, after the decline of the housewife as a normative labouring
subject. Here, I explore gendered subjectivity through the notion of emotional labour, thus
opening up possibilities to subvert and denaturalise such subjectivity.
In chapter four, I return to the WFH writings, this time reading them “politically” – that
is, trying to locate potentials for resistance to and refusal of the regimes of labour to which
we are subjected (Cleaver 1979). I look at the formal qualities of the WFH manifestos, and
their aim to bring into being an autonomous feminist subject capable of refusing the
naturalisation of reproductive labour. I then explore the writings of WDL, and lesbianism as
a mode of resistance to heterosexual models of reproduction. I also explore the radical
potential of emotion, as something which is not just an essential component of preserving
the status quo, but also a necessary aspect of constituting feminist subjects. Drawing on
the previous chapters, I read the WFH writings as a critique of gendered subjectivity and
emotion, and consider how a feminist movement might utilise such critique to work
towards a different organisation of (re)production.
The final chapter looks at some of the limitations of the mainstream feminist
movement thus far, and in particular its articulation of “gender equality” as the goal for the
movement. Drawing on the WFH critique of equality, I instead look to the demands for
gender abolition and family abolition, which have been part of the legacy of communist,
feminist, and queer movements. I then turn to broader considerations of what it would take
to remodel emotional reproduction in more liberatory ways. This, I argue, would entail both
the material remaking of the world and the reconfiguration of subjective and social aspects
of life. 
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In my conclusion, I return to the political potentials of the concept of emotional labour
and the WFH perspective on reproduction. I look at their implications for our understanding
of work as well as political subjectivity. The conclusion thus takes up the guiding thread of
this thesis, namely what it would mean to move away from contemporary understandings
of emotion, the self, and the social, towards more collective ways of being. 
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Chapter one: Wages for Housework and reproductive labour
In this chapter, I will outline the WFH perspective on reproduction. This perspective lays
the groundwork for a theory of emotional reproduction in the following chapters. Rather
than taking emotional labour as a form of work existing separately from other types of
reproductive labour, I want to establish a notion of emotional reproduction which forms a
continuum with reproduction more broadly. To do this, I will draw out some key points of
the WFH perspective, which establishes emotional labour as an essential but in itself
insufficient aspect of reproductive labour. The first section starts with a brief
contextualisation of WFH in relation to its political origin and some contemporary debates.
Surveying the WFH writings, the chapter then centres on why reproduction is such a vexed
issue in capitalist economies, as reproductive labour is simultaneously disavowed and
necessary. The second section outlines themes of crisis and stratification, and the relation
between reproductive labour and the state. It also takes sex as an example of reproductive
work, which is regulated through various forms of state intervention. The final section then
looks at reproduction from the perspective of workers – that is, as a site of potential
struggle and antagonism. It brings up themes of political subjectivity and denaturalisation,
to which I will return in chapter four. This chapters functions as a thematic review of the
WFH literature, mainly written in the 1970s. Some themes outlined here will be less
applicable today, yet they form part of the context from which the WFH perspective
emerged. 
Reproductive sites and the exploitation of work
WFH, often labelled “workerist” or “autonomist” feminism,11 shares some of the theoretical
11 See for instance Andrew Ryder’s paper “Italian autonomist feminism and social reproduction theory” 
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and methodological premises of workerism, as outlined in the introduction. Furthermore,
key members of the Italian WFH movement, including Dalla Costa and Fortunati, had
previously been members of workerist movements (WSC 231, Fortunati 2013). However, it
is unhelpful to describe WFH as a movement that merely applied workerism to questions
of gender. Such a description misses the extent to which WFH formed a substantial
critique of workerism, in particular the vanguardism that shaped much of the workerist
movement (RPZ 28). Furthermore, it misses the influence of other theoretical and political
movements on WFH. Notably, Selma James gained her political training in the Johnson
Forest Tendency, a heterodox Marxist group led by CLR James and Raya Dunayevskaya.
This group shared a similar political orientation to Italian workerism, but was much more
aware of the hierarchies of power within the working class, and emphasised the political
role of those who are marginalised and excluded by labour markets (Boggs 1963: 50,
Wright 2002: 23, 85, 190, NYWFHC 18). We can see this influence in the theoretical
importance that WFH affords to the “third world” (PWSC 48) and the significance of race in
the writings of James in particular (SRC 92). 
A different source of inspiration for WFH was the welfare rights movement, which
organised primarily black women in the United States in the 1960s and early 1970s, to
demand dignity and resources for welfare mothers (Nadasen 2005). Federici cites this as a
key influence on WFH, as the welfare rights organisers emphasised that mothering is a
form of work (NYWFHC 22). They also resisted the demand that welfare recipients should
seek waged work. As Premilla Nadasen explains, black women have historically been
valued primarily as waged reproductive workers rather than as mothers, and their
revalorisation of black mothering must be read within this context (2005: 140). The welfare
movement and WFH emphasised the work that particularly working-class women already
(2015). As Patrick Cuninghame suggests, however, it would be more accurate to present the autonomist 
movement as inspired by feminism rather than the other way around (2008: 2).
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do, and how much of contemporary wealth is based on historically unwaged work,
including the work of enslaved people. The founders of Black Women for Wages for
Housework (BWFWFH), Margaret Prescod and Wilmette Brown, drew the link between
wages for housework and reparations (Prescod 1980: 39, Brown 1986: 13). The idea that
wages for housework should compensate for past labour and wealth extraction is visible in
the WFH demand for retroactive wages (NYWFHC 44). This link between reparations and
wages for housework finds a contemporary echo in Paul Preciado’s assertion that “[i]f
interest were applied to the debt for sexual services and colonial plundering, all women
and colonized peoples on the planet would receive an annuity that would allow them to
spend the rest of their lives without working” (2013: 123).
WFH developed a unitary theory of gender oppression under capitalism, which
integrates gender and class in one analysis.12 Here, the sphere of reproduction emerged
as the central site of struggle. They extended the legacy of workerist theories of
antagonism to reproductive work. Under capitalism, workers became separated from the
means of production, a separation that entailed the split of production and reproduction.
Production, now organised according to the capitalist logic of surplus-value extraction,
moved decisively out of the home and into separate workshops and factories. Thus
reproduction was constituted as a semi-autonomous site, as the wellbeing of workers was
mostly ensured outside of their places of work. As I hope to show throughout this thesis,
this separation is always tenuous and unstable, and does not always overlap with the
distinction between private and public spheres, or between waged and unwaged work.13
The WFH authors, however, shifted the political focus of workerism, from the factory to the
community and the home.
12 This approach is distinct from dual-systems theories, where patriarchy and capital are seen as distinct yet
interlocking systems. For examples of this approach, see Hartmann (1981), and, as I will discuss below, 
Jónasdóttir (1994). For a collection of essays on “the systems debate,” see Sargent (1981). 
13 For an extended discussion, see Gonzalez and Neton (2013). 
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According to bourgeois ideology, the community and the family are the spheres of
private life, separate from the logic of the market. In the history of reproduction under
capitalism, reproduction has often been connected to the so-called private sphere, in ways
that serve to obscure the extent of state intervention and how we reproduce ourselves as
labour power. The WFH writers attest to the instability of the separation which structures
much of the experience of life under the capitalist organisation of labour. Thus the
concepts of reproduction and the domestic do not appear as stable or coherent entities in
the WFH literature, but rather as sites that are continually put into question. As Arlen
Austin and Beth Capper, describing the uses of the term housework in WFH activism and
theory, write:
Rather than a stable location, the house was understood, on the one hand, as a political-
economic modality that regulated racialized, gendered, and sexual labor across multiple sites
that included, but was not confined to, the heteronormative familial household and, on the
other, as a mutable and contested form that, if imagined collectively, might yield an altogether
different organization of sexuality and social reproduction. (2018: 446)
This wide definition of housework allows WFH writers to explore how this work takes place
across multiple sites, in ways which nonetheless do not undermine the continual
construction of the private sphere of family life. The relative incoherence of the concept of
housework in WFH literature is similar to that of the concept of social reproduction, used in
contemporary debates and covering many of the same relations of work. While there is no
strict spatial boundary between the private and the public, these terms do name a certain
experience of capitalist life. As Maya Gonzalez and Jeanne Neton write, “we do not define
spheres in spatial terms, but rather in the same way Marx spoke of the two separated
spheres of production and circulation, as concepts that take on a materiality” (2013: 57).
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Similarly, Camille Barbagallo states that in the Marxist feminist perspective, capitalism
operates through a “series of interlocking and contingent separations, many of them
enforced through violence and extraeconomic means” which “encapsulates the production
of value and, conversely, the devaluation of certain spheres, labours and subjectivities”
(2016: 230).  
As a response to the bourgeois understanding of the private sphere, as fully cut off
from the public and thus non-political, functionalist theories of reproduction posited it as a
sphere determined by production, where the organisation of personal life is a mere
response to the demands of the logic of capital, and family forms shift according to the
form of surplus extraction (Fraser 2011: 182). In a more orthodox Marxist vocabulary, the
sphere of reproduction appears as a superstructure, responding to the needs of the
economic base. WFH can be usefully read as a response to both of these tendencies – the
understanding of “private life” as, on the one hand, non-political, and on the other, a mere
response to the logic of capital. These authors fully reject that there is something private
and thus non-political in the sphere of life external to the spaces of waged work (AR 21).
Indeed, they stress that “we have always belonged to capital every moment of our lives”
(RPZ 38). However, this does not lead them to conclude that the logic of production is the
determinant factor of all of society. As I will outline below, the fact that reproduction is a
site of permanent crisis and antagonism under capital means that reproduction cannot be
fully subordinated to the logic of production and surplus-value extraction. As the WFH
authors argue, struggles on the site of reproduction can have an impact on the
organisation of waged work. Furthermore, struggles over reproduction have at various
points led the state to intervene in capitalist production. The concept of capital in the WFH
literature is thus more expansive than just the organisation of factories or the ownership of
the means of production. Capital, here, is a set of social relations which structure life and
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work. The separation of workers from the resources they need to live should be
understood as an antagonistic relation of power, rather than the ownership of a set of
things. 
On these grounds, WFH can claim reproduction as a site of struggle. Capital has
deprived most people of what they need to survive, yet a majority of workers need to be
kept alive in order to maintain the extraction of surplus value. This paradoxical structure at
the heart of capitalism, in which workers are both individually disposable and collectively
indispensable, gives reproduction an unstable, shifting character. It also means that it can
become a central location of antagonism, as the standards of reproduction, its resources
and labours, are never given but are continually contested. The needs of capital, the state,
and the workers themselves are often contradictory.
This leads the WFH authors to assert what Federici later has called the “double
character” of reproduction, “as work that reproduces us and ‘valorizes’ us not only in view
of our integration in the labor market but also against it” (RPZ 2, 99). Or, as Barbagallo
puts it, under capitalism “people are reproduced as workers but also, at the same time,
they are reproduced as people whose lives, desires and capabilities exceed the role of
worker” (2016: 61). Because we are never reproduced fully for capital, but also for
ourselves, reproduction is simultaneously a site of preservation and a potential space for
the radical remaking of the world. It is this tension that enables WFH authors to call for a
feminist struggle in the sphere of the community, a struggle they believe has the potential
to radically disrupt the functioning of capitalist society. The struggle in the domestic sphere
and the service sector, which together constitute the sites of reproduction, “subverts the
image of social peace that has given capitalism the appearance of naturalness and
viability” (AWNP 83).
A key tenet of the WFH strategy was to make visible the dependence of capitalist
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society on the labour of reproduction, both waged and unwaged. This work is
simultaneously glorified and invisible, valorised and devalued (NYWFHC 91, Weeks 2011:
124). The point, then, is not to make reproductive work visible for visibility’s own sake, or
to (morally) valorise it, but rather to highlight capital’s structural yet disavowed dependence
on reproductive labour in order to subvert both this work and capital itself. As I mentioned
in my introduction, a useful reading of WFH emphasises its use of “struggle concepts,”
which do not merely describe phenomena but emphasise the potentials for disruption and
antagonism. These concepts do not take capitalist domination as a given, but rather
highlight relations of power in our daily life in order to facilitate struggles against such
domination. In this way, the WFH perspective aims to expand and multiply the sites of
struggle. This would imply the expansion of the ways in which we are reproduced for
ourselves, rather than for capital. 
However, it is not easy to separate these aspects of reproduction. We need to be
attentive to the ways in which reproduction “for ourselves” is not an uncomplicated matter.
WFH authors stressed that the working class is not a coherent unit, but rather
characterised by various divisions and hierarchies (RPZ 21, SRC 67, 96). These are
necessary for capitalist accumulation, in that they are constituted within the capitalist
division of labour. Yet they do not only stem from a stratified labour market but also
various hierarchies in “the community,” or the spheres external to waged work. As I will
argue in more detail in chapter three, the fact that we are not always reproduced for capital
but also for ourselves enables men to exploit the surplus labour of women within the
broader capitalist economy of surplus-value extraction. There is thus always a risk of
romanticising “the community” against capital. Marina Vishmidt argues that in Federici’s
later writings, “all the good [is] on the side of ‘communities’” – thus neglecting the violence
and exploitation that structure relations within such communities (2014: xii-xiii).14 The WFH
14 For a similar reading of Federici’s recent essay collections, see Gotby (forthcoming). 
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writings, however, are attentive to these forms of violence. A central reason for struggling
within the community is to eradicate such hierarchies, in order to create a more unified
working class, and to unite on the basis of the needs and demands of the most exploited
within the class (SRC 58). In this reading of WFH, to exploit the surplus labour of other
members of the class is also to reproduce for capital, since such exploitation reproduces
the hierarchies of race and gender on which capital thrives. 
While WFH writers are generally unwilling to use the term exploitation in this context,
choosing instead to describe men as the controllers, agents, intermediaries, or managers
of women’s labour (AR 9, PWSC 33, WL 55, Federici 1976: 24), I think this reading is
consistent with their general argument. Here, I use the term exploitation to denote
processes that appropriate people’s labour, whether or not such processes take place
through the value form. Women are exploited insofar as they cannot satisfy their own
needs (including their emotional needs) other than by labouring for other people. Men, on
the other hand, tend to benefit from this labour insofar as they are both the direct
beneficiaries of women’s caring work, and because they are largely “freed” from
performing caring work for others – they are often excused from fully reciprocating
women’s care and from the work of caring for children, the elderly and other dependants.
Fortunati seems to imply this understanding of exploitation when she describes the “dual
nature” of men’s role as “exploiter and exploited,” and writes that men too exploit women’s
labour, “for the satisfaction of his needs and not in order to extract surplus-value” (AR 174,
94). This is important also because exploiting others within the sphere of reproduction can
potentially make one less vulnerable to high levels of exploitation within the sphere of the
waged labour market. Workers who have the option of exploiting others’ surplus labour
have an advantage over those who do not, since they have more time and resources to
invest in their waged work, and more leisure time to restore their capacity for labour
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(Hochschild 1989a: 254). As Melissa Wright shows in her book about the myth of the
“Third World woman,” those most likely to be exploited in the reproductive sphere are also
likely to be hyper-exploited and deemed disposable in the sphere of waged production
work, something that in turn makes these workers vulnerable to high levels of violence in
the community (2006: 2, 18). 
Reproduction and value
To struggle on the site of reproduction is thus simultaneously a struggle to break the grip
of capital’s surplus-value extraction over our lives, and to work against the forms of
violence and surplus-labour extraction that exist outside of spaces of waged work. For the
WFH authors, the unwaged domestic work that primarily women do also produces surplus
value for capital (PWSC 52, AR 8). Many authors of the contemporaneous “domestic
labour debate” took issue with this perspective (Vogel 1973, Gardiner, Himmelweit and
MackIntosh 1975).15 This debate, initially aimed to deconstruct Marxist categories from the
perspective of gender, eventually became mired in questions of value, and many of the
later contributions affirmed a rather orthodox reading of Marx (Smith 1978, Briskin 1980).16
Such critiques of the WFH authors, however, tends to miss the political stakes of their
intervention. As Gonzalez puts it, 
this reaction has framed the discussion of reproduction since the publication of The Arcane of
Reproduction: measuring its adequacy as a theory of value rather than understanding it to
reveal what a theory of value cannot immediately disclose. [...] if the debate revolves around
whether reproductive labor is value-productive, we are still missing the point. The point is the
political, as opposed to the moral, viewpoint of the proletariat – that which arises from the wage
15 For an overview of the debate, see Vogel (2013). Other key contributions include Benston (1969), Morton 
(1971), Harrison (1973), Gerstein (1973), Seccombe (1974), Himmelweit and Mohun (1977), Gardiner 
(1979), Molyneux (1979). 
16 For a more recent argument for the value-productive nature of reproductive work, see Mezzadri (2019).
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and class relation of exploitation itself. (2013: np)
I agree with Gonzalez’ assessment that Fortunati was incorrect in asserting that unwaged
domestic labour is productive of surplus value, but that “according to Fortunati’s own
schema, it must remain external to accumulation” (2013: np). We can thus appreciate the
political meaning of this assertion, as an intervention into Marxist debates of the time,
while at the same time arguing that the WFH perspective would be more internally
coherent if it had stressed that certain types of labour are indeed excluded from
calculations of value, and that such exclusions are necessary for the functioning of value.
Instead of affirming the value supposedly “hidden” in the commodity of labour power, the
WFH theorists would have done better to emphasise the relatively arbitrary nature of
value, and how various types of labour are valued or devalued (Weeks 1998: 124,
Alessandrini 2012: 3).17
The devaluation of reproduction is at the core of the feminist critique of Marx, who
neglected the dependency of value production on its constitutive outside – the devalued
work of reproducing labour power. Constructing the value of labour power only in terms of
consumption of goods (1990: 274), Marx mostly ignored how additional unwaged labour is
necessary for the reproduction of the working class (Federici 2017: 26). This is despite, or
perhaps because of, the fact that reproduction is labour-intensive and has as of yet been
carried out at a relatively low level of technological development.18 The domestic
technology that has been introduced during the 20th century has not significantly reduced
the time spent performing reproductive labour (Cowan 1983). Federici writes that “the only
true labor saving devices women have used in the ’70s have been contraceptives” (RPZ
47). Reproductive labour often depends on the continual presence of the worker, which
17 Feminist theorist Roswitha Scholz calls this process “value dissociation” (2014: 125-127).
18 This is not the case in some forms of waged reproductive labour, for instance nursing, where there are a 
multitude of advanced technologies in use. 
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suggests that it is difficult to make it more efficient (WL 79). As Gonzales and Neton put it,
“[y]ou can not look after children more quickly: they have to be attended to 24 hours a day”
(2013: 86, emphasis in original). While reproduction has been increasingly commodified
over the past decades, it is difficult to fully integrate within the capitalist organisation of
production and surplus-value extraction. This might serve to explain why reproductive work
was relatively neglected in the writings of Marx, and why it continues to be devalued and
disavowed in capitalist economies. 
This devaluation of reproduction forms the condition for the devaluation of labour
power, as unwaged labour goes unaccounted for in the setting of the wage. The wage
appears as a fair compensation for the hours spent doing waged work, not for the process
of reproducing oneself or others as labour power. Here, I agree with the initial formulation
of this question in Dalla Costa’s writings, where she states that “domestic work not only
produces use values but is an essential function in the production of surplus value” (PWSC
31). Reading this statement as a weaker claim than the assertion that domestic work is
directly value-productive, I think we can preserve the political stakes of this assertion
without arguing that capital exploits unwaged work through surplus-value extraction.
In order to preserve the theoretical contribution of the WFH authors, however, it is
important to stress reproductive work as productive of labour power rather than just use
values. Arguments that domestic labour produces only use values, such as Margaret
Benston’s 1969 contribution to the domestic labour debate, tend to neglect the capitalist
organisation of reproductive labour. Federici, defending the WFH framing of this question,
argues that the use of the concept of labour power highlights “the fact that in capitalist
society reproductive work is not the free reproduction of ourselves or others according to
our and their desires.” Furthermore, it emphasises “the tension, the potential separation,
and it suggests a world of conflicts, resistances, contradictions that have political
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significance” (RPZ 99). Labour power is unique among commodities in that it is carried by
people with needs, desires, and a capacity to struggle against the conditions of its
consumption. However, being reproduced as labour power also constrains those desires
and capacities. Fortunati writes that under capital, workers are obliged to reproduce
themselves “only as labour power, [...] individuals cannot create value for themselves” (AR
11, emphasis in original). Here, she seems to point to the devaluation of workers that
takes place simultaneously with their constitution as value-creating labour power. We
might thus think of Wright’s assertion that the very valuelessness of female Mexican
factory workers is what is turned into value by capital, as their cheap, disposable, and
supposedly unskilled labour is a condition for the extraction of surplus value (2006: 87-88).
The key strength of the labour power perspective on reproductive labour, I would
argue, is that it serves to highlight how labour power is constituted by “the aggregate of
those mental and physical capabilities existing in the physical form, the living personality of
a human being” (Marx 1990: 270), and that these “acquired and historically determined
attributes [...] are not homogenous in all individuals” (AR 165). We can thus begin to see
how labour power consists of acquired capacities, which are bound to the construction of
gender and race. As I will argue in more detail in chapter three, gendering processes can
be read as a set of “skilling” or “deskilling” procedures, which challenges the framework of
the capitalist construction of skills and capacities as inherent in the carrier of labour power.
Here, I also want to note that the framework of labour power allows us to see how
labour power is a commodity that cannot be sold by the reproductive labourer, “but only by
the male worker himself” (AR 102). In other words, the person with a primary responsibility
for reproducing labour power is not constructed as the owner of that commodity, but is
rather alienated from it through a model of capitalist ownership of the self, which does not
account for one’s dependency on other people.19 The wage contract, through which labour
19 Not everyone has someone else perform reproductive work for them – many workers do this for 
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power becomes actualised as a commodity, excludes the social relations under which
labour power is produced. In this moment, the capacities that constitute the use value of
labour power also become naturalised as inherent in the subject, rather than acquired and
historically specific. Labour power thus shares in the fetishised character of other
commodities, in which the conditions of their production tend to disappear (Marx 1990:
165). It is important to note how capitalist societies excluded wage labour from
constructions of the notion of dependency, so that (white, male) workers could become
free to enter contractual relations and appear as independent owners of labour power
(Fraser and Gordon 2011: 90). 
This does not mean that what is needed is necessarily the increased visibility or
moral valorisation of reproductive work. Mariarosa Dalla Costa, in her introduction to The
work of love, suggests that visibility for its own sake is not particularly useful, since it does
not imply a change in the structure of reproductive work (2008: 30). In fact, the valorisation
of reproductive labour might consolidate the split between productive and reproductive
work, with its attendant gendering of labour. This was most clearly the case in the Victorian
valorisation of white women’s care for their families, posited against the world of
productive work (Coontz 1988: 215, Roberts 1997a: 55, 59).20 This is why the WFH writers
posed their activism as wages against housework, simultaneously drawing attention to
reproduction and aiming to subvert it (RPZ 15-22). Federici states that “we are suspicious
when we hear the press and the politicians celebrating motherhood and our capacity to
love and care” (NYWFHC 91). Such celebration, she makes clear, does not translate into
women’s autonomy over their labour. However, we should note that in some cases the
valorisation of the work of mothering, for example, can be a central part of the struggle for
themselves as best they can. But everyone has at one point been cared for by someone else, however 
insufficiently. 
20 Such valorisation also obscured the contribution of servants to the reproduction of white, bourgeois 
families. 
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the reorganisation of reproductive labour. For the mainly black women in the welfare rights
movement, whose mothering work was rarely recognised and valorised, asserting that
mothering is work was the first step to increased autonomy (Nadasen 2006: 139-140). 
Because labour power is the central commodity of capitalist economies, the
production of labour power is structurally necessary work. As Federici argues, “[i]f we were
not at home doing housework, none of their factories, mines, schools and hospitals, could
run, none of their profits could flow” (NYWFHC 91). In contemporary capitalism, there has
been an increased reliance on commodified reproductive services, yet these are also not
always recognised as necessary for the functioning of the economic system more broadly.
As Barbagallo writes, “there is a concerning lack of acknowledgement of the dependent
characteristics that full-time professional employment has with the ever-expanding low
waged service industries” (2016: 141). In the era when WFH were active, a combination of
state services and unwaged domestic work constituted the main horizons of reproductive
labour. Both of these forms of labour practices have since become less prevalent, as there
is less time for unwaged domestic work and fewer resources for state-provided services.
However, the labour-intensive and often less profitable nature of reproductive work means
that it has not been fully commodified, and some previously waged reproductive labour
has in fact been pushed back into the sphere of unwaged work (Glazer 1993: xi, Gonzalez
and Neton 2013: 86). The (partial) commodification of reproduction might in some sense
have made these activities more visible as work, yet it is not certain to what extent such
visibility has in fact amounted to an acknowledgement of the dependency of productive
labour on various forms of reproductive labour. This also indicates a limitation of a politics
of visibility of reproductive work, which does not necessarily change the material
conditions of reproduction, leaving it continually marginalised by the organisation of waged
productive work. Because of the structural devaluation (sometimes combined with moral
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valorisation) of reproductive work, commodification of reproductive services does not solve
the question of the simultaneous importance and neglect of reproduction in capitalist
economies. 
Neither does commodification capture the breadth of reproduction. While
commodification has been part of the restructuring of reproductive labour under the
neoliberal regime (RPZ 69, Barbagallo 2016: 14-23, O’Brien forthcoming), much of the
necessary labour of reproducing labour power still takes place over a continuum of
commodified services, unwaged work, and state-provided services. For example, Dalla
Costa highlights the fact that commodified elder care often relies on women’s unwaged
work of filling in the gaps in commodified services and performing managerial roles, even
as some of the manual labour has been outsourced to other, low-waged women (WSC
172). The continuity of reproductive work is necessary and points to the fact that a patch-
work of commodified and state-provided services cannot fully compensate for the labour
traditionally done by women for their family members. As I will discuss in more detail in
chapter two, emotional bonds are central for ensuring the links between various types of
reproductive work. This is why domestic work, as Dalla Costa writes, cannot only be
measured as “number of hours and nature of work, but as quality of life and quality of
relationship which it generates” (PWSC 19). In her pamphlet “Wages against housework,”
Federici states:
It is precisely this peculiar combination of physical, emotional and sexual services that are
involved in the role women must perform for capital that creates the specific character of that
servant which is the housewife, that makes her work so burdensome and at the same time so
invisible. (RPZ 17)
Fortunati and Giovanna Dalla Costa both note that this indicates a lifetime of reproductive
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work, as people’s reproduction depends on some form of stability over time, even when
the exact types of work they need might change (AR 40, WL 37). As the New York WFH
Committee write in a pamphlet, older women often take care of their grandchildren to allow
their daughters to perform waged labour (NYWFHC 74). This is important since there is a
tendency to conflate reproductive labour with the work of taking care of one’s own children
while they are young, thus neglecting the fact that many (waged and unwaged)
reproductive workers perform such work within a range of relationships that are not limited
to the care of children. 
The continuity of reproductive labour means that it often consists of a multitude of
different tasks. While some of these tasks, especially the seemingly more physical forms
of labour such as cooking and cleaning, can be outsourced to low-waged reproductive
workers, reproduction is more than the totality of discrete tasks. This leads Fortunati to
assert that domestic labour appears as the most concrete, private, and complex of all
work, “able to differentiate itself in an infinite variety of ways and in a variety of operations,
and able to posit itself as qualitatively unique with regard to the work supplied by other
female houseworkers” (AR 110). As I will go on to explore in chapters two and three,
reproductive work has a role to play in the individualisation of people, through the tailoring
of care to suit the individual needs of the recipient – a form of work which is not easily
captured by the provision of commodified or state-provided reproductive services.
However, the complexity of domestic work and caring work, and the multitude of different
tasks that fall into these categories, is complemented by the construction of most types of
reproductive labour as unskilled. Fortunati describes the unskilling of housework in terms
of its appearance as a “natural force of social labour,” which makes reproductive work
appear as simpler than commodity production (AR 107). This naturalisation of reproductive
work operates despite the fact that in capitalism, the separation of production and
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reproduction, and the subordination of reproduction to production, continually threatens to
disrupt the reproduction of labour power.
Permanent reproduction crisis
According to Federici, “[c]apitalism fosters a permanent reproduction crisis” (RPZ 104).
The terms “crisis of care” and “crisis of social reproduction” have often been used over the
past years (Fraser 2011, Thorne 2014). This crisis is explained by phenomena such as
women’s increased participation in waged work, cuts to state-provided reproductive
services, and an ageing population in Europe and North America. In this account of the
crisis, it emerged due to the decline of the welfare state and the Fordist model of the family
wage. The term permanent reproduction crisis intends to highlight the fact that such a
crisis is nothing new, but rather has been a permanent feature of capitalist accumulation.
The reproductive crisis, however, is not expressed evenly but has differentiated effects on
various demographic groups. The idea that a crisis of care has emerged with neoliberalism
obscures the fact that the post-war organisation of reproduction never included everyone,
but rather functioned according to differentiated reproductive standards (Dalla Costa 2015:
9, 27). Reproduction under capitalism is always stratified, most commonly according to
factors such as class, race, and migration status. Additionally, reproductive needs are
socially and historically constituted, which corresponds to a stratification of wages (Marx
1990: 748). 
As I mentioned above, various forms of reproductive work are valorised differently,
depending on the nature of that labour, who is performing it and for whom it is performed.
For example, as Prescod argues, the waged reproductive work that black women have
performed in white families has been considered more important than the work that the
same women have done for their own families (Prescod 1980: 13-15). Dorothy Roberts
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and Evelyn Nakano Glenn both point to the racialised differentiation of reproductive work,
in which emotional, “spiritual” and customer-oriented work has been more highly valued
than the “dirty,” manual, and backroom forms of work that have often been reserved for
women of colour (Roberts 1997: 51, Glenn 1999: 19). As certain populations are produced
as “vulnerable to premature death” (Gilmore 2007: 28), others have to be reproduced a
higher standard. Federici remarks that we must resist the conclusion that 
the indifference of the international capitalist class to the loss of life which globalization is
producing is a proof that capital no longer needs living labor. In reality, the destruction of human
life on a large scale has been a structural component of capitalism from its inception, as the
necessary counterpart of the accumulation of labor power, which is inevitably a violent process.
(RPZ 104)
Neoliberal capitalism, while seemingly hostile to reproduction, is as dependent on
reproductive labour as previous forms of accumulation, and as dependent on living labour.
However, it is at times more apparent that only some groups of people are reproduced as
living labour. People belonging to surplus populations, and those who are excluded from
formal labour markets, might be more aware of the permanent nature of the reproductive
crisis. These populations, Dalla Costa remarks in her 1994 essay “Capitalism and
reproduction,” are increasingly “destined to extinction because they are believed to be
redundant or inappropriate to the valorization requirements of capital” (WSC 220).
However, it is not so much extinction of whole populations that is at stake, since capital
relies on the existence of vulnerable surplus populations. Furthermore, Wright argues that
entire groups of people are produced as temporary and disposable labour forces in terms
that also produce individual workers as vulnerable to violence and death (2006: 18). In my
final chapter, I will explore how these exclusions also contain radical potentials, as not
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being reproduced as labour power might offer possibilities of other forms of life.
BWFWFH, together with other groups led by women of colour, organised against the
stratification of reproduction when they broadened the question of reproductive rights to
include not only abortion rights but the struggle against forced sterilisations. In a pamphlet,
WFH draw attention to the global dimensions of population control and family planning,
and write that in the US, forced sterilisation primarily affects black women and women on
welfare, as the state does not want to pay benefits to raise children (NYWFHC 57).21
Brown notes that sterilisation was often a condition for receiving a welfare check (1976b:
15). She points to the long history of racial capital when she writes that the “population of
black people has always been a burning issue for international capital: [...] it has never
ceased to concern itself with the size, age, sex, availability, manageability, and when need
be, extinction, of the black population as a labour force” (1976b: 3).
Here, we can note that it is not only the number of people that is at stake, but the
availability and manageability of the labour force, as well as black women’s discipline as
reproductive workers (Brown 1976b: 10). It should thus be clear that capitalist states
attempt to promote a specific type of reproduction – one that creates a stable, disciplined
labour force (RPZ 31). Biological and social reproduction become difficult to separate, as
only certain forms of generational reproduction are encouraged by state policies. As
Fortunati writes, the state intervenes against the reproduction of the “dangerous classes,”
which are not seen as part of the manageable working class (AR 19). In a later essay,
Federici highlights the neoliberal state’s reliance on criminalisation to control young
working-class people of colour, thus producing workers without rights and punishing
potentially disruptive elements of the working class (RPZ 105). 
21 For an extended discussion of the racist implications of sterilisations in the US, see Roberts (1997b). 
Forced sterilisations, however, were by no means only the expression of conservative politics in the US, 
but were also practiced in European social democracies. For instance, pioneering Swedish feminist and 
social democratic politician Alva Myrdal suggested that the Swedish state should sterilise less desirable 
(racialised and disabled) elements of the population, in order to secure a well-functioning welfare state. 
Sweden used forced sterilisation for several decades (Ekerwald 2001).
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We can thus conceptualise the state’s intervention into the politics of population as
part of the broader politics of reproduction. The state, in fact, has had a central role in
organising the forms of reproductive labour. While Nikolas Rose has argued that a key
characteristic of the modern family form is its ability to internalise control and engage in
self-management (1990: 173), it is important to recognise the role the state has played in
situations of heightened reproductive crisis and as a manager for those who have been
less willing to reproduce in a normative manner. Here, there is a parallel to the role that
men play within the family – according to Giovanna Dalla Costa, the role of men as
“controllers” of reproduction only becomes clear when women start to struggle over the
terms of reproductive labour (WL 55). While all WFH writers articulate their politics against
the state, as representative of collective capital, WDL and BWFWFH were particularly
aware of the state’s intervention into reproduction, through sterilisations of black women
and loss of custody rights for lesbians and other “bad mothers” (Wyland 1976: 4). WFH
member Antonella Picchio also emphasises the need of the state to control the inherently
conflictual site of social reproduction, arguing that a great deal of social control is required
to manage such conflicts (1992: 58). 
The state, however, should not be understood as merely repressive but as an active
organiser of unwaged and waged reproductive labour. In her book Family, welfare and the
state, Dalla Costa notes that 
not only in the material sense but its reproduction on the psychic level, including its discipline
and socialization – in which the correlate production of a new labour power required a specific
relationship between the family and the labor market, the state needed to both regulate the
labor market and strengthen the family. (2015: 20)
The family, she concludes, was at the centre of the New Deal in the US and post-war
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welfare states more broadly, setting the standard for the type of reproductive labour that
could produce a relatively healthy population (2015: 91, 94). The welfare state, while
seemingly replacing some of the labour of the family, actually operated in continuity with it,
often intervening in the “private sphere.” While neoliberal regimes seem less reliant on
traditional family forms, Melinda Cooper has convincingly shown that neoliberalism is
based on normative family values, and operates on an often unspoken assumption of
family support of the individual (2017: 9). The family, then, is an ideological and material
supplement of the “free” individual assumed by neoliberalism. Our current political regime
requires the continual management of reproductive labour, thus preserving some version
of the family as a unit of reproduction and economic support. 
For Fortunati, a central function of the state is the management of reproduction. She
argues that the modern, capitalist state was shaped by the open reproductive crisis
caused by capitalist industrialisation in the 19th century, when women and children were
drawn into factory work to an extent that threatened generational replacement of the
working class. She cites Marx’s comments on the “unnatural estrangement” between
mothers and infants that occurred in this phase of capitalist accumulation, which led to
high rates of neglect and infanticide (Marx 1990: 521). In order to stave off this crisis, in
which mothers lost their supposedly natural maternal instinct, the state had to intervene
into the composition of the working class (AR 172). The total subordination of reproduction
to the short-term interest of production, that is the extraction of absolute surplus value
through the extension of the working day for all members of the class, was found to
undermine the long-term stability of capitalist accumulation. The state, promoting such
long-term stability, was thus forced to intervene and regulate the length of the working day
as well as the employment of women and children. Working-class struggle over the
conditions of its own reproduction also contributed to such regulation, which in turn
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“provoked a profound transformation of the state itself” (AR 173, emphasis in original). The
state thus participates in the creation of a “house working day” and the figure of the
housewife (AR 165, see also Seccombe 1993). 
This shift, in Fortunati’s account, coincides with the shift from absolute to relative
surplus-value extraction in the sphere of production.22 In the sphere of reproduction, she
argues, capital’s logic is inverted, so that the limitation of the working day in the sphere of
production correlates to the extension of the working day in the sphere of reproduction (AR
157-158). The figure of the housewife functions as the inversion of the general logic of
capital, which subordinates reproduction to production. According to Fortunati, the
houseworker’s capacity for productive work is subordinated to her reproductive capacities,
so that even when she is not “freed” from waged work, her reproductive capacities are
primary. She thus cannot appear as labour power on the waged labour market without
simultaneously appearing to capital as a “natural force of social labour” (AR 15). The point
Fortunati is making here is similar to what Gonzalez and Neton argue in their essay “The
logic of gender,” when they discuss women’s supposedly natural reproductive capacities.
“This systematic differentiation”, Gonzalez and Neton write, “– through the market-
determined risk identified as childbearing ‘potential’ – keeps those who embody the
signifier ‘woman’ anchored to the IMM [indirectly market-mediated] sphere” (2013: 76).
The unwaged reproductive sphere thus continues to mark women even as they enter the
sphere of waged labour.23 This is despite the fact that many feminised workers, for various
reasons, will never be mothers. We can read the WFH slogan “all women are housewives”
as pointing to the perceived primacy of reproductive capacities even for those women who
are neither mothers nor housewives. It also marks many women as part-time waged
22 This also seems to be the argument of an unpublished text by Federici entitled “The development of 
domestic work in the transition from absolute to relative surplus value,” which unfortunately appears to be 
lost (Federici, personal correspondence, August 2018). 
23 On this topic, see also the literature on the “motherhood penalty,” for instance Budig, Misra, and 
Boeckmann (2012), Folbre (2017). 
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workers, or workers who will inevitably quit their jobs after a certain period of time (Pompei
1972: 2, Wright 2006: 29). Here, the terminology of “choice” of part-time work appears
central for maintaining women’s continued responsibility for reproduction. As Barbagallo
remarks, mothers’ waged work is often organised around childcare demands, and 
while [neoliberalism] mobilis[es] a language of gender equality and promoting the benefits of
increasing maternal employment, one of the outcomes of the framing of childcare as choice has
been to reaffirm traditional ideas that it is women who have the primary responsibility for
children and their care. (2016: 103)
The discourse of choice points to the continuing relegation of reproductive labour to
the private sphere. Even in the current organisation of reproduction, when much of this
work takes place outside of the home, there is a continuing sense that reproduction is
essentially a private matter. This, however, does not necessarily imply autonomy in the
sphere of reproduction, since the possible choices are so circumscribed. Especially for
those responsible for the reproduction of others, there is little material support for choices
other than the most normative. As Fortunati argues, the apparent freedom of choice when
it comes to individual relations, “this ‘freedom’ is matched by minimal real opportunity for
individual relationships” (AR 25). For instance, the choices relating to child-care provision
are often very limited by financial restrictions as well as a lack of individual relationships
that could support child-care arrangements outside of the nuclear family. WFH writers thus
criticised the idea that private life is a sphere of freedom, outside of capitalist domination.
Instead, they argued that capitalist control extends to the sphere of unwaged reproduction.
According to Fortunati, however, the family must necessarily “appear to be the least
capitalist relations that exist” (AR 129-130, emphasis in original). As I will go on to argue in
chapter two, this creation of what seems to be an outside of capitalist relations is an
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essential aspect of unwaged emotional reproduction, which must appear as natural and
voluntary as opposed to the regulation of waged work. Dalla Costa writes that unwaged
reproductive labour appears as a form of personal service rather than work (PWSC 26).
This privatisation, in the sense of relegation to the private sphere, has an impact on
emotional reproduction, as it can serve to individualise the recipient of reproductive labour.
All privatised, unwaged reproductive care comes to appear as an investment in their
person, thus strengthening their sense of personal value as well as satisfying some of their
physical needs. Acts of physical labour can thus contribute to emotional reproduction
insofar as they give the recipient a sense of being cared for. This care seems to refer to
that person as an individual, especially if the acts of care are tailored to perceived unique
and individual needs. In such a way, reproductive labour can appear to be outside of
capitalist market logics, and provide people with a sense of individuality that appears to
compensate for their dehumanisation in their waged work places (AR 110).
Sex as work
In this section, I will discuss some aspects of unpaid sexual labour.24 This is because of
the close connection between sex and notions of romantic love, and the similarities
between emotional labour and sexual labour in terms of their supposed intimacy. For
Federici, one of the central aspects of the privatisation of reproduction is through sex, as
well as love. In her 1975 essay “Why sexuality is work,” she describes how privatised
sexuality spuriously appears as “a space of freedom in which we can presumably be our
true selves – a possibility for intimate, ‘genuine’ connections in a universe of social
relations in which we are constantly forced to repress, defer, postpone, hide, even from
ourselves, what we desire” (RPZ 23). Sexuality thus comes to stand as the opposite of the
24 On this concept, see Duncombe and Marsden (1996). 
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public world of work. Fortunati argues that paid sex work is stigmatised – deemed
unnatural and criminal – on the basis of taking place in a less privatised manner and in
exchange for money. For Fortunati, this represents one of the state’s efforts to contain
reproduction within the domestic space, so that women’s reproductive work becomes split
along lines of legality and illegality (AR 21, 44).25 Here, it is interesting to draw on the
history of queer sex, which is also less privatised due to the historical exclusion of queer
people from the domestic sphere of the nuclear family (Houlbrook 2006). The
decriminalisation of sodomy in the US, which took place through the 2003 Supreme Court
case Lawrence v. Texas, stipulated that queer sex could be decriminalised through the
protection of sexual privacy in the home (Eng 2010: 43). The private sphere is thus not
understood as a merely domestic setting, but a spatial construction of heteronormative,
unpaid sex. Such sex, Fortunati writes, is represented as a “reward” for those who work –
that is, as part of the wife’s duties towards her husband. The flip side of this is that those
who do not formally work are seen as having no right to sex (AR 24). While this view has
changed since WFH were active, the association between wagelessness and “deviant”
sexualities remains. As Brown asserts, the sexual relations of welfare mothers are always
deemed transgressive and excessive (1976a: 5).26
The WFH writers, then, do not draw a line between paid and unpaid sex on the basis
of the former being work and the latter a space of freedom or self-expression. Instead,
they both appear as simultaneously work and potential sites of resistance, although in
different ways. Across her three essays on sexuality from 1975, Federici insists on the
work-like character of much (hetero)sex in the current organisation of reproduction.
25 Another difference, for Fortunati, is that unpaid, privatised sex tends to share the individualising character
of privatised reproductive work in general, whereas paid sex is more depersonalised and standardised. 
According to Elizabeth Bernstein, however, this characteristic belongs to an earlier phase of organisation 
of sex work, while many contemporary forms of paid sex tend to use forms of “bounded authenticity,” that 
is, sexual services that also contain an emotional and individualising component (2007: 103). In this 
sense, paid and unpaid sex work might be becoming increasingly similar.
26 For more current examples of the fear of sexuality and reproduction while on welfare, see Roberts 
(1997b), and Lewis (2019a: 112-113). 
51
Federici suggests that sex is work because it has been structured by the two imperatives
of biological reproduction and the provision of pleasure to men. This does not mean that
heterosexual women do not enjoy sex, as people can enjoy their work, but that their
enjoyment is not primary to the organisation of sexuality.27 
According to Federici, there is thus not only a duty to have sex but also a particular
regimentation of sex (NYWFHC 144-146). Here, we can note that such sexual
regimentation is not merely repressive, or merely implying the limitation of sexuality to
biologically reproductive sex, but rather that the productive creation of pleasure comes to
take a certain form. That form can be more permissive or more conservative. The
liberalisation of sex in itself, WFH writers argue, does not make sexual relations non-work
(RPZ 25, AWNP 21). WDL read heterosexuality as the naturalisation of the current
organisation of reproduction (AWNP 21, 47). Similarly, Giovanna Dalla Costa discusses
sex as a part of the work women have to do in order to fulfil their obligation within a
marriage contract, and as work that gives women access to the means that they need to
live (WL 63). While WFH members understood the struggle to criminalise marital rape as
part of challenging men’s right to their wives’ bodies, they argued that such criminalisation
could not fully address this work obligation (NYWFHC 153-154, Hall 1985: 88-92). 
 In Women and the subversion of the community, however, sexuality appears in a
more ambivalent fashion. First, the pamphlet states that 
[c]apital, while it elevates heterosexuality to a religion, at the same time in practice makes it
impossible for men and women to be in touch with each other, physically or emotionally – it
undermines heterosexuality except as a sexual, economic and social discipline. (PWSC 30)28
27 In 1982, when the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s and 70s appeared complete, Michèle Barrett and Mary
McIntosh remarked that while women are no longer expected to be chaste, sex is still on men’s terms 
(2015: 74). 
28 This sentence is similar to the argument in James’ unpublished text “When the mute speaks”, (1971a) 
(dated prior to the published version of “Women and the subversion and the community”), suggesting that
it might be influenced or written by James. Different authorial voices, however, are not sufficient to explain
this ambivalence. 
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A few pages later, however, the text demands the right to the freedom to have sex, as it is
in women’s interest to refuse to be “unsatisfied mothers for their husbands and children”
(PWSC 36). Furthermore, Dalla Costa stresses that to “make love and refuse night work to
make love, is the interest of the class” (PWSC 37, emphasis in original). Here, sexuality
appears as a site of struggle that can be productively mobilised as a form of reproduction
“for ourselves” as politicised subjects, both as women and as working class. We can thus
note that sexuality is part of the dual character of reproduction. It might be necessary to
simultaneously explore how sexuality becomes bound up with the practices of reproductive
work (particularly for women in heterosexual relationships), and emphasise that sexuality
can potentially form a site of disruptive sociality. 
Especially for those whose sexual practices and identities are less closely bound to
the intimate sphere of domestic heteronormativity, sexuality can be a site of reproducing
otherwise. As I will discuss at greater length in chapter four, WDL in particular explored
this tension with regard to lesbian sexual practices. Here, sexuality appears both as a form
of work and as a potential for the reproduction of a radicalised form of subjectivity.
According to Fortunati, lesbian sexuality can be politicised as a form of refusal to
reproduce within the bounds of capitalist reproduction. Such heterosexualised capitalist
reproduction, however, “is so influential that in practice it is difficult to modify or escape
from it” (AR 34). As Andrew Ryder has noted, this argument prefigures Lisa Duggan’s
critique of homonormativity, insofar as it seems to suggest that the privatised form of
heterosexual reproduction is dominant to the point that homosexual relations must to some
extent exist within it (2015: np). In a similar vein, Austin and Capper write:
Although WDL positioned lesbianism as an attack on work, they argued that lesbian sexuality
was still reproductive of capitalist relations. Such an analysis, written well before the widespread
legalization of gay and lesbian marriage, is prescient in its articulation of lesbian sex as a form
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of reproductive labor as opposed to common ascriptions of lesbian sexuality as “non-
reproductive.” (2018: 456) 
The theoretical perspective of WFH, however, emphasises not only reading reproduction
in terms of work, but also locating potential points of struggle within the sphere of
reproduction. 
Reproductive antagonisms 
Whereas the previous sections of this chapter have discussed why reproduction can be a
site of political struggle, this section begins to explore how such struggle might take place.
This theme is developed further in chapter four. Here, I want to emphasise that
reproduction is never a stable, coherent site that is merely functional to the capitalist
economy. The WFH perspective involves formulating reproductive sites of struggle, where
the functioning of capitalist accumulation might be disrupted. As Dalla Costa notes in her
1972 introduction to “Women and the subversion of the community,” “[i]f your production is
vital to capitalism, the refusal to produce, the refusal to work, is a fundamental leveraging
of social power” (WSC 15, emphasis in original). While WFH convincingly established that
reproductive work is indeed vital to capitalism, there are some notable difficulties to
constituting a reproductive politics of refusal. Firstly, the dual nature of reproduction means
that it is difficult to disrupt the reproduction of labour power without also harming people.
Secondly, many types of struggles on the site of reproduction can be coopted by the state
or become part of the expanded accumulation of capital.29 The paradigmatic case here is
perhaps the struggle for a shorter working day, as described by Marx, which was at least
partly based on a concern for reproduction, and which led to the development of relative
29 It should be noted that this also applies to more traditional workers’ struggles within the sphere of 
production. 
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surplus value (1990: 341, 429). As we have seen, Fortunati argues that this struggle led to
a profound change in the organisation of the state, as well as the state-sanctioned
institutionalisation of a stricter division of labour (AR 165, see also Seccombe 1993: 75-
80). A more contemporary example is the use of migrant labour to “solve” the current
reproductive crisis, caused in part by white women’s entrance into waged work (Anderson
2000, Farris 2017). Federici in particular is critical of how the women’s movement’s
emphasis on entering into waged work merely displaced some of the burden of
reproductive labour onto low-waged reproductive workers (RPZ 118).  
These two problems have opposite effects – the first is the risk of harm to those who
are recipients of care, the second is the risk that reproductive crises are “solved” in a way
that increases the exploitation of reproductive workers while not threatening capital or the
state. What is needed, then, are reproductive struggles that can address the concerns of
reproductive work without displacing the potential harm of such struggles onto more
marginalised groups. A core WFH organising principle is that the working class can only
be unified on the terms of those more marginalised by the current organisation of
capitalism (SCR 81). The issue, however, is to identify what those terms would be – a task
made more difficult by the hierarchies that structure current politics. The hierarchies that
structure the working class are often deeply naturalised. Any reproductive struggle must
thus take such naturalisation into account.
If heterosexuality is the naturalisation of reproductive labour, and reproductive work
entails the naturalisation of capitalism, such naturalisation must be undone. According to
members of the English WFH collective, “[t]he routines of capitalist life have always given
capital the appearance of naturalness (as if life couldn’t be any other way) and the
appearance of viability (as if nothing else could work as well).” They add that “[h]alting
service work undermines this appearance of social peace” (AWNP 83). At the heart of the
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WFH writings, then, lie various forms of provocation that can cause the denaturalisation of
reproductive work, and the organisation of life under capitalism more broadly. As Gonzalez
argues, the purpose of a text such as The arcane of reproduction is to uncover the “gender
fetish” that Marx left unexplored, even as he exposed the wage fetish (2013: np).
According to Fortunati, however, this work is often harder because of the “higher and
greater level of ideological organization” that is necessary for the sphere of reproduction to
operate without disruption (AR 9, emphasis in original). 
This gender fetish operates through the capitalist configuration of the body as a
“natural machine” (AR 119). Fortunati discusses this body-machine in relation to
pregnancy, writing that women’s bodies have been transformed into “a machine for
producing labor-powers” (AR 72, emphasis in original). This is resonant with Lewis’ work
on surrogacy, which explores how pregnancy becomes the capacity to produce property
(2019a: 78). While Dalla Costa writes about the “diminution of [women’s] physical integrity”
under capitalism (PWSC 28, emphasis in original), it is important not to think of this
reconfiguration of the body as a merely repressive moment in the development of
capitalism. Rather, as Federici argues in Caliban and the witch, we can think of the
capitalist reconfiguration of the body as enabling it to be exploited in particular ways (2004:
141). We do not necessarily have to read the metaphor of the body as machine as a
desire to return to a pre-capitalist body, but rather as a way of understanding how the body
is implicated in and co-constituted through shifting relations of labour. We have already
seen how the construction of subjectivity as labour power relies on certain acquired
capacities. These capacities, as I will discuss in the next chapters, are simultaneously
mental, bodily, and emotional. Bodily capacities under capitalism are thus constituted in
such a way that facilitates various forms of exploitation. 
Naming the supposedly natural capacities of the body as work is one strategy for
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their denaturalisation. As Federici writes, “you work, not because you like it, or because it
comes naturally to you, but because it is the only condition under which you are allowed to
live. Exploited as you might be, you are not that work” (RPZ 16). Work, then, becomes a
mode of separation and disentanglement – a way of saying that we are not reducible to
our acquired capacities for labour. Affirming this is part of affirming our dual character as
labour power and something more than labour power. In Weeks’ terms, it is a way of
constituting a feminist subject, which is simultaneously created by and against the social
relations of work (1998: 136). I will discuss these questions at greater length in chapter
four. Here, I want to note that struggles within the sphere of reproduction might depend on
our ability to create a distance between what we have been made into and what we could
become (Weeks 2007: 248). 
As we have already seen, WFH names lesbianism as such a site of struggle, in which
feminist subjectivities of refusal can appear. This is not a merely negative movement of
withdrawal, but rather reconstituting sexual desire and practice in a way that is less
entangled with the configuration of nuclear families as the nexus of reproductive labour.
However, for the WFH authors, there are multiple sites of possible struggle within the
varied field of reproduction. One such site is the declining birth rate in European and North
American countries, which WFH members read as a refusal of labour (AR 19, 146, RPZ
31). This is not a form of refusal that is universally applicable, as some (mainly racialised)
groups are already seen as disposable (Brown 1986: 9, AR 19). Brown, writing from a
black feminist perspective, argues that for those who are typically excluded from normative
forms of reproduction, having babies might be a way of affirming the value of reproduction
against the state and capital (1976b: 19). Raising those children against the demand for a
disciplined labour force might also be a way of resisting capital accumulation (Federici
2018b: 62). 
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Part of women’s struggle against reproductive work is also to force men to assume
responsibility for this work, beyond merely “helping” their female partners. However, WFH
were critical of reformist attempts that were aimed at making men share housework, as
such politics merely reshuffles the burden of reproduction without directly intervening into
the organisation of waged and unwaged work (SRC 84). Federici writes that “trying to
educate men has always meant that our struggle was privatized and fought in the solitude
of our kitchens and bedrooms” (RPZ  36). Instead, she wants to constitute collective
feminist power capable of refusing housework. This attempt to create power through
refusal is also a struggle for women’s time for themselves (AWNP 86). Federici argues that
more free time would allow women to become increasingly autonomous and political
subjects, as it would free their time not for more waged work but rather for attending
meetings or spending time with other women (RPZ 57). 
Further, the WFH literature mentions a series of reclamation tactics, which range
from shoplifting to migration (AWNP 55, Prescod 1980: 13). These are ways of taking back
wealth that has been expropriated through the exploitation of the totality of work of the
global proletariat. As Prescod argues, enslaved women’s reproductive labour was an
essential part of the slave system, which in turn created vast amounts of capital circulating
in Europe and America. Migration from the Caribbean and other former colonies to the
colonial metropoles is thus a way of trying to reappropriate some of that wealth (1980: 18).
We can thus see that there is a multitude of ways in which people struggle for their
own reproduction. A problem with these strategies, however, is that they often appear as
merely individual. Women are “seen as nagging bitches, not as workers in struggle” (RPZ
16). Constituting reproductive struggles, then, must also be a project of collectivising
struggle. In order to do this, WFH tried to build links between these various aspects of
reproductive struggle, by placing them in a shared framework of “housework.” As Austin
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and Capper notes, “[t]he conceptual impropriety of ‘housework’ propagated by the WfH
movement at times led contemporaneous feminist critics to argue that this analytic was
incoherent” (2018: 451). However, this broad conceptualisation of reproduction was
needed in order to name a form of work that took place across different sites and in
different forms of labour relations. The concept of housework itself is doing the political
work of not only naming naturalised activity as work, but also of constituting a coalitional
politics on the terrain of reproduction. 
Wage struggles
The main WFH tool for achieving the denaturalisation of reproductive work was the
struggle concept of the wage. While we should not reduce the WFH perspective to the
struggle for a wage, it is important to understand what function the wage is fulfilling, as a
political concept and demand. Drawing on the tradition of workerist organising, in which
the struggle for wage increases across sectors of the working class was intended as a tool
to overcome divisions of power within the class (WSC 160), WFH broadened the strategy
to include those who are currently unwaged. This strategy also included those who are
low-waged because of their proximity to unwaged and naturalised labour. Here, then, I
partly disagree with Angela Davis’ critique of WFH as neglecting waged domestic work
(1981: 230-231). It is true that such work was partially sidelined in the better-known WFH
texts, which focus on the figure of the unwaged housewife. However, the work of
BWFWFH and WDL, as well as many lesser-known texts by various WFH collectives,
highlight the relation between waged reproductive work, welfare, and unwaged work.30 For
WFH, a wage for currently unwaged reproductive labour would allow women to refuse the
30 See for example “The home in the hospital” by the Power of Women Collective (1975), Black women:
Bringing it all back home by Margaret Prescod and Norma Steele (1980), and Women speak out by the
Toronto Wages for Housework Committee (1975). These texts all explore the continuities of waged and
unwaged reproductive labour.
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often dehumanising and low-paid types of service work into which especially women of
colour are drawn (Brown 1976a: 8). Here, we can see how WFH form a continuation of the
intellectual and political legacy of groups such as the National Welfare Rights
Organization, who refused work outside their communities on the basis that they were
already working as mothers. These women’s labour as mothers was devalued because
black women were primarily valued as waged workers, reproducing white families
(Nadasen 206: 140, Prescod 1980: 13-14). Sara Farris has shown that in contemporary
Europe, the labour of immigrant women of colour is devalued in a similar way, thus forcing
these women to perform low-waged care work for others, often the same work that
bourgeois white women have been able to refuse to do for free (2017: 15). There is thus a
continued relevance of the legacy of the welfare movement and WFH, in the sense that
they had a different perspective from the mainstream feminist movement which demanded
the emancipation of women through labour-force participation.
A wage for housework, WFH authors argue, would strengthen the position of those
women who do engage in currently waged reproductive work. As work such as nursing is
low-paid and built around the same emotional responses of care, responsibility, and guilt
as housework, WFH authors suggest, a wage struggle can only happen across currently
divided sectors in ways which would strengthen both waged and unwaged reproductive
workers. By making sure that the state and capital cannot rely on domestic work for free,
the English WFH collective argue, they would also be forced to increase the wages of
those who are currently working in low-paid service sectors and domestic settings (AWNP
87). 
As Farris has shown, the Fordist economic era and the post-war family model
constituted a historical moment in which both middle- and working-class women were
mostly housewives without servants (2017: 132-133). Similarly, Barbagallo writes that in
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this era, the construction of womanhood conflated two different historical subjectivities,
“that of the ‘non-working’ middle-class housewife and that of the working-class domestic
servant” (2016: 207). The perspective of the wage was designed to draw together
differently located women, who at this point in time shared an interest based on the current
configuration of a gendered division of labour. However, the WFH demand can also be
read as an articulation of difference among women, as it was not aimed at allowing already
privileged women to escape domestic labour off the backs of other women, but rather to
address the interests of those who are charged with the responsibility of caring for others.
Prescod argues that the struggle for more money would destroy the image of the “mammy”
– a well-meaning and non-threatening black woman working to reproduce white people.
Here, she also includes a struggle against the work that black women are doing in
reproducing white women (1980: 14-15). As black women were charged with reproducing
their own families as well as those of others, they were engaging in both waged and
unwaged forms of labour. The struggle for the wage, for Prescod, is a part of destroying
the labour relations that force black women to adopt a servile position in relation to
everyone else (1980: 23). According to Federici, WFH was a struggle for those who were
stuck with reproductive labour, and could not easily “move up” to do other forms of work
(RPZ 58-62). For Brown, the struggle for wages for housework is a majority perspective,
against the liberal feminist desire for token positions of power for a few privileged women
(1986: 44). While the WFH perspective could be constructed as centring on the white,
bourgeois women who are able to live up to the image of the idealised housewife, 31 it in
fact sought to make sure that no woman was left with the “dirty work” as bourgeois women
moved into the professions. 
A core tenet for WFH organising was to not leave unwaged workers behind by
31 Kalindi Vora makes this critique when she writes that Fortunati’s work concerns “middle-class white 
women’s labour in the household” (2019: np).
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suggesting that there is a moral or political value in taking on waged work. WFH authors
frequently critiqued leftist organising that suggested that women and other unwaged
people should “join” the working class by becoming part of the industrial proletariat (Toupin
2018: 50).32 In this way, WFH accused the male-dominated left of accepting a capitalist
model of development. The authors of the text “Capital and the left” write that the
difference between “the Trotskyist line – housework is barbarism i.e. all women to the
factories – and the libertarian line – housework is socialism i.e. no work should be paid – is
only a difference in tactics within an overall capitalist strategy” (NYWFHC 232). In this way,
the WFH strategy is articulated against both liberal feminism, with its aim of allowing some
(white, bourgeois) women to become the bearers of capitalist power, and the socialist
strategy that suggested that class struggle can only be carried out by waged workers on
the terrain of capitalist production (RPZ 38). James presciently warned against the
construction of hierarchies among women in her essay “A woman’s place,” originally
published in 1953. She describes how companies try to better control female workers by
employing women as supervisors (SRC 30). The same warning is repeated in her writings
from the 1970s, such as “Women, the unions, and work” from 1972 (SRC 62). Against
attempts to enforce such hierarchies among women, WFH argued that career
opportunities could never lead to liberation, as such “solutions” to women’s status as
unwaged labour depend on someone else doing reproductive labour (RPZ 62).
Furthermore, Federici argues that individual solutions draw on a racist hierarchy between
“modern,” career-oriented women and supposedly backwards women doing reproductive
work (NYWFHC 21). 
The demand for wages for housework, Federici and Nicole Cox assert, is not a
demand “to be let into the wage relation (for we were never out of it) but to be let out of it”
32 The editors of LIES instead suggest that the WFH strategy was too dependent on women becoming 
proletarianised through the wage (2012: 220).
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(2012: 37). Similarly, James insists that the wageless are not outside of the wage relation
(SRC 104-105). Here, the WFH authors argue that the wage fetish is based not only on
unwaged work at the formal work place, as Marx had shown, but also in the home. Many
feminists of the time, however, were critical of this attempt to be let out of the wage
relation, arguing that it would institutionalise women in their homes (Toupin 2018: 4). WFH
responded that it was capital’s organisation of reproductive work, not a wage for
housework, that had relegated women to the domestic sphere in the first place (RPZ 37).
As stated above, then, the WFH strategy was not intended to preserve the relations under
which we currently work but to subvert them by giving the primary labour subjects more
power over their conditions of labour (Toupin 2018: 211). Federici adds that the critics of
WFH assume that currently unwaged work could become waged without simultaneously
changing that work, an assumption that she strongly contests. She writes that we could not
get wages for housework without “at the same time revolutionizing – in the process of
struggling for it – all our family and social relations” (RPZ 15). This, she argues, is because
the wage should not only be understood as a bit of money, but rather as a framework for
the struggle for autonomy and power.
The demand for wages relies on a strategic inversion of existing power relations
within the class. By making waged the currently low- or unwaged work of reproduction,
and thus valorising it in money rather than merely in moral terms, WFH hoped to
strengthen currently disempowered members of the class. This was a strategy of locating
potential power (AWNP 10), similar to that employed by workerist writers. Constituting a
seemingly powerless political subject as having potential power gave the WFH writers a
tool for criticising leftist authors who took the disempowerment of sections of the working
class as a given, due to that section’s exclusion from formal labour. This is why WFH
authors insist that they are strengthening the whole of the class through their selective
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demands concerning workers engaged in reproduction (SRC 193). Federici and Cox argue
against the idea that a wage would merely take resources from male workers and give
them to women, instead arguing for a perspective where sectors of the working class can
expand their power in a way that hurts capital and the state rather than other sectors
(2012: 40). 
 This strategy also applies to the WFH perspective on divisions among working-class
women. They argue that seemingly marginalised women, who have a different relation to
reproductive work, have the potential power to strengthen their own position in a way that
would give more power to all women. In the WFH writings, this applies specifically to
lesbians, welfare recipients, and sex workers. This position is not intended to deny the
stigmatisation that these groups face. Indeed, the writings of WDL and BWFWFH
members in particular list the specific vulnerabilities to which these women are subjected
(Hall 1977: 6, Brown 1976a: 1). However, the WFH authors tend to explain such
vulnerability through reference to these women’s refusal of normative conditions of
reproductive labour, and the violence and stigmatisation that follows. Here, BWFWFH
draw connections between the position of black women and sex workers, who are often
subjected to overlapping forms of violence due to their “deviance” from normative (white,
bourgeois, unwaged) forms of reproductive labour, particularly intense for those who are
both black and sex workers (Black Women for Wages for Housework 2012: 230, see also
Austin and Capper 2018: 452). In order to locate potential sources of power, the WFH
authors tend to read such deviance as a refusal of reproductive labour on the terms set by
the state. But they also understand that such vulnerabilities also give certain groups of
women potential disadvantages, which means that they have a reason to organise
autonomously in order to assert their needs. In chapter four, I will return to the notion of
autonomy as a way of constituting political subjectivity. 
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Here, I want to point to the WFH retheorising of the workerist notion of class
composition – a concept intended to track the changing internal structure of the working
class and its struggles. This notion was often used to locate the most technologically
advanced workers within the class (Wright 2002: 225). As the WFH writers point out, this
tends to lead to a vanguardism where some sectors of the class come to represent the
class as a whole (RPZ 28, NYWFHC 38). The WFH position instead entails an affirmation
of the possibility of struggle from a multitude of points within the social totality, and the
potential power of refusal that belongs not only to workers in key sectors of industry but to
all those who participate in capitalist economies in some capacity. This includes students,
the unemployed, and unwaged peasants as well as housewives (PWSC 25, SRC 66). It
also includes those seemingly “unorganisable” members of the class who have an
antagonistic relation to the state, such as people who are criminalised in various ways
(Prescod 1980: 36). WFH struggles could thus expand to include those who have
traditionally been dismissed as belonging to the lumpen proletariat (NYWFH 104). WFH
also emphasises struggles of recipients of care, and the potential solidarity that could be
fostered between reproductive workers and those they care for – including children, the
elderly, and the mentally ill (SRC 73, RPZ 125). Instead of focusing exclusively on the
struggles of factory workers, then, WFH writers affirm a broader notion of capitalism that
extended to informal economies and unwaged workers, as well as focusing on the
proletariat as a collective subject with needs.33 As James suggests, it also entails an
understanding of politics that did not pit a universal class struggle against the particularity
of identity-based struggles, but instead reads identity as the “substance of class” (SRC
96). There is thus no “class in general” whose interests can be seen to represent the
interests of the whole, as such universalising constructs tend to be based on the invisibility
33 This conception of the class is often described using the workerist term “social factory,” intended to 
explain how capitalist exploitation extends beyond the factory itself. However, this term is not widely used 
by WFH authors. 
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of dominant identities within the class (SRC 67). The concept of class composition thus
has to be drastically rethought, in order to do justice to the multiplicity of potential
anticapitalist struggles. 
Rather than merely focusing on the disruption at the point of production of surplus
value, WFH strategy seeks an understanding of the full circuit of capitalist production. This
can mean interrupting the process “before” the surplus-productive moment – that is, at the
stage of production of labour power. It can also mean disrupting the moment “after”
production, in the realisation of surplus-value through the work of consumption. As we can
see, these two moments are not distinct, but rather indicate the circular motion of capitalist
accumulation, where various moments are interconnected and all necessary for the
production of surplus value. Interventions in reproduction/consumption can take various
forms, including rent strikes, strategic withdrawals of unwaged labour, “proletarian
shopping,”34 and the reappropriation of reproductive resources and services. The WFH
strategy was thus not limited to the demand for the wage, but operated across a multitude
of claims for more free time, more resources, and less work (SCR 77, 158). 
As Guiliana Pompei argues in an essay based on one of the first meetings of the
WFH movement, the claim for a wage should be understood as the reappropriation of
wealth and power – including reproductive resources such as housing, transport, and
health services (1972: 4). Reappropriation is a central term in the WFH perspective,
naming both the previously invisible labour that is part of the capitalist production of
wealth, and the strategies that result in the reclamation of control (RPZ 38, NYWFHC 34).
This, paired with the demand for less time spent working, was intended to lessen the grasp
of capitalist control over our lives. WFH is thus also a demand for the increasingly self-
directed activity of workers, who can organise reproduction in a way that does not
succumb to the demands of capital. 
34 A collective form of shoplifting, where a group of people enter a store to “liberate” goods. 
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The reclamation of wealth, both in terms of an adequate wage for reproductive work
and the access to reproductive resources and services, is a strategy aimed at making
capital and the state pay for reproduction. Through unwaged work, expensive reproductive
resources, and “individual responsibility,” capital has externalised much of the cost of
reproducing the labour force. Claiming free reproductive services, as well as claiming an
adequate wage for reproductive work, is a way of increasing the cost of reproduction for
capital and the state. Fortunati writes that working-class reproduction has often been
reduced to the bare minimum, where anything beyond mere survival is constructed as
luxury (AR 19). A way of struggling against this is to construct new social needs, such as
adequate and affordable housing or free child-care services, which continually increase
the cost of reproducing the workers. In organising communal reproductive resources, this
could also expand the social worlds of people, which are currently often restricted to
various labour relationships within waged and unwaged spheres. 
Thus, both the attempt to put a price on reproduction and to get the state to pay for
reproductive resources such as health care and housing were part of the WFH project of
reappropriation. This was simultaneously an attempt to “commodify” the reproductive
labour capacity of the currently unwaged by demanding that the state pay for it, and
decommodifying services and resources that workers have to pay for in order to survive.35
The demand for a wage from the state mimics the commodification of work under
capitalism, through the sale of labour power. However, this would not lead to the
commodification of reproductive services, in the sense that they would become value-
productive or paid for by consumers. Rather, it is an attempt to limit the exploitation of
unwaged work. This type of “commodification” could be read as a form of alienation of
labour, as it incorporates currently unwaged work in a market logic. However, WFH
35 This discussion finds a contemporary echo in the debates around Universal Basic Income and Universal 
Basic Services. See Weeks (2011: 138-150), and Social Prosperity Network (2017). 
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wanted to show that there is nothing natural or non-alienated in this work as it is currently
organised (RPZ 35). 
This perspective thus strives to “commodify” reproductive work through the wage
provided by the state, while at the same time decommodifying reproduction from the
perspective of the recipients of care and services. Arguing for free housing, WFH writers
claim that houseworkers were the only people paying rent for their workplace (NYWFHC
62).36 Constructing the home as a place of work, then, allows WFH to question the
conditions of such work places. However, the point is not just to improve the working
conditions of houseworkers, but rather to undo the material and ideological lines between
the domestic and the public, the reproductive and the productive. Such undoing, WFH
authors argue, challenges the organisation of the totality of the capitalist circuit (RPZ 15).
In their political practice, however, WFH oscillated between reformism and radicalism
(NYWFHC 19). Like most political movements, the WFH campaign worked within a radical
political perspective but often engaged in reformist struggles, such as the Family
Allowance Campaign, which aimed to increase the meagre sum of money women received
to support their children (SRC 87, Toronto Wages For Housework Committee 1976). WFH,
at its best, was able to operate on several levels simultaneously – as both a practical
demand to improve the lives of working-class women, and as a revolutionary provocation
for an end of the current organisation of our lives.37 While this caused some confusion in
the Women’s Liberation Movement, it also allowed WFH to shift from reformism to a
revolutionary perspective, according to the needs of a given situation. At the heart of the
WFH demand as a provocation is the fact that capital would not be able to pay for the
totality of reproductive labour. For the WFH activists, the aim is “to be priceless, to price
36 This has become significantly more common today, with the rise of freelancing – another attempt by 
capital to externalise the costs of (re)production onto the workers. However, home-based production has 
a long history under capitalism. On this topic, see Staples (2007). 
37 See Weeks (2011: 131) for an extended discussion of the WFH strategy as provocation. 
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ourselves out of the market, for housework and factory work and office work to become
‘uneconomic’” (RPZ 39). While the Family Allowance Campaign did not provide women
with a great deal of financial resources, it was a way of holding onto some of the money
that the state gives to women, in order to counteract capital’s tendency to increase profit
margins by externalising reproductive costs. 
The demand for wages, then, is also a refusal to internalise the cost and effort of
reproducing the working class. It is a refusal of the notion that some members of the class
must necessarily be exploited by others in order for people to survive. The demand for
more money was also the demand for an end to the inadequate remuneration of all the
work that people perform. The current organisation of reproductive work tends to construct
love as the reward for, and precondition of, labour, yet as we will see in the next chapter,
love itself is part of the reproductive labour that people do for each other. Reproductive
labourers are made to produce “the good life” (Berlant 2008: 19) for other people, in order
to compensate for the damaged life of capitalist labour. A WFH perspective demands more
than this meagre reward. It demands the continual expansion of the needs of the working
class. As WFH members put it: “So far we have done it for love, not money. But the cost of
loving is going up” (AWNP 88). 
In this chapter, I have outlined a WFH perspective on reproductive labour and
politics. I have introduced the problem of the reproduction of labour power for capitalist
economies, and how that causes a permanent reproductive crisis. From the perspective of
reproductive workers, I have discussed reproduction as a site of antagonism on which a
multitude of struggles can take place. In the following chapters, I will concretise this in
relation to emotional reproduction and the work of love.
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Chapter two: Love as labour
This chapter explores theories of affective and emotional labour. I will review two sets of
literature on this topic. Firstly, I will give a brief account of the tradition of post-workerism,
which uses the concept of affective labour to describe a type of immaterial labour – that is,
labour where the product is something other than a material object. I will explain why the
“feminisation of labour” thesis, a central aspect of post-workerist accounts of affective
labour, is insufficient as a foundation for a materialist feminist theory of emotional labour in
contemporary society. While seemingly in line with a WFH account of gendered labour, the
feminisation of labour argument in fact obscures the persistent gendering and devaluation
of emotional labour. 
Secondly, the chapter returns to the tradition of feminist sociology of emotional
labour, starting with Hochschild’s 1983 book The managed heart: Commercialization of
human feeling. Hochschild introduces the concept of emotional labour to describe a
specific but increasingly common labour practice. Drawing on Hochschild’s writings as well
as later feminist theories of emotional labour, I will outline the foundation of a historical
materialist account of emotional reproduction. I use the term emotional reproduction in
order to indicate the essential nature of emotional labour for the reproduction of labour
power, and capitalist social relations more broadly. Here, it is important to emphasise that
while emotional labour is a specific type of labour, it cannot be properly understood outside
of the context of reproductive labour. Contrary to post-workerist theorists, I read emotional
labour not as an instance of immaterial labour but as a specific yet integral aspect of
reproductive labour, thus linking it to more obviously material aspects of this work. I also
want to note the complexities of emotional labour, which today spans the divisions
between public and private spheres, and waged and unwaged work. While the concept of
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emotional labour is most commonly applied to forms of commodified work, I want to
highlight the links between this form of labour and unwaged reproductive labour (which I
explored in chapter one) and the gendering of work (which I will study in more detail in
chapter three). I use the term emotional reproduction to indicate a labour process that
exceeds the type of work described by Hochschild. 
The WFH theorists do not present a developed theory of emotional labour. However,
I will trace their scattered mentions of this type of work, in order to expand on emotional
labour as a specific instance of reproductive labour. I will argue that emotional labour has
an important function in their writings, where it often appears under the name of “love.” It is
as love, then, that emotional labour is linked to other practices of intimate care work. This
move seeks to complicate the description of emotional labour in the sociological literature,
where it is commonly separated from “real” emotional bonds (see for example Hochschild
2003b: 7, 119, 132). Further, it serves as a critical interrogation of what we mean by “love”
– a term that has had a central position in modern and contemporary ideals of “the good
life,” understood as normative investments in certain forms of reproduction. While
reviewing some of the literature on affective and emotional labour, then, this chapter will
also begin to detail the theory and content of emotional reproduction.
Affective labour, post-workerism, and gender
What would it mean to say that labour is increasingly immaterial and affective? In this
section I try to work through the problematic of the relation between affect, gender and
labour as it appears in the writings of the post-workerist tradition. The post-workerist
moment emerged in the 1990s, after the decline of the organised labour movement. A
group of theorists, some of them key thinkers of workerism and Autonomia, tried to rethink
the nature of the working class in light of changed labour relations under post-Fordist
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capitalism. Autonomia, a 1970s political movement which stemmed from workerism,
demanded more flexibility and more freedom from capital. By the 1990s, however, many of
the demands of Autonomia seemed to have come true in a perverse form – post-Fordism
was based on the loss of the traditional stability of industrial labour, announcing a new era
of flexibility, precarity, and work utilising interpersonal and cognitive skills. Instead of
freeing life from labour, labour now seemed to be diffused over the entirety of life (Morini
2007: 46). As this new type of labour centred on verbal communication and affective
relationships, the term “feminisation of labour” became widespread to indicate that many
tasks were related to those traditionally conceived as “women’s work.” The general
feminisation of labour, according to this theory, is connected to the increasingly affective
character of work. In this section, I will provide a critique of this conceptualisation of
affective labour, from the perspective of WFH feminism. Here, I will mainly focus on Hardt
and Negri’s Empire trilogy, as it provides the most extensive statement on affective labour,
and appears to be the most useful for feminist theory. 
Hardt and Negri offer a three-part definition of the feminisation of labour. Firstly, there
has been a quantitative increase in women engaged in waged work. Secondly, post-
Fordism has brought a qualitative shift in labour conditions, so that all people are now
subjected to conditions traditionally associated with women, such as flexibility, part-time
work and informal employment. Thirdly, post-industrial production is often centred around
qualities associated with “women’s work,” and affective tasks are increasingly central in all
types of labour (2009: 133). While Hardt and Negri emphasise that they are less
concerned with the quantitative than the qualitative shift, there might be a link between the
two – Cristina Morini suggests that the affective dimension of post-Fordist work might
make women particularly attractive workers (2007: 46). This is true insofar as women are
constructed as workers with a heightened affective capacity. The WFH authors, however,
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would stress that this hinges on a particular construction of femininity rather than being an
inherent quality in women as workers. For the post-workerists, the gender of the workers
matters less. Post-workerists argue that feminised labour is now hegemonic, which means
that it tends to include all forms of work and all workers, so that even industrial labour
operates according to the logic of post-Fordist, immaterial labour (Hardt and Negri 2004:
113). Affective labour is a key aspect of immaterial labour more broadly: “Caring labor is
certainly entirely immersed in the corporeal, the somatic, but the affects it produces are
nonetheless immaterial. What affective labor produces are social networks, forms of
community, biopower” (2000: 293). In this stage of development, Hardt and Negri suggest,
“capitalist production is aimed ever more clearly at the production of not only (and perhaps not
even primarily) commodities but also social relationships and forms of life” (2009: 133). 
Elsewhere, Negri offers a definition of the term “becoming-woman of labour” as not
only feminisation but a broadening of the social space of valorisation (2008: 64). There is
thus a spatial shift, in which valorisation processes finally leave the confined space of the
factory to infiltrate all spheres of life. This perceived shift raises questions of the possibility
of measuring the labour time of production, and therefore of the status of Marx’s theory of
value as socially necessary labour time (Negri 1999: 80). Post-workerist writings tend to
emphasise the power of new kinds of labour to break down boundaries, be they
boundaries of space, time, gender, productivity and non-productivity, or employment and
unemployment. This theoretical move opens up both problems and potentials for post-
workerist thinkers. 
One of the problems is how to think about the continuing stratifications of work. Hardt
and Negri are eager to point out that much of immaterial labour, especially affective labour,
is traditionally “women’s work,” and thus devalued. They also remark that the feminisation
of labour is related to migration and the devaluation of immigrant workers (2009: 135).
However, this concern for devalued workers is not integrated into their theory. The term
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“the feminisation of labour,” unlike “feminised labour,” indicates a process, a becoming-
woman of labour (see also Revel 2003). It is thus not a characteristic of a particular subset
of labour, but the feminisation of labour, understood as a generic term. All of labour thus is
increasingly “feminine.” Clearly, not everyone is performing traditionally feminised tasks,
such as child care. Instead Hardt and Negri suggest that affective and communicative
skills are increasingly required in all forms of work, the work performed by men as well as
the work performed by women. The main shift, according to this argument, is thus that
“men’s work” is taking on some of the characteristics of the tasks that have traditionally
been established as “women’s work.” While they acknowledge that affective labour is
primarily connected to women (2009: 134), their argument seems premised on the ever-
increasing demand for the skills of affect. According to this argument, affective labour is
characteristic of post-Fordist labour generally.
As we have seen, not only affectivity but a generalised precarity is part of the
definition of the feminisation of labour. The problem here is that Hardt and Negri take this
characteristic as a given aspect of feminisation without fully exploring how it is bound up
with the exclusion of women from waged work and their primary responsibility for
reproductive labour. The second group of characteristics of feminisation, relating to
affectivity, seems more closely related to femininity as it is commonly understood. But
extending the term “feminisation” (in the sense of affectivity) to people who are not
normally feminised runs the risk of employing a “metaphysics of sexual difference,”
(Preciado 2013: 289) while simultaneously denying the political meaning of gender. Not
only is “feminisation” imprecise as a term for affectivity, it also risks construing affect as an
inherent quality or territory of “the feminine.” As Hochschild notes, while women are
generally constructed as more skilled in emotional work, some emotions are distinctly
masculine in their cultural coding (MH 163). Furthermore, an unproblematised conceptual
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association of feminisation and affectivity risks overlooking the fact that any perceived link
between gender and a particular capacity for certain emotions is a by-product of gendered
socialisation itself. While I argue that emotional labour is central in the constitution of
modern femininity, affectivity takes on a different meaning when ascribed to people who
are not feminised. The term “affective labour,” understood as an increasingly generalised
condition, tends to erase such differences. A materialist feminist perspective explores this
type of work as having a historically specific link to a set of workers, rather than a
seemingly essentialised trait that is generalised. The problem with Hardt and Negri’s
account is that it sometimes seems to posit certain characteristics as essentially feminine,
while at the same time erasing the importance of gendered hierarchies from their account
of labour. As Shiloh Whitney asks, “when all work is women’s work, what becomes of
women, and the usually unpaid, usually reproductive work that is traditionally assigned to
us?” (2018: 641).
Moreover, as Federici has shown, the concept of affect for Hardt and Negri often has
an ontological meaning derived from Spinoza’s Ethics, where affect is closer to the
concepts of force or capacity than emotion (2011: 64). This is certainly true in Negri’s
essay “Value and affect,” in which he describes affect simply as the power to act (1999:
79). This double meaning of affect makes it less terminologically consistent, thus making
its link to gender even more unclear. 
There is also a whole set of issues relating to the historical aspects of the
feminisation thesis. The term “feminisation of labour” suggests that labour was once
masculine, which obscures the fact that most women have always worked, whether they
were waged or not. Donatella Alessandrini argues that the post-workerist identification of
post-Fordism with the impossibility of measuring labour time undermines the theoretical
principles of the feminist theorists on whose writings post-workerists claim to draw, as
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capitalist value has always been reliant on non-measured, unwaged labour (2012: 3). 
The post-workerist theorists tend to gesture vaguely towards an alleged historical
rupture in which the labour conditions previously reserved for devalued workers (women,
immigrants) become generalised (Hardt and Negri 2009: 133). However, I find the
argument regarding the increased homogenisation of labour conditions unconvincing.
While it might be true that many jobs are increasingly precarious, and that work tends to
take over more and more of “life,” this shift does not affect everyone in the same way,
since not everyone experienced a clear demarcation between work and life in the Fordist
era. Nor does it justify the claim that there has been a fundamental rupture in labour
relations, as many people have been working under these conditions for a long time. What
has happened is that much of factory labour, long the centre of communist political
organising, has moved to the global South and/or been automated. Many workers in the
global South, however, experience a factory discipline similar to that which European and
North American workers lived under during the 19th and early 20th centuries, especially in
industries where the (often female) work force is so cheap that it has not been replaced
with machines (Wright 2006).38 Here, the supposed shift towards immaterial labour and the
“feminisation of labour” has not been felt in the same way. Nor is there much homogeneity
between the working conditions of migrant women of colour, working as cleaners and
carers, and white “creatives” and intellectual workers, working to realise themselves
through their careers, as the immaterial labour thesis seems to suggest. This does not
mean that these subjects cannot come together in struggle,39 but that we must be mindful
of political differences and hierarchies that are continually reproduced between them, at
least partially through differentiating labour processes. A WFH perspective, as we have
38 This use of women’s labour instead of machines is nothing new. Marx writes that “women are still 
occasionally used instead of horses for hauling barges, because the labour required to produce horses 
and machines is an accurately known quantity, while that required to maintain the women of the surplus 
population is beneath all calculation” (1990: 517).
39 The organising efforts of Precarias a la Deriva suggest that such solidarity can be useful – see their essay
“Adrift through the circuits of feminized precarious work” (2004).
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seen, implies centring the conditions and demands of those most exploited. 
A problem with positing “feminisation” and immateriality as tendencies is that all other
forms of labour come to appear as relics of the past, and boundaries between workers
appear to be in the process of disappearing. It imposes a theory of work which is clearly
based on a particular set of workers onto the working class as a whole. Post-workerist
theorists, like the workerism they draw on, tend to generalise one aspect of labour and use
it as a framework for understanding all other types of work (Wright 2002: 224). In the post-
workerist case, this hegemonic labour is no longer the manual labour of the factory worker
but the immaterial labour of the intellectual worker. As we have seen, Hardt and Negri
stress that affective labour is also part of immaterial labour (2004: 111), although, as I
have argued, it is not clear what this affective element means. Franco “Bifo” Berardi
repeatedly mentions the “corporeality” of the collective working subject (2009: 105), but the
theoretical emphasis of post-workerism is still very much on the intellectual aspect of
immaterial labour, in which affective labour is not theoretically integrated. This is especially
clear in concepts, such as Bifo’s “cognitariat,” which tend to reestablish a mind/body
dichotomy while claiming to undo that very distinction. Here, it is also obvious that the shift
towards immaterial labour, as the post-workerist construe it, depends primarily on
technological innovations. A perhaps ironic virtue of Maurizio Lazzarato’s
conceptualisation of immaterial labour is that it makes no claim to theorising feminised or
embodied aspects of work. Rather, it unabashedly uses the traditionally masculine labour
of the creative, technical, and scientific industries as a model for post-Fordist labour, thus
producing a more conceptually coherent though obviously limited account (1996: 142). 
Steve Wright observes that the workerist tended to see the most “advanced” fraction
of the working class as a tendency for the whole class (2002: 225). Bifo does this explicitly,
writing that he will focus on the most innovative form of contemporary work, which
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represents the trend that is transforming the whole of social production (2009: 87). The
limitations of using relatively privileged workers in the intellectual and creative industries as
a model for the whole working class apparently does not trouble Bifo. Similarly, Paolo
Virno does not problematise his theoretical move to use the cultural industries as a model
for other kinds of post-Fordist work (2004: 61). Here, we can see a problem in the
theoretical and methodological focus on “class composition” – it tends to make broad
generalisations that are unhelpful for understanding the fragmentation of the working
class. Some WFH writings can be read as being guilty of this tendency, exemplified by the
claim that all women are housewives, and that the position of working-class women is
determinant for all women (PWSC 19). However, WFH authors always start from a
position of specificity, even when it is the broad specificity of working-class women. The
post-workerists, despite oft-repeated claims to the contrary, seem to start from the
“general” position of “workers,” or the “multitude,” which due to its lack of determination
ends up being implicitly gendered and racialised as white and masculine. Federici writes
that the concept of “feminisation of labour” in fact is a way of ungendering labour, as it
pays little attention to the specificity of the work that women are expected to perform
(2011: 64-67). 
Indeed, there seems to be inherent problems in using a generalising term for
understanding the gendering of labour, as gender is a social system which is built upon the
violent division of people into different groups. Would the “becoming-woman” of men’s
work mean the end of gender as such? Hardt and Negri insist that it does not, but their
theoretical framework cannot account for the persistence of gender. The flaw of post-
workerist theory is its search for a hegemonic tendency, a universalising force, in the way
that capitalism operates. While we must be attentive to shifts in capitalist relations, post-
workerists seem to assume that these shifts will come to affect “everyone” in relatively
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homogeneous ways. In this, they follow a long tradition of Marxist thinkers who have
assumed that capitalism is inherently universalising and therefore will impose wage
relations on everyone, and under similar conditions. A counter-tradition of feminist, post-
colonial, and antiracist Marxists have contested this, and instead explored the limitations of
capitalist universality. As post-colonial Marxists Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu
write:
We can say that capitalism is defined by a contradictory fusion of universalising and
differentiating tendencies, exerting both equalising and fragmenting pressures on social
development. This systemisation of unevenness – so dramatically exemplified by the
(re)production of systematic inequalities and power hierarchies within and between societies –
is a necessary consequence of the expansionary, competitive logic of capital accumulation.
(2015: 324 n60)
A similar tradition of Marxist feminism has emphasised the way that the privatisation of the
home has come to create a form of internal “outside” of capitalist society, which
necessarily appears as untarnished by capitalist processes of valorisation. As Gonzalez
and Neton argue, there must be an exterior to value in order for value to exist (2013: 62).
Both WFH feminists such as Fortunati and the German value-theory feminist Roswitha
Scholz have theorised the division between the sphere of reproduction and the sphere of
production (AR 8, Scholz 2014: 125-128). While the terms of this division have changed
since the prime of the WFH movement, and indeed are continually open to renegotiation
through political struggle, nothing justifies the abandonment of the theoretical principle of
internal and external differentiation and exclusion of some forms of labour from the general
process of capitalist valorisation. The division between gendered spheres of labour has not
been dissolved, nor has labour melted into the undifferentiated sphere of “life,” as Hardt
and Negri’s concept of “biopolitical production” implies (2004: 109). 
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What are the political stakes of this debate? What would the political meaning be of a
hegemony of affective labour? Hardt and Negri are the most optimistic proponents of the
immaterial labour theory, suggesting that its tendency towards hegemony will cause
capitalist management to withdraw from the management of labour, becoming a mere
parasite or mechanism of capture (2000: 62). Federici points to the empirically dubious
status of this statement (2011: 68), but here I am more interested in its political
implications. For Hardt and Negri, immaterial labour itself will create a common, due to its
expansive nature that is not limited by a logic of scarcity. The politics of today is therefore
not a question of confrontation with capital over the means of production, but the
multitude’s constitution of common wealth through immaterial production (2009: 283).
Again, it is obvious that Hardt and Negri use intellectual production, especially scientific
production, as a model for all immaterial labour. While it is easy to understand how
knowledge can be reproduced without being diminished, this has different implications for
affective labour. They do not explore what it would mean to say that affect is not limited by
scarcity, and what material conditions would allow for this. While the claim about unlimited
affect could be construed as a contestation of the current limitation of affect to romantic
and familial relations, I think it instead points to Hardt and Negri’s Spinozist understanding
of affect as a vital force. This is especially apparent in their declaration that love is the
ontologically constitutive force of the common (2009: 181). The post-workerist reading of
affect is thus at odds with the feminist reading of reproductive labour, which tends to
emphasise the material basis of the production of affect and the family as the locus of
“love.”40
Post-workerists often ignore that basis, claiming that immaterial labour itself can
constitute the common, without any consideration for the material arrangements necessary
to challenge the current forms of reproductive labour. Indeed, the insistence that
40 See Wilkinson (2017) for a critique of Hardt and Negri’s Spinozist notion of love. 
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immaterial labour in itself provides “the potential for a kind of spontaneous and elementary
communism” (Hardt and Negri 2000: 294) obscures the fact that contemporary forms of
immaterial labour are far from communist. It would be more useful to think about how
immaterial and material labour alike produce many things we need, under social relations
that we do not want. Especially when writing about affective labour, it is apparent that the
post-workerists share the bourgeois, sentimental vision of the family and affective
production, “a haven in a heartless world” now renamed “the potential for communism.” As
Susanne Schultz writes, 
Hardt and Negri’s vague attempts to locate utopian potential in the new forces of production
stand in a long left tradition of idealizing women’s and reproductive work as spheres free from
alienation and domination. In this conception, the gesture they make towards feminist theory (in
a mere footnote) is perhaps better understood as a gentleman-like dismissal of feminist critique,
a way of keeping feminist critique at bay. (2006: 79)
In Empire, Hardt and Negri gesture towards the feminist movement’s struggle on the site of
reproduction, but make it appear as though these struggles are primarily over the valuation
of reproductive labour, rather than a refusal of such labour (2000: 274). The feminist
refusal does not fit neatly into their conception of affective labour as somehow already
communist.
In post-workerist writings, it appears as if feminised labour conditions are only
politically relevant when they have become “generalised” – that is, when they affect white
men. Now, it seems, the time has finally come to expand the sphere of the political to
include everyday life. But what form can organising take in the age of post-Fordist labour?
In post-workerist theory, the era of the union and the party is over. Two post-workerists
who have a more rigorous understanding of gender, Judith Revel and Christian Marazzi,
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both suggest that the feminist movement invented the forms of subjectivity, organisation,
and struggle necessary for a post-Fordist radical politics (Revel 2003: np, Marazzi 2011:
52). If post-workerism is to have a lasting political function, it will hopefully be to broaden
the meaning of revolutionary struggle beyond the confines of productive labour. But as I
have suggested in chapter one, WFH feminists tried to do this in the 1970s. Furthermore,
feminist theorists have been working on more robust conceptualisations of emotional
labour since the early 1980s. The rest of this chapter will be dedicated to their work. 
Emotional labour in feminist theory
Federici’s critique of Hardt and Negri’s notion of affective labour gives us a direction for
reconceptualising this work within a feminist framework. As noted above, she criticises this
concept for neglecting the gendered aspects of affect, and thus how different forms of
work are productive of social difference, which she understands as fundamental to the
reproduction of capitalist relations (2011: 63). Furthermore, she emphasises that placing
affective work within the framework of immaterial labour severs the link between such
labour and other types of gendered work. Care, she notes, depends on the integration of
material and immaterial aspects (RPZ 100, 107). It is only through understanding affective
labour as an integral part of the reproduction of labour power that we can imagine
productive forms of refusal (2011: 71). In her essay, Federici mentions Hochschild as
someone who has usefully conceptualised the gendered aspects of emotional labour
(2011: 66). In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore whether Hochschild can help us
develop a feminist understanding of emotional labour which avoids the pitfalls that Federici
identifies. Questions around gender will as far as possible be deferred to the next chapter,
although the strong link between emotion and gender makes them difficult to disentangle.
Here, I will focus on Hochschild’s writings and later feminist theory on affective and
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emotional labour, while making more passing references to WFH writings. In chapter
three, I will try to bring the analyses of the first two chapters together in an analysis of
emotional labour as (re)productive of gender difference. 
First, we might ask what emotion is. I cannot develop an extended theory of emotion
in this chapter, nor do I think that a theory of emotion separated from social and political
contexts would be very helpful. However, I do want to suggest that the concept of emotion
might be more productive for feminist analyses than that of affect.41 This is partly due to
the conceptual instability of the term affect, which as we have seen is often used to denote
a Spinozist understanding of power, intensity, and energy (Seigworth and Gregg 2010: 2,
6). In my conceptualisation of emotion, I try to move away from such associations. The
conceptual distinction between affect and emotion is shifting, unstable, and often
somewhat incoherent (Whitney 2018: 656 n1), but the terms nonetheless carry somewhat
different associations. I argue that emotion is a politically more useful concept because it
can be clearly linked to processes of management, regulation, and control. As Brian
Massumi writes, “[e]motion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of
insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into
narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning” (2002: 28). Affect, on the
other hand, has more free-floating connotations, as one of its central aspects is that it
consists of pre-conscious or non-conscious intensities, and therefore is less intentional
than emotion (Gutiérrez-Rodríguez 2010: 132). For Massumi, the difference between
affect and emotion is also a distinction of consciousness, as he suggests that affect is pre-
cognitive, bodily, and unqualified (2002: 28). 
The concept of affect also seeks to disprivilege the idea of a coherent subject, and
the notion of internal psychological states. I maintain that it is a virtue of the concept of
emotion that it implicitly refers to a notion of a subject, although as I will argue in the next
41 In this thesis, however, I use the terms emotion and feeling interchangeably. 
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section, that subject need not be understood as a pre-given or “authentic” self. I am
interested precisely in the “conventional” aspects that Massumi assigns to emotion, which I
suggest can tell us something about the gendered constitution of the subject of emotional
labour. Here we can recall Raymond Williams’ phrase “structure of feeling,” which reminds
us that feeling is not random or spontaneous, but tied to various historical processes. As
Williams writes, such a structure is not “recognized as social but taken to be private,
idiosyncratic, and even isolating, but which in analysis [...] has its emergent, connecting,
and dominant characteristics, indeed its specific hierarchies” (1977: 132). 
With Federici, I also suggest that emotion better captures structures of antagonism
than the term affect (2011: 70). Clare Hemmings criticises Eve Sedgwick and Brian
Massumi for presenting affect as difference from social structure, without fully exploring
how affective investments are central to maintaining such structures (2005: 550-551). This
critique could also be made of Hardt and Negri, who are invested in the affirmation of the
emancipatory aspect of affect, thus neglecting how affect or emotion form part of what
binds us to oppressive structures. Given this, I am not convinced of the usefulness of the
concept of affect, especially as a political term or as a way of describing a particular type
of labour. As affect is used to denote pre-conscious social processes, emotion is better
suited to describe those labour processes that involve the intentional orientation towards
the wellbeing of others. 
Some feminist theorists of affective labour do however start from hierarchies of power
and difference. A notable example is Encarnación Gutiérrez-Rodríguez’s book Migration,
domestic work and affect, which explores how affect can both affirm and subvert relations
of power. She suggests that affect is a more encompassing concept than emotion, as it
includes intensities, sensation and bodily reactions, which can exist pre-consciously
without being mentally conceptualised and named as emotion (2010: 5). However,
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Gutiérrez-Rodríguez draws on the same conceptual background as Hardt and Negri,
understanding affect as energy that can circulate through bodies. I find this way of
conceptualising affective investments and processes less helpful, as it relies on a notion of
vitalist energies that are transferred between people. Paradoxically, this can lead to a
strangely reified concept of feeling, where the idea of the subject is replaced with
substantial affects which travel between people and can be stored in a particular body. In
an otherwise helpful essay, to which I will return later, Whitney describes affect as a by-
product, where negative affect becomes a form of waste which can be accumulated in
certain bodies (2018: 638). Here, affect appears as a very thing-like entity, which needs to
be displaced or stored somewhere. The concept of affect thus tends to be conceptualised
either as an unbounded and free-floating energy, or as a thing which can be passed onto
certain subjects. Both of these conceptions run contrary to an understanding of emotion as
labour or process, in which acts of expressing, suppressing and shaping emotion have to
be constantly repeated and managed, and which are bound to the construction of
labouring subjects. The term emotional labour, then, describes this work of managing
emotion. The term “affective labour” cannot quite capture this process, as the
conceptualisation of affect insists on its unmanaged nature. 
In this chapter, I conceptualise emotion as a fundamentally social and rule-bound
process. While often understood as something internal, a psychological state within the
subject, emotion signals the subject’s involvement with the world (Heller 1979: 7). As I will
explore in greater detail below, emotion is not a spontaneous eruption but rather a
profoundly social phenomenon, which is learnt and managed by the subject. Emotion,
then, should be conceptualised not as coming from within the subject, but rather as a form
of interaction between the subject and the social, though which the subject becomes
involved in social practices. This includes hierarchies of power, which become part of the
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subject through emotional processes. 
It is not easy to pin down an exact definition of emotion, as it is by its nature an
elusive phenomenon (Lupton 1998: 167). I follow Deborah Lupton and Alison Jaggar in
their interest in emotion as a historically malleable and everyday concept (Lupton 1998: 5,
Jaggar 1992: 117-118). With this I wish to emphasise that emotion is not a “thing” which
we can identify and intellectually separate from other phenomena. Rather, in Jaggar’s
words, it describes a form of habit or a way of engaging with the world, which escapes
simple dichotomies of activity and passivity. Emotions presume language and social order,
and they are closely linked to social values and modes of evaluation (1992: 123-124).
Emotions are not passive states that we simply endure, but neither are they things which a
subject can fully control or will into being. They form part of the very constitution of the
subject itself, and are fundamental to constituting the subject as a social being. 
Subject and status
Several critics have argued that Hochschild’s theorisation of emotional labour depends on
a notion of an authentic self (Tracy 2000: 97, Weeks 2007: 244). However, I contend that
her argument is more complex than that. She does draw on an understanding of a subject
with “real” feelings, and argues that the capacity for emotion is a biologically given sense,
which like hearing and sight has a signal function (MH 29). However, the realness of these
emotions is also socially constituted. A Hochschildian understanding of emotional labour is
not dependent on a notion of an authentic self, although she sometimes seems to argue
for the existence of such a self. The notion of authenticity, Hochschild suggests, is a result
of certain historical processes, in particular the commodification of emotional labour (MH
190).
This aspect of Hochschild’s thought is underdeveloped and sometimes contradictory.
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She is aware of the constructedness of the authentic self, yet her writing often seems to
take this self as a given. Therefore, I want to turn to some other theorists of subjectivity,
from which we can develop a notion of emotional labour which is not tied to notions of a
pre-social self. I argue that the subject as we understand it is in fact a historical product,
related to changes in social relations at the inception of modernity. As Cinzia Arruzza puts
it, “a robust notion of the privacy of affects as characterizing what it means to be a unique
individual arises with capitalism and modernity” (2014: np). Historian Lawrence Stone calls
this “affective individualism” – the process through which an idea of an individual with a
private and affective interior life became prominent, as well as a focus on the individual’s
emotional self-expression (1979: 151). In Lupton’s words, the body and the self in the
Middle Ages were conceptualised as “far less contained, privatized and controlled” than
they are today (1998: 72). Both Michelle Rosaldo (1984: 146) and Theresa Brennan (2004:
2) refer to the idea of the emotionally bounded individual as a Eurocentric form of thinking.
As such, it is tied to capitalist-colonial systems of power (Bhandar 2018: 4, 179) as well as
gendered forms of labour. This is related to possessive individualism, a term that I will
explore in greater depth in the next chapter. Here, I want to note that this understanding of
the self is a real abstraction – we cannot simply do away with it intellectually, since it is
implicated in real social relations. The fact that many modern philosophers have criticised
this notion of the subject has not led to its disappearance, nor can we simply choose to
understand our own selves as a mere bundle of experiences and social processes. 
While subjective interiority thus appears as simply given and natural, we do not need
to rely on notions of authentic subjectivity in order to suggest that the subject is not mere
flux. Weeks argues that while there is no pre-given subjectivity, labour practices have an
ontologising effect, a process through which the subject comes to appear as a stable entity
through memory, desire, and habit (1998: 133). According to Arruzza, our sense of
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ourselves as ontologically pre-given subjects exists in contradiction with another process
in capitalist society, in which emotions come to appear as things, which are detachable
from their subjects. In a parallel to Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism, Arruzza calls
this “affects fetishism,” through which feelings come to appear as discrete entities,
separate from their social context (2014: np). While affective individualism is an aspect of
possessive individualism and a prerequisite for the commodification of labour power,
affects fetishism is part of a general process of the commodification of things and services.
This means that two seemingly contradictory developments – the focus on an “authentic”
self and the view that emotions are detachable from the subject – are both part of a
modern, capitalist structure of the subject (Oksala 2016: 295). This process, which
according to Arruzza is experienced within the subject as a clash between two logics, is
particularly noticeable in the commodified forms of emotional labour that Hochschild
describes, which draw on supposedly intimate feelings in ways that people might
experience as alienating (MH 90, 187). Nonetheless, it is also part of unwaged emotional
labour, and constitutes an aspect of the emotional landscape of capitalist society more
broadly. 
This concept of the subject as a historical phenomenon is sometimes consistent with
Hochschild’s own account, and sometimes in contradiction with it. Hochschild writes that
“we search for a solid, predictable core of self even though the conditions for the existence
of such a self have long since vanished” (MH 22). Here, she seems to indicate that such
conditions were once given, but have been undone by the flux of capitalist relations, rather
than arguing that capitalism itself was one of the preconditions for the emergence of this
construction of stable subjective interiority. However, in the next paragraph she goes on to
suggest that we look to emotion as a way of establishing such a core self. Because
emotions come to appear as indicators of an authentic self, she writes, they are given
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more weight (MH 22). Hochschild’s account thus wavers somewhat between describing
our current understanding of an authentic affective subject as a historical product or as a
pre-modern true self which is threatened by the logic of capitalism. In her later writings,
Hochschild seems to have chosen the second option, although not without offering some
critique of it (2003b: 24). However, we can use passages of The managed heart to build a
non-essentialist notion of the subject. Here, subjective interiority is constructed through a
process in which emotions become expressions of an authentic self, while simultaneously
emerging as highly malleable and as material for labour. 
It is not necessary, then, to read Hochschild as arguing for a stable and authentic
subjective interiority. Even when she describes an experience of contradiction between an
authentic inner self and imposed rules for emotion, both of these can be understood as
historically constituted. Hochschild describes the process through which feeling becomes
perceived as an object or a resource which we can manage or work on (MH 41) as well as
our shifting understanding of which feelings are “real” (MH 45). Because we use emotion
to locate our supposedly authentic selves, and because emotion is subjected to various
forms of management, there is no need to posit emotion as the source of our core identity
in order to derive a coherent theory from Hochschild’s account of emotional labour. She
writes that “we make up an idea of our ‘real self,’ an inner jewel that remains our unique
possession” (MH 34). Indeed, we can read this conflict between the real self and reified
emotion as a interiorised version of the dichotomy between private and public in capitalist
society, which is historically constructed and unstable, but which nonetheless produces
real social effects. This does not mean, however, that Hochschild’s use of these
categories, especially the distinction between private and public, is not sometimes
unsatisfying or does not lead to an incorrect understanding of the role of emotion in
capitalist public life. I will return to this issue towards the end of this chapter. 
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Before exploring in more detail what emotional labour is, I want to note that emotion
has an important role to play in shoring up our sense of identity and subjectivity.
Subjectivity in modernity is fundamentally bound to hierarchy, so that the notion of a
coherent subject who is the master of its own capacities is tied to various forms of material
and social inequality. However, these inequalities become invisible in the making of this
subject, as it depends precisely on the erasure of the social. As Brenna Bhandar shows,
the self-possessed subject of modernity was defined in opposition to the figures of the
savage, the woman, and the child (2018: 183). This suggests that subjectivity is
fundamentally related to status. It is my contention that emotional reproduction is central in
the production of both subjectivity and status, and that we need a rather capacious
understanding of emotional labour in order to understand this process. In her study of
black maids and their white, female employers, Judith Rollins argues that the domestic
labourer is not only economically exploited, but also suffers from psychological exploitation
(1985: 156). The figure of the domestic worker produces a “contrast figure,” which affirms
the status and social world view of the employer while simultaneously making this work of
affirmation invisible. It enhances the liberation of middle- and upper-class white women
from participation in traditionally feminised forms of work, and thus establishes their status
as hegemonically modern subjects (1985: 129, 180, see also Anderson 2000: 2). It also
frees them to perform the more highly valued forms of emotional labour, especially the
“spiritual” work of motherhood (Roberts 1997a: 55, Barbagallo 2016: 114). This implies
that emotional reproduction can be understood in broader terms than Hochschild’s
definition of emotional labour, explored in the next section, seems to allow for.
Furthermore, the production of gendered, classed and racialised status is a more central
aspect of emotional labour than Hochschild suggests. Status in capitalist society is
continually reproduced within the process of affirming some people’s emotions while
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disregarding the emotional wellbeing of others. 
Definitions of emotional labour
Like any influential concept, emotional labour has been defined and redefined in numerous
ways. Hochschild’s original definition is stated in different ways, all of which require some
unpacking. In the introduction to The managed heart, Hochschild writes that emotional
labour is “the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily
display” which is sold for a wage (MH 7). The more detailed definition is that emotional
labour consists of 1) face-to-face or voice-to-voice interaction with the public, 2) the
production of an emotional state in another person, and 3) employer control of the worker’s
behaviour (MH 147). It is immediately clear that Hochschild draws a distinction between
private and public (or commercial) forms of emotion management, where only the
commercial form is true emotional labour. This is problematic from a WFH perspective,
which focuses on the continuities between waged and unwaged work. Hochschild calls the
private counterpart of emotional labour “emotion work,” which functions in similar ways but
is not subjected to a profit-motive. We can also note that this definition restricts emotional
labour proper to jobs that include public-facing work, thus excluding, for instance, the
emotional labour done by secretaries for their bosses (AWNP 10, 45). 
Further, Hochschild argues that successful commercial emotional labour depends on
the transmutation (or transformation from private to public) of emotion work, feeling rules,
and social exchange (MH 118). Emotion work is defined as the management, expression
or suppression of emotion (MH 7). Feeling rules are the often unstated social rules that
dictate what emotions are appropriate in particular circumstances, and how they should be
expressed (MH 56). Social exchange is the forms that our social relations take, in terms of
the trading back and forth of social obligations (MH 19). Whereas private emotion work,
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according to Hochschild, depends on the logic of gift exchange, transmutation demands
that these processes are subjected to external control, in the form of rules imposed by a
company. This means that when emotional labour is directed and controlled by employers,
feeling rules (which are normally implicit) become explicitly stated in company manuals,
and social exchange is forced into a narrower form, where it is performed by an employee
for the sake of a customer (MH 119). 
Taking these three definitions together, we can see that Hochschild uses a fairly
narrow conception of emotional labour, which mainly defines the problem with emotional
labour in terms of its commercialisation. Subsequently, academics have used the term in
more encompassing ways, including emotional labour done for colleagues (Pierce 1996)
and in the family (Duncombe and Marsden 1995, Mulholland 1996, Seery and Crowley
2000). This has led critics such as Sharon Bolton to argue that the term emotional labour
is incorrectly applied (2005: 55). However, the problem with Hochschild’s definition, and
even more with Bolton’s own and narrower conceptualisation of emotional labour (2005:
94-97), is that it produces a complex definitional framework which highlights minor
differences while obscuring the continuities between various forms of emotional labour.
While I partly agree with Johanna Oksala’s insistence on the importance of analytically
separating different types of emotional and reproductive labour (2016: 291), we also need
to account for how similar logics are reproduced across waged and unwaged spheres. As
Helen Colley has suggested, the conceptual distinction between emotional labour and
emotion work makes social relationships within the family appear as being somehow
outside capitalism (2015: 228). Therefore, I follow Nicky James (1989, 1992) in using
emotional labour as an overarching term that spans both private and commercial settings.
I use the term emotional labour to denote interactive work that produces, or is intended to
produce, psychic or emotional effects in another subject. I include not only the work of
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emotionally affecting someone else, but also that of constituting and reproducing
emotional bonds. Emotional labour, I argue, always impacts the working subject as well as
the recipient of emotional labour. 
This leads us to questions regarding the connection between emotional management
of the self and that of others. Here, Hochschild introduces the distinction between surface
acting (which aims at creating a certain emotion in another person) and deep acting (which
also influences the subject’s perception of its own emotional states) (MH 33). This
distinction has led to a discussion around false consciousness, since it seems that
Hochschild assumes that people engaged in deep acting are duped by management
(Leidner 1993: 5, Lopez 2005: 136). However, I want to focus on the continuity between
the emotion management of self and others. Whitney writes that the strength of
Hochschild’s account compared to that of her followers is that she emphasises the
connection between the management of one’s own emotions and those of others (2018:
643). As Svenja Bromberg suggests, this can help us understand the role of emotional
labour in the making of subjectivity, thus explaining how hierarchies of gender are
experienced as part of the subject and not mere external constraints (2015: 112). 
A focus on the link between emotion management of the self and the management of
other people’s emotions also allows for a deeper understanding of how emotion is not only
cognitive and immaterial, but rather must be part of an embodied practice. As Hochschild
writes, emotional labour crucially involves a “publicly observable facial and bodily display”
(MH 7). Further, she defines emotion as “the awareness of bodily cooperation with an
idea, thought, or attitude and the label attached to that awareness” (2003b: 75). It is thus
not the case, as critics such as Witz, Warhurst, and Nickson have suggested (2003: 36),
that emotional labour theory presents the worker as a mindful rather than embodied
worker. Emotion as a theoretical paradigm allows us to move beyond simple dichotomies
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of mind and body.42 Emotional labour is embodied not only in the sense of using the body
as a tool for communicating emotion, but also because emotion itself involves bodily
dispositions as well as cognitive states. As I noted above, there are strong links between
emotional and sexual labour. Federici suggests that emotive communication has a sexual
component, as body and emotion are indivisible (RPZ 24). This emphasis on embodied
performance serves to link emotional labour to the gendering of the body, something I will
discuss further in chapter three. 
With James, it is also worth noting that emotional labour is skilled work (SRC 167),
even though it is rarely recognised as such. It involves techniques of emotional
communication as well as the emotional management of the self (MH 33). Emotional
labour does not just come “naturally” to certain personalities, as is often implied by
mainstream discourses on emotion, but rather it has to be learnt. Hochschild and Federici
both note that these techniques are closely related to the construction of femininity (MH
11, Federici 2011: 66).
Love and care
The primary function of emotional labour is to create good feeling. This is not always the
case – Hochschild studies the masculinised work of bill collectors whose labour consists of
instilling fear and deflating the status of the debtor (MH 139). However, for most
companies, as well as much unwaged emotional reproduction, the aim is to increase the
emotional wellbeing of at least one of the participants of social exchange. We can
therefore understand emotional labour as a form of care, which is often an integral part of
more physical or domestic types of care. Caring practices can involve various degrees of
emotional labour. Hochschild’s flight attendants perform a highly visible form of emotional
42 For an extended discussion of emotion and embodiment, see Lupton (1998: 31-37).
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labour, where smiling and comforting passengers are primary functions of the job. In some
cases, care can involve a minimal degree of emotional labour, as the main aim is to satisfy
physical need. Sometimes, physical care can be accompanied with emotional neglect or
even abuse. We thus cannot take for granted that caring labour will necessarily work
across both physical and emotional levels, but need to think of emotional labour as a semi-
autonomous aspect of reproduction more broadly. However, as DeVault and others have
shown, the satisfaction of physical needs, such as the need for food, often contains an
emotional component (1991: 35, Carrington 1999: 32-33). I therefore want to think about
emotional labour as a kind of organising principle of care, where “caring about” someone is
in most cases an aspect of “caring for” that person (Ungerson 1983: 31). The intimate
labour of care often results in emotional involvement, although that involvement might not
consist of “positive” emotions such as love or empathy, but can also cause emotions such
as disgust, boredom, or anger. Emotional labour can involve the management of such
negative emotions as much as fostering feelings of love or affection. This, however, is also
part of the creation of good feeling. 
As Hochschild argues, the feelings of those with higher status are often granted
greater importance than the feelings of subordinate people (MH 84).43 Emotional labour
thus tends to cater to those at the top of the social hierarchy. This is especially true of the
creation of positive feeling, which as Hochschild states tends to move upwards in social
hierarchies (2003b: 85). A prominent feminist account that centres on this aspect of
emotional labour is Anna Jónasdóttir’s theory of love power. Jónasdóttir contends that
women are oppressed because they satisfy men’s sociosexual needs without reciprocity,
thus making men more powerful and confident, particularly in relation to women (1994:
43 However, as I will discuss below, the feelings of children are nowadays often prioritised over those of 
adults, and children are often the recipients of emotional care. Fortunati highlights the subordination of 
the needs of parents to those of their children, as carriers of future labour power (AR 19).
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26).44 This theory is intended as a materialist account of women’s oppression, which
centres on the need for emotional, sexual and existential satisfaction, parallel to how
Marxism is founded on a theory of physical need. Jónasdóttir is a dual-systems theorist in
that she posits emotional needs as separate and parallel to the need for food, shelter, et
cetera, thus arguing that women’s oppression has an autonomous foundation (1994: 12-
13). While my account of emotional reproduction shares some aspects of Jónasdóttir’s
theory, notably our focus on emotional need as an organising principle for material life
(1994: 229), I want to emphasise that care must be understood as a continuum of physical
and emotional needs. There is thus no viable distinction between sociosexual (gendered)
needs on the one hand and material (class-based) needs on the other. From a WFH
perspective, I argue that much emotional care takes place through various material acts of
care (RPZ 107). While some forms of work require more “pure” forms of emotional labour,
even the work of flight attendants includes material tasks such as providing food and
drinks. 
To explain how emotional labour works in intimate practices of care, Hochschild
introduces the concept of gift exchange. This form of social exchange structures caring
interactions, and specifies what is owed by various participants (MH 18). The
conceptualisation of emotion as gift exchange explains how emotion is not a spontaneous
and unruly form of expression, even though emotional gift-giving might be experienced as
such. Rather, emotional expression is highly structured and bound up with various social
forms, across both private and public spheres. Emotional gift exchange is not just the
expression of emotion, but can also include the performance of various practical tasks (MH
84). These tasks are given emotional meaning as part of an ongoing social relation.
Hochschild’s study The second shift (1989a) explores how domestic work is incorporated
in emotional and gendered systems of meaning when performed within the intimate setting
44 See also Ferguson (1991) for a similar theory, based on a concept of sex-affective production.
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of the home. Here, “gifts” such as cleaning and cooking might become emotional currency
and contribute to the maintenance of the emotional bonds of the family. What counts as a
gift thus depends on the broader social and economic context in which the intimate
relationship is set. Subordinates generally “owe” more than dominant partners in
relationships (MH 84). In the sphere of the heterosexual family, women are expected to
contribute more to the continued emotional wellbeing of individual family members, as well
as ensuring the maintenance of the family bond itself (Di Leonardo 1987: 442, Seery and
Crowley 2000: 110). However, we can question whether emotional labour can be
understood within a gift exchange framework when it is so deeply naturalised that it comes
to be understood as an aspect of feminine personality (RPZ 16). In chapter three, I will
explore how heterogendered understandings of complementarity become a way of
sustaining relationships, a notion that does not rely on each participant contributing
discrete “gifts” to an emotional exchange. Rather, it is based on a more continuous
understanding of emotional reproduction. 
 Hilary Graham states that care is a way of making the fragmentary cohesive (1983:
26). Through caring practices, disparate acts are integrated into an emotional bond. Care
most often involves a multitude of different tasks, some of which might be invisible
because they consist precisely of the mental work that goes into coordinating the
satisfaction of various needs (DeVault 1991: 56, 90). In some cases, more privileged
women, who are wives and mothers, are seen as performing the labour of love even when
they delegate much of that work to domestic workers. Because of the emotional bond
between the mother-wife and her husband and children, emotional labour might become
more visible when she performs it, while also being more naturalised. This is related to the
conception of emotional labour as a form of zero-sum game, in which emotional bonds
owe their intensity to their exclusivity.
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 Intimate relationships contain a potentially infinite number of tasks, as they are
intended to meet the complex needs of individuals (AR 110). As Federici puts it, wives are
expected to be “housemaids, prostitutes, nurses, shrinks” for their husbands (RPZ 20). Or
as Giovanna Dalla Costa writes, care produces “a continuum of work” (WL 46). This
continuum ensures that emotional labour, and reproductive labour more broadly, are not
understood as a set of limited tasks that can be ticked off on a list. Rather, our
contemporary understanding of loving relationships requires them to be “without measure”
(WL 53). This supposedly infinite and unconditional nature of love, however, is unequally
performed. For a woman, as I will argue in more detail in the next chapter, this might imply
the expectation of being constantly available to meet the emotional needs of people she
loves. Giovanna Dalla Costa writes that, for a woman, merely being present within the
home is a form of work, as it means she is available to physically and emotionally
reproduce other members of the household (WL 79). The problem of measurement of
affective labour, which Hardt and Negri seem to assume is a recent development (2000:
209), has thus always been an integral and crucial aspect of this work, especially when it
is performed unwaged and out of love. 
Love, contrary to Hardt and Nergri’s account of it in Commonwealth (2009: 181), is a
highly privatised “resource.” In contemporary capitalist society, love is constructed as an
intensive emotion, but also something that is restricted to a limited sphere. Stone argues
that affective individualism brought with it a notion of the subject which had a heightened
affective capacity but for a more restrictive group of people (1982: 180). This is related to
the construction of the “authentic” interior self that Arruzza theorises. However, some
forms of waged emotional labour might require the worker to empathise with a larger
group, especially for those in need of physical care such as children and the elderly, thus
producing clashing principles of emotion management. This is also related to parenting, as
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nannies sometimes appear as a threat to the exclusive emotional bonds of the family
(Macdonald 2010: 137). 
As the material acts of reproduction often operate through emotional bonds, and are
co-constitutive with them, it is difficult to fully separate reproductive labour from emotional
labour, or what the WFH writers call “love.” Love is constructed as a reward for this work,
and what makes the work of reproduction sufferable (WL 57). It is also a feeling that hides
the effort and skill that goes into caring (RPZ 21). While not all relationships based on care
work or emotional labour involve love, it is important as an organising factor of many of our
most important and enduring reproductive relationships. Many other forms of care are also
constructed as being “worthy” or “good” work, and thus inherently rewarding. As WFH
writers argue with regard to the work of nurses, this work involves many of the same
emotional structures that bind people to their unwaged work in the home (AWNP 73).
Hochschild notes that while intimate relationships are supposedly free from regulation,
consisting merely of the spontaneous expression of love, feeling rules and emotion work
may be more important the deeper the relationship, due to the heightened attachment to
those relationships (MH 68). Here, we can return to the question of the constitution of the
subject. While a breach of the rules of emotional exchange in an ephemeral service
encounter might not generate anything more than annoyance, emotional neglect in an
intimate relationship might be experienced as a threat to the subject itself, as intimate
attachments are central to “the continuity of the subject’s sense of what it means to keep
on living and to look forward to being in the world” (Berlant 2006: 21). 
Love, I argue, is essential to constituting the individuality of people. In modernity,
love has become that which confirms the value of a person, especially in the intimate
sphere of reproduction (Berlant 2012: 102). More specifically, love entails focusing on the
desirable qualities of the other (MH 236), and, as Theresa Brennan puts it, attending to the
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specificity of the other (2004: 32). I argue that emotional labour processes often ensure
that not only do acts of reproductive labour serve to satisfy the needs of individuals, but
can also affirm the status of the recipient of care, and thus participate in the construction of
individualism – what Brenda Seery and Sue Crowley refer to as “ego work” (2000: 110).
This can include seemingly insignificant acts of reproductive labour, such as cooking a
meal in a way that attends to the specific preferences of family members (DeVault 1991:
85, 90). It can also include acts that affirm your partner’s gendered subjectivity (Holmberg
1993: 138, Ward 2010). All these acts contribute to the emotional evaluation of an
individual, as well as ensuring that their basic needs are met. Here, needs become an
expression of individualism through the construction of such needs as a form of unique
self-expression. As I will discuss further in chapter three, it also contributes to gendered
forms of status through the construction of masculinity as autonomy and femininity as
dependency. 
Furthermore, love places limits on the refusal of emotional and reproductive labour –
in Giovanna Dalla Costa’s words, one cannot stage a slowdown or a strike when it affects
those one loves. Love can thus be used to extract an infinite amount of labour (WL 46, 54,
88). Mariarosa Dalla Costa describes love as a form of blackmail (PWSC 33). We can note
the prevalence of the feeling of guilt in feminist writings on care and emotion (Hays 1996:
150-151, DeVault 1991: 134, Macdonald 2010: 28, AWNP 73). Guilt seems to tether
people to the work relationships in which they are participants, and make sure that the
work “owed” in that relationship is carried out. Even though it is a negative emotion, which
people are likely to avoid, it is closely correlated to love. Hochschild notes that we can feel
guilty for failing to feel the right thing, or feeling what is “owed” (MH 82). Guilt can be a
threat to one’s sense of self as a generous, loving person, and thus undermine a positive
evaluation of the self (DeVault 1991: 134). However, it can also reinforce a sense of self –
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the feeling of guilt can act as an indication that one is actually a good person (MH 32).
Most forms of emotional labour induce the subject to take on an understanding of itself as
generous and giving. According to Fortunati, women are characterised as generous
because they perform the work of love (AR 75). Federici notes that emotional investment
in the object of caring work can entail emotions of responsibility and pride, thus preventing
the worker from cutting those attachments, even when they are exploitative (2011: 69). 
With such forceful impediments, we can question Hochschild’s claim that we are
more free to renegotiate the emotional standards in private relationships than in
commercial ones (MH 85). Many people do leave relationships that are emotionally
unsatisfactory, and changed emotional standards over the last decades have made
divorce more socially acceptable and presumably less guilt-inducing. However, Hochschild
seems to suggest that the commercial logics of company management are more forceful
than private emotional investments. But aside from the economic precarity of many
people, which makes it difficult for people to break up family relationships, emotional
investment can serve to maintain ongoing intimate work relationships in the private sphere,
even when they are emotionally unsatisfactory. Hegemonic understandings of emotional
life stipulate that emotional needs are best satisfied within the family, which might make it
seem risky to opt out of even unfulfilling family arrangements. Barrett and McIntosh argue
that the family has monopolised care in a way that makes it more difficult to build
alternative forms of caring relationships (2015: 80). As Hochschild herself notes, persistent
gender inequality deepens women’s emotional “debt” and thus makes it more difficult not
to fulfil family obligations. Even in supposedly egalitarian heterosexual couples, the wider
context of gender inequality posits that women owe men gratitude for such relative equality
(MH 85). This situation fixes standards for emotional exchange as well as contributing to
the reproduction of gender within intimate relationships. Lauren Berlant argues that women
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might experience some satisfaction from emotional labour, even when it is not
reciprocated (2008: 19). Being perceived as emotionally generous, and watching loved
ones flourish emotionally, is key to the feminised ideal of the good life.  
Parenting and emotional reproduction
Within the context of the emotional reproduction of the family, parenting is different from
the gendered patterns of obligation discussed above. While the child is in some sense
subordinate to its parents, in contemporary capitalist society, children’s emotional needs
are afforded a greater social weight. In the modern period, children were increasingly
constructed as a different kind of being from adults (Stone 1979: 149). Children are now
seen as innocent and unsullied by the supposedly cold and unfeeling logic of capitalism
(Cancian 1987: 18, Hays 1996: 31, 125). In Viviana Zelizer’s words, children are
increasingly constructed as economically worthless but emotionally priceless (1985: 3).
Childhood is thus constructed as a zone of particular emotional intensity, and mothers
especially are made responsible for meeting the emotional needs of their children. In the
modern period, there has been a shift in parenting methods, as physical discipline was
deemphasised at the same time as love came to appear as the primary tool for socialising
children. Displays of parental love could be used to reward children, whereas the
withdrawal of such displays became the primary means for punishing a child for bad
behaviour (Hays 1996: 32). Love thus emerges as a disciplinary force. 
This coincided with the rise of psychological experiments around childhood
attachment (Brennan 2004: 32), as well as literature aimed at mothers which emphasised
the need for a primary caregiver (Hays 1996: 55). Emotional needs were thus constructed
in a way that meant that only one person could satisfy them. Even with the rise of “working
mothers” and daycare centres, this notion of individualised parenting was retained or even
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intensified. As Hochschild notes, mothers are constructed as primary parents – the people
responsible for fulfilling their children’s need for emotional warmth (1989a: 150). Here,
emotional labour is intensely privatised in the sense that it is tied to a specific person and
cannot be fulfilled in the same way by another adult. Emotional labour thus emerges as a
zero-sum game, in which emotional satisfaction is linked to exclusive bonds. Sharon Hays
calls this “intensive mothering,” to signal its difference from other standards of parenthood.
This type of mothering is labour-intensive and emotionally absorbing. While this emotional
standard is closely associated with the rise of bourgeois culture, it affects working-class
mothering as well, as it is tied to notions of aspiration and class mobility (Hays 1996: 3,
43). This form of mothering is based on the contradiction discussed above, where an
increased focus on the subject’s capacity for intense emotions is coupled with a notion of
capitalism as devoid of emotion or, at most, as treating emotion as commodities. 
Cameron Lynne Macdonald argues that this idea is also related to a form of
emotional privatisation, where the nuclear family is seen “as an isolated unit with its own
limited resources” (2010: 5). Mothers, Macdonald writes, are seen as having “blanket
accountability” for how their children turn out (2010: 13). This, as I will discuss in more
detail below, is fundamentally linked to the reproduction of class relations. Mothering is
not, then, somehow separate from capitalism, but an important aspect of setting the
emotional standards in capitalist societies. Seery and Crowley show that mothers are also
assigned responsibility for constituting and maintaining the bonds between fathers and
children, thus having a blanket responsibility not only for the emotional wellbeing of the
child itself but for the emotional life of the family. Mothers are constructed as “love’s
experts” – working to interpret the emotional needs of different members of the family so
that the family might continue to exist (2000: 122). 
Weeks rightly notes that Hochschild tends to naturalise these intensive emotional
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standards (2011: 158). Especially in her later writings, Hochschild takes the emotional
needs of children as a given and constructs her critique of (waged) work from the
perspective of those needs. Here, capitalist production is criticised from the standpoint of
emotional reproduction, without an acknowledgement of how those spheres are intimately
intertwined. Hochschild does note that this emotional standard tends to make parenting
more labour-intensive, for instance when she writes that there is now a “third shift” (after
waged work and domestic work) devoted to the emotional labour of soothing children,
whose emotional needs have supposedly been neglected during the day (1997: 215).
However, she does not question the need for such a shift, nor does she question her own
assumption that children’s emotional needs can only be met in the private sphere by a
primary caregiver. We thus need to supplement Hochschild’s account in order to construct
a radical politics of emotional reproduction. While I agree with Hochschild’s emphasis on
emotional need, we should understand need as historically constituted and tied to specific
forms of sociality, which entail potentially exploitative forms of labour. This construction of
need can also mean that mothers’ emotional wellbeing is sacrificed for the sake of their
children (Fox 2006: 237). Emotional need cannot be taken as a given, as there might be
competing needs that cannot all be satisfied, thus making it a shaky foundation for radical
politics. Prioritising children’s emotional satisfaction over that of adults depends on a
cultural zoning of childhood as a time of particular emotional intensity. As Fortunati points
out, mothers’ own emotional needs then have to be adjusted so that they are satisfied
through the emotional satisfaction of other family members (AR 77). 
In The managed heart, Hochschild suggests that parental love is constructed as
“natural” and unconditional, and therefore not in need of regulation. She writes that we
think of this love as spontaneous, as nature supposedly “does the work of convention for
us.” However, she emphasises that we do rely on conventions to regulate these bond, as
104
they are sometimes difficult to sustain (MH 69). It thus seems that Hochschild is well
aware that the sphere of the family is not a site of natural emotional needs, but rather that
emotional expectations for what a parent-child bond should entail are themselves situated
within a wider social context. The emotional site of the family, then, is not outside of the
emotional regulation of waged work, but rather co-constituted with such regulation and
responsive to changes in the broader emotional standards of capitalism. 
The emotional needs of children have long been used to extract more emotional and
physical labour from mothers. Fortunati criticises the literature aimed at mothers which
establishes those emotional standards by claiming that children who are not loved enough
become “maladjusted” (AR 75, see also Rose 1990: 163). This understanding of child care
makes women morally responsible for both the current and future wellbeing of the child.
Emotional reproduction, then, is constructed as the foundation of successful reproduction
more broadly. Social problems are blamed on the supposed failure of women to love their
children enough. Brennan emphasises the importance of emotional care through a reading
of studies on the effects of a lack of love on orphaned children, which suggest that such
children do not physically grow at an average rate. She uses this argument to undo the
boundaries of the physical and the psychic, arguing that love itself is the basis of biological
life and consciousness (2004: 32). However, under current social relations, this is easily
turned into a moralising argument which blames a general lack of emotional and physical
flourishing on individuals, most often mothers. 
Emotional class reproduction 
While we tend to associate reproductive work with the reproduction of people or labour
power, it is important to remember that class distinctions themselves need to be
continually reproduced. Macdonald notes that the work of status attainment, often taken
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for granted, is primarily women’s work (2010: 202). Much of this work takes place in the
private sphere. Kate Mulholland, in her study of “self-made men,” notes that men’s social
mobility often depends on the emotional labour which they receive in the home, which
encourages them to inhabit individualist subjectivity. Unwaged emotional labour, she
argues, is thus an essential input into capitalist accumulation (1996: 123, 148-149). As I
noted in chapter one, the work that goes into reproduction remains invisible as it becomes
part of labour power, thus disappearing the trace of emotional labour.
The emotional conditioning of children is also a fundamental aspect of reproducing
capitalist class relations. Intensive mothering is responsive to the naturalised and
individualised emotional needs of children, and therefore teaches them that those needs
are important. Hochschild suggests that middle-class parents prime their children for high-
status professions by centring on developing a capacity for decision-making (MH 157).
Similarly, Hays writes that intensive mothering offers middle-class children self-esteem
and independence (1996: 91). Macdonald uses the term “competitive mothering” for this
kind of class transmission. Competitive mothering prepares children for success in their
future careers, and is a way of ensuring the preservation or improvement of the family
class advantage (2010: 21, 25). This form of parenting, in which families are competing
over increasingly scarce resources, serves to constantly increase the emotional standards
of childhood. Contra Hays, Macdonald writes that class reproduction through competitive
mothering shows that there is no contradiction between the ideals of intensive mothering
and the logic of the market. Intensive mothering is a way of translating the logic of market
within the family (2010: 203). 
Hochschild argues that middle-class families have long trained their children for
emotion management, through stressing the importance of emotion. The child learns that
their own emotions have a social importance, but also that they can be instrumentalised
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and adjusted (MH 158). This form of parenting has an appearance of freedom, as middle-
class parenting centres on the needs and desires of the child. But as I have argued above,
those needs and desires are not given. Rather, they are created through the very process
of parenting that is supposedly responding to them. Middle-class parenting, according to
Hochschild, works not against but through the will of the child (MH 157). It is thus based on
the construction of affective individualism. This creates the impression of freedom, yet the
whole project of parenting is about educating that will in the right direction, and teaching
the child to desire class reproduction. Hays notes that this is a very labour-intensive form
of parenting, as reasoning with a child takes more time than simply telling the child what to
do (1996: 64). This is the work that bourgeois women perform to ensure the reproduction
of their own class status. 
According to both Hochschild and Hays, working-class parents are more likely to
emphasise obedience and discipline (MH 156, Hays 1996: 93). But Hochschild points out
that with the increase in work requiring emotional labour, working-class parenting styles
might change (MH 160). The demand for the emotional styles of discipline and deference,
however, is still central for working-class jobs. As Federici argues, the availability of a
stable, well-disciplined labour force is an essential condition of production (RPZ 31).
Fortunati also writes about what she calls the “non-material labour” of creating work
discipline and adaptation to work conditions. She argues that this work is as important as
the work of feeding and clothing the family, stating that “[t]he continual reproduction of the
working class, which is essential for capital, depends on these relationships, so too does
its productivity, its work discipline and adaptation to a whole complex of living conditions”
(AR 75). Hochschild argues that this is to prepare working-class children for work that
does not require emotional labour per se – that is, work that aims to influence the
emotional state of another person. Rather, working-class jobs tend to deal with things
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rather than people (MH 154). However, this has changed since Hochschild wrote The
managed heart, as more and more working-class people are part of what Macdonald and
Sirianni describe as the “emotional proletariat,” characterised by strict regulation of their
emotional expressions at work (1996: 3). This means that working-class people engaged
in the service industry might face similar demands to those of Hochschild’s flight
attendants, a profession which she describes as distinctly middle-class, especially since it
draws on middle-class notions of femininity (MH 175). As low-waged reproductive service
jobs become increasingly prevalent, Hochschild’s remarks on the class-specific nature of
emotional labour ring less true today. 
Thus, as jobs involving emotional labour have become increasingly proletarianised
with the growing service economy, it might no longer be the case, as Hochschild suggests,
that working-class people “may enjoy almost complete freedom from feeling rules,
although they have no right to set them for others,” therefore enjoying “the licence of the
dispossessed” (MH 155). Nor might it be the case that the outward behaviour of people in
working-class occupations is all that matters, and that they have more freedom to enjoy
their own interior lives beyond company regulation (MH 154, 159). Rather, capacities for
management of negative emotions, both one’s own and those of others, may be
increasingly central in working-class jobs in the service economy. This would presumably
put an increased emphasis on “people skills” in working-class upbringings. As Whitney
writes, many of these jobs involve “the work of metabolizing unwanted affects and
affective byproducts” (2018: 643, emphasis in original). As noted above, I am reluctant to
use Whitney’s conceptual framework of affect as by-products that can be passed around,
although I share her understanding of the role of emotion in service encounters. In my
terminology, working-class service jobs are mainly about the management of other
people’s negative emotions, rather than what Hochschild describes as the traditional
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working-class emotional field of suppressing one’s own boredom or fear (MH 154). 
In the WFH literature, there is an emphasis on emotional labour as a “safety valve.”
The role of the woman in the working-class family, Federici suggests, is as a shock
absorber for discontent (RPZ 18, 24). For the WFH writers, then, the work of emotional
reproduction is less about commodifying one’s capacity for emotion management as part
of one’s labour power, but rather about managing those feelings that are excluded from
the waged workplace. However, this work is not merely oriented towards the suppression
of bad feeling. It is also about creating the “other” of work, a site supposedly free from
work discipline (RPZ 23). According to Fortunati, 
[h]ousework must appear like this because the more production work is made abstract, social,
and simple – dehumanized – the more housework must compensate and ‘re-humanize’ the
production worker, creating the illusion that he is more than a commodity, a labor-power, that he
is an individual with unique characteristics, and a real personality (AR 110)
Emotional reproduction, then, has a compensatory function, as well as an important role in
constituting a sense of individuality and uniqueness. Similarly, Hochschild writes that the
family is imagined as a “‘relief zone’ away from the pressures of work, where one is free to
be oneself” (MH 69). Working-class emotional labour is thus not only about creating
discipline but also about its temporal and spatial undoing. The home and the community
must provide emotional satisfaction for those whose work conditions are the opposite of
satisfactory. While working-class women have been charged with large amounts of waged
and unwaged work, they often have to do at least some work of creating the home as an
apparent site of non-work, thus obscuring their own labour in the domestic sphere. 
Working-class emotional reproduction has historically not been confined to the
privatised home to the same extent as bourgeois reproduction. But working-class sociality
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that extends beyond the individual home is constantly under threat. The spatial
organisation of working-class sociality and emotional reproduction is vulnerable to
destruction, as increasingly limited forms of public space constitute an important
precondition for many less privatised forms of sociality. Stephanie Coontz, looking at
working-class organisation of space in the early 20th century, notes that there was a lack
of distinction between the intimate life of the family and the life of the neighbourhood,
indicating that emotional reproduction can take place across a wider spatial field (1988:
295). James, writing in 1953, similarly describes how working-class housewives come
together to share their work and leisure (SRC 24). However, these spatial constructions of
emotional life are difficult to sustain in the increasingly privatised landscape of
contemporary capitalism. Federici argues that working-class forms of sociality are being
destroyed by urbanisation and gentrification (RPZ 115). James briefly notes how domestic
architecture plays a part in institutionalising the nuclear family as a model of sociality (SRC
103). The emotional and social needs of people are thus codified in the built environment,
creating boundaries for sociality. The institutionalisation of nuclear family models often
creates loneliness and a lack of emotional satisfaction for those outside the nuclear unit.
Hochschild’s first book, The unexpected community (1973), explores how such sociality
can be recreated, beyond the confines of the family. In my final chapter, I will return to the
topic of working-class emotional reproduction against the spatial organisation of
contemporary capitalism.
The reproduction of the working class is thus both influenced by and resistant to
bourgeois values, as well as creating different types of demands on those performing this
work. If the emotional reproduction of the middle and upper classes tends to involve the
work of creating class aspiration, the reproduction of working-class life might entail more
compensatory types of emotional labour. This is also true of other marginalised groups.
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BWFWFH and WDL writers discuss the emotional cost of racism and homophobia, and
how members of black and lesbian communities have to work harder in order to
compensate for the emotional harm of discrimination and violence (Prescod 1980: 28,
Wages Due Lesbians London 1991: 19). Prescod also notes that migration entails much
“emotional housework” in terms of adjusting to a new social environment and retaining a
sense of personal value in the face of daily acts of racism (1980: 24, 28). Emotional labour
is thus deeply imbricated in racialised modes of reproduction.
Whiteness also entails particular demands on emotional reproduction. White
mothering in particular involves demands for “spiritual” work. Dorothy Roberts describes
this in terms of white women’s “exclusive” bond with their children, which is constructed as
unique even when a child might spend more time with a nanny. This construction of
motherhood, she argues, arose partly out of the institution of slavery (1997a: 57, 59). Hays
argues that this 19th century ideal of white, bourgeois motherhood was centred around
raising virtuous future citizens of the republic (1996: 29). Similarly, Rose suggests that in
the modern era, the wellbeing of children became tied to the destiny of the nation (1990:
121). The bourgeois nation was pictured as a white nation, linking the spiritual
reproduction of children to racial ideals of the subject. In practical terms, this was related to
a racial division of labour within “women’s work,” where black, brown, and immigrant
women were relegated to menial tasks whereas white women took on the spiritual and
emotional guidance of both men and children (Roberts 1997a: 52). This spiritual work is
more highly valued, and contributes to the ambiguous status of motherhood, which is
simultaneously devalued and glorified (Macdonald 2010: 111). While this construction of
motherhood relies on naturalised emotional labour, the spiritual duty of mothers has been
used as a way of claiming rights for white, bourgeois women (Hays 1996: 29). Emotional
labour can thus be used to create hierarchies among women. It plays into the ambiguous
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status of reproductive labour, as it is in theory glorified as part of sacred motherhood, but
in practice often invisible, particularly when it is performed by working-class and racialised
women. These women do not perform the “right” kind of class transmission to ensure the
reproduction of the white, bourgeois nation. Their work is therefore deskilled and subjected
to various forms of control. 
Commercialising feeling 
Much of the debate around emotional labour centres on its commodified forms. Following
Hochschild, most researchers of emotional labour have explored the use of emotional
labour in the growing service economy (Hall 1993, Leidner 1993, Taylor and Tyler 2000,
Korczynski 2003, Bolton 2005, Knights and Thanen 2005, Brannan 2005). This research
has mainly been focused on ethnographic study of various professions and working
environments, testing Hochschild’s claims against the experience of workers engaged in
emotional labour. While focusing mainly on the private service sector, some writers have
investigated public-sector work in for example nursing (James 1992, Smith 1992, Simpson
2007). As noted above, some authors have extended Hochschild’s original definition of
emotional labour to include workers whose jobs involve ensuring the emotional satisfaction
of their colleagues (Pierce 1996). These accounts also include a focus on workers’
resistance to the demands of commodified emotional labour (Paules 1996, Korczynski
2003). However, these strategies tend to remain tentative and operate on an individual
level, due to management strategies aimed at quashing solidarity between workers
(Federici 2011: 69). 
Waged reproductive workers, such as carers and nurses, are at the centre of much
of the contemporary problematic of emotional labour. Often migrant women of colour, their
labour is introduced as a solution to the “crisis of social reproduction” that has emerged
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both as a result of feminist struggle against unwaged labour, and capital’s increased use of
women’s waged labour (RPZ 107, Farris 2015b). Linda McDowell suggests that in the
post-Fordist economy, the need for domestic labour has declined, and the maintenance of
capitalism has not been harmed by the withdrawal of domestic labour (1991: 408). But
while the standards for the reproduction of labour power, including emotional needs, are
highly variable, the current configuration of life has not abolished domestic work but rather
shifted some of it onto public service-provision or waged domestic workers. Many of these
jobs are low-waged and highly exploitative, especially since emotional labour is largely
invisible as work and thus not adequately remunerated.45 These types of labour also
depend on creating emotional bonds between the worker and the recipient of care (who is
sometimes the employer), which means that they are more easily exploitable (Uttal and
Tuominen 1999: 768). While many mothers resist “being replaced” by a nanny or daycare
worker as the child’s primary caregiver, parents also expect a high emotional standard
from their replacement caregivers and are often happy to exploit the bond between the
caregiver and the child (Macdonald 2010: 114, MH 150). 
In her later work, Hochschild describes what she sees as a particularly troubling form
of outsourcing of emotional labour, through the employment of migrant care workers. This,
Hochschild writes, results in a “care-drain” in the countries of origin of those workers
(2003b: 186). Love is not a resource like any other, which can simply be imported. Rather,
she argues, emotional work is carried out in more wealthy countries, but uses the
emotional capacities of migrant workers. This then limits their capacity to provide care and
nurturance for their own communities, resulting in an unequal global distribution of loving
care (2003b: 192-193, see also RPZ 118, Parreñas 2009: 141).46 Federici refers to the
45 However, visibility in itself does not guarantee adequate remuneration.
46 Lewis criticises the naturalising assumptions behind some of this research. She argues that the notion 
that the migration of female care workers automatically results in a loss of care for their children is based 
on the assumption that mothers should ideally be their children’s primary carers (2019a: 130).
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sites most affected by this uneven distribution as zones of “near-zero-reproduction” (RPZ
103). Migrant workers, who leave these zones behind, are themselves often lacking
networks of care and protection in their countries of destination. As Bridget Anderson has
shown in detail, the migrant status of many domestic workers, combined with a discourse
of these workers as “part of the family,” make their work particularly exploitable while
hiding exploitation under the semblance of familiarity (2000: 51). In some aspects, this
resembles the system developed under slavery in the United States, where black women
were made to care for white children (Hays 1996: 35, Prescod 1980: 14). 
The commodification of care is related to not only the arrangement of waged work
and the family, but also to varying constructions of need. Because labour power is the
commodification of human capacities rather than a thing, standards for skill will shift
according to the demands of capital. These might involve shifting standards for the psychic
constitution of individuals. Some workers need only a minimally disciplined behaviour,
whereas others need many years of intense subjectivation to various forms of emotional
pressure. Yet the emotional standard of the working class is an issue open to political
struggle. While the working class as a whole has struggled for a higher standard of living,
members of this class are constructed as having varying needs. For instance, white
workers typically have a higher standard of living than black workers, and can also expect
a higher degree of emotional comfort and care. In a similar vein, Fortunati argues that sex
work is productive of male labour power because men have the societal power to enforce
their right to sex, whereas women do not have the same right to pleasure (AR 51). 
The commodification of some emotional services might be the result of increased
emotional standards and more leisure time. Higher standards of living often translate into
greater access to emotional services for the wealthy. As Emma Dowling argues,
establishments that cater to wealthy clients generally place greater weight on delivery of
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emotional services (2007: 122). Similarly, Hochschild shows that there is a tendency for
negative feeling to move downwards, whereas positive feeling tends to move upwards in
the social hierarchy (2003b: 85). In general, then, those at the top of social hierarchies can
expect more attention to their emotional needs and a greater degree of emotional
wellbeing. Commodification processes contribute to this tendency, as the rich are able to
pay for the emotional services they need. 
As noted above, Federici does not share Hardt and Negri’s optimism for the “new
hegemony” of emotional labour and service work more broadly. While the waged condition
of this work might allow for a greater degree of autonomy and ability to struggle over the
conditions of work, WFH never strived for reproductive labour to be integrated into the
formal workforce. Moreover, the commodification of emotional labour merely hands over
control of this work from individual men to capitalists, rather than undoing the need for
such labour. As we have seen, such transmutation might lead to more explicit forms of
control. Despite the seemingly infinite character of emotional labour, Federici notes
capitalists have done their best to find ways to manage and measure this work. She
emphasises not the supposedly emancipatory character of affectivity, but its uses in
binding workers to their own exploitation. According to Federici, the blurring of life and
work is in no way a step forward in the struggle against capital, but rather a way in which
capitalist control of our lives is intensified (2011: 69). 
Much of the emotional labour literature explores how this control takes place. In
many cases, it is a question of cultivating a certain “personality” in the workers, thus
integrating the work with the worker (Weeks 2007: 241, 2011: 73). Hochschild notes how
flight attendants are carefully screened before they are hired, to see if they have the
required skills for interpersonal work (MH 97). In their study “Emotional labour and sexual
difference in the airline industry,” Steve Taylor and Melissa Tyler found similar patterns
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persisting in hiring practices. Selection panels for flight attendants reported that they
wanted to hire “personalities” that would “naturally” deliver emotional services –
personalities which in most cases were female (2000: 83). Companies thus rely on
internalised forms of emotion management, which are part of the worker’s “personality,” as
well as the carefully codified external regulations described by Hochschild and Dowling. 
Dowling notes that workers are expected to embody the emotional values stipulated
by management, thus using their bodies as part of the performance of emotion (2007:
123). This is something that cuts across commodified and non-commodified emotional
labour, as Federici and Fortunati both note that the work of love tends to draw on the
body-personality of the worker as part of the naturalisation of this work (RPZ 16, AR 77).
While measurability becomes central to the capitalist commodification and regulation of
this work, it continues to draw on the supposedly natural personality of the worker, which
in some sense exceeds that regulation and creates the conditions for hyper-exploitation.
We thus need to look at how emotional labour participates in the reproduction of status
based on gender, class and race – factors that are sometimes, though not always,
translatable into exchange value (Anderson 2000: 2-7). Capitalists might be able to
explicitly commodify this status production – for example by drawing on the racialised sex
appeal of Asian women in certain airline commercials (MH 130, Forseth 2005: 47) – but
often it is a more implicit externality of emotional labour. 
Measure and control have the effect of making emotional labour into specific and
finite tasks to be completed by the worker. Commodification, then, in some cases implies
the loss of the infinite character of “love” discussed above. As emotional labour is scripted
by company manuals, it becomes divided into discrete activities. Hochschild describes this
as a form of deskilling of emotional labour, whereby agency over the work is increasingly
removed from the worker (MH 120). However, Robin Leidner argues that the routinisation
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of emotional labour might help workers control service interactions (1993: 5). It is likely that
the scripting of emotional labour affords workers some control in relation to customers, yet
the codification of emotional labour does not necessarily mean that workers are doing only
what they told, as workers in some situations might feel compelled to give more emotional
care than they are asked to do. This is particularly true across public sectors such as
health care and education, which have faced significant cuts in recent decades, with
resulting management calls for speed-ups. As Rebecca Selberg observes with regards to
nurses, this allows for the hyper-exploitation of the caring capacities of an already
devalued group of workers (2012: 223). 
A somewhat different issue concerns the ability of commodified emotional labour to
actually satisfy the emotional needs of service recipients. As noted above, the work of love
involves tailoring emotional services to the specificity of the individual, thus continually
reaffirming that very individuality in the process. The commercialisation of intimate
services seems to imply the loss of this capacity, as services become increasingly
standardised by management control. However, we should not assume that capitalist
production automatically leads to standardisation. Capitalist logics, when it comes both to
the production of status and the production of services, employ both standardising and
individualising practices. High-end emotional services are often individualised as a part of
their commodification. In some other types of care work, such as nursing, workers can
offer individualised emotional labour as a “gift” to those they care for (Bolton 2005: 97).
Here, emotional labour might not be formally integrated in the service itself, which is
focused on the completion of physical tasks, yet management might rely on the empathy
and sense of duty of its workers to provide emotional services for free (Selberg 2012: 73,
223). However, these processes of individualisation do not necessarily mean that the
individual emotional needs of people are met, especially as both exclusive emotional
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services and care services can be limited to those who have the means to pay for them,
just as unwaged forms of emotional labour are often reserved for those who are part of a
nuclear family. The satisfaction of emotional needs is sometimes tied to access to
commodities and services, and capitalism continually generates such needs that can only
be satisfied through market interactions.
In critiquing the commodification of emotional services, it is important to note that the
private sphere of unwaged work can also be insufficient for meeting people’s needs. The
nuclear family form is not merely one form among others, as it has been institutionalised
as the exclusive site catering to people’s emotional needs. While other kinship forms have
become less stigmatised, and the father-mother-child model has become more flexible, the
hegemonic status of the nuclear family still means that this form is promoted at the
expense of other forms of sociality (Barrett and McIntosh 2015: 47, 80). It is inscribed
across legal, material, and ideological structures. Thus, those who live outside the nuclear
family form, or are the primary caregivers within that form, lack much of the emotional
support that such a model supposedly has been instituted to provide. 
Private and public 
For Hochschild, there are a number of problems with the increasing commercialisation of
emotional labour. While she has resisted the critique that she thinks that emotional labour
is more “free” in private than in commercial life (1989b: 439) it does often seem as if she
thinks that the proper place of emotion is in private life. In The managed heart, she
repeatedly invokes the profit motive and increased managerial control as processes
whereby emotional labour is subsumed under a capitalist logic (MH 20, 182). She writes
that in commercialised emotional labour, what matters is no longer the welfare or pleasure
of participants but rather the company’s internal regulations and profit (MH 119). In her
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condemnation of the exploitation of commodified emotional labour, she cannot help but
invoke a somewhat mythical outside, in which emotional labour is not commodified and
therefore not exploited (Weeks 2007: 244). This is despite the fact that she is well aware of
the gendered dynamics of emotion, which tend to place women in positions of private
emotional exploitation. 
In her later work in particular, Hochschild deplores the problem of the increasing
commercialisation of the private sphere. She constructs intimate life and commercial life as
two competing logics, in which the “cold” logic of capital is currently winning (1997: 49,
2003b: 26, 29, 2013: 102). While it is correct that commodification changes emotional
labour, it is not necessarily the case that non-commodified emotional labour is preferable
for participants. Indeed, Federici and Cox resist the claim that commodification equals
exploitation and alienation (RPZ 35). Hochschild understands capitalism in Polanyian
terms, where the unfettered and destructive market stands against the logic of community.
From a WFH perspective, the logic of capitalism is always present in the very construction
of the “community” as we know it.47 This also means that the commodification of emotional
labour and other forms of reproductive labour stems not only from the encroachment of
capital logics upon private life, but also from the feminist refusal of unwaged reproductive
labour (RPZ 49, Federici 2011: 67). Barbagallo argues that the use of commodified
reproductive services might be a passive and individualised form of resistance to the
neoliberal logic which seeks to place responsibility for forms of care, previously provided
by the Fordist welfare state, in the private household (2016: 129). Arguing that emotional
labour should be decommodified, as Oksala does (2016: 296), depends on the continued
unwaged exploitation of women, at least in the absence of other forms of sociality. While
rejecting Hardt and Negri’s overly optimistic view that the “new hegemony” of affective
labour can bring about communism, the WFH perspective implies that commodification is
47 For a critique of the notion of community as inherently anticapitalist, see also Joseph (2002). 
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an ambivalent process, which might enable at least individual forms of refusal. 
Hochschild is concerned that the increased availability of individually tailored
emotional services is creating an increasingly commercialised culture in the private
sphere. Already in The managed heart, she describes how commercialisation is present in
people’s intimate lives. While commodified emotional labour draws on “private” feeling, as
when flight attendants are asked to imagine the cabin as their living room, corporate profit
motives seem to infiltrate people’s homes (MH 161). The idea of a distinct domestic
sphere is in itself an invention of bourgeois society, and at times it seems that Hochschild
tries to question this distinction by pointing to the paradox of companies drawing on the
private sphere as supposedly unsullied by capitalism. In The managed heart, Hochschild
suggests that the cultural emphasis on authenticity is a by-product of the commercial use
of emotional labour (MH 192). In her later writings, however, Hochschild seems
increasingly worried about the trend towards the commercialisation of intimate life.
Personal services, she suggests, can separate us from the acts by which we used to say
how much we care (2013: 23). She writes that “part of the content of the spirit of capitalism
is being displaced onto intimate life” (2003b: 24, emphasis in original), suggesting that it
was not present there before. This runs contrary to the WFH argument, as Federici and
Cox suggest that “every moment of our lives function for the accumulation of capital.” They
state that the ideology that opposes the private and the public supports the subjugation of
women in the home, as it makes unwaged work appear as an act of love (RPZ 35). 
Indeed, as Weeks has shown, Hochschild cannot avoid invoking a fairly conservative
ideal of the family (2011: 156). While she wants to promote a more inclusive notion of the
family, going beyond the mother-father-child schema, she still defines family as adults who
raise children, thus implicitly favouring a heteronormative model of family (2003b: 198). As
Christopher Carrington emphasises, however, family consists of the work to create family,
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rather than a set of roles (1999: 6). Weeks argues that while Hochschild presents a fairly
normative model of the family, her writings simultaneously represent family as a matter of
unique individual choice when opposed to waged work (2011: 158). 
The distinction between private and public becomes important in this context
because it determines the political perspective on emotional labour. If the proper place of
emotional labour is in the domestic sphere, a political viewpoint is bound to posit private
and commercial forms of emotional labour as oppositional, and presumably privilege the
more “authentic” private forms. A WFH perspective, on the other hand, recognises the
continuities of emotional labour across public and private spheres, while emphasising that
there are different logics of capitalist accumulation operating in these domains. As
Giovanna Dalla Costa argues, the existence of unwaged labour determines women’s
position on the labour market, and ensures that men can demand emotional labour from
women (WL 95, see also Adkins 1995). The division of private and public has very real
effects, but mainly because it produces various forms of exploitation. For example, the
conflation of “work” in general with waged work makes unwaged work invisible and
furthers its exploitation. The constitution of a private sphere, seemingly beyond labour law,
also deepens the exploitation of waged domestic workers (Gutiérrez-Rodríguez 2010: 4). 
Because we tend to think of love as the opposite of money, there is a limit to the
commercialisation of emotional reproduction. Some emotional labour is thus continually
relegated to the “private,” whereas other forms have moved into waged workplaces and
the service market. The public and the commercial sphere are often constructed as devoid
of emotion, or operating according to a “cold” logic as Hochschild would put it (2003b:
214), whereas they are in fact suffused with emotion.48 This is important because it helps
us understand the persistent gendering of capitalism, after the demise of the family wage-
48 See Konings (2015) for a general critique on Polanyian writings on capital, which neglect the emotional 
nature of the market. See also Zelizer (2005) for a critique of the distinction between public and private in 
capitalist societies.
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model as the hegemonic form of the family. The next chapter will explore how gendered
subjectivity is reproduced in contemporary society.
In this chapter, I have argued that notions of affect and affective labour are not
sufficient for explaining the organisation of reproduction in capitalist society, especially in
its connection to persistent hierarchies based on gender, race, and class. Rather, modern
constructions of emotion, in relation to the construction of subjective interiority and
“authentic” selves, tell us more about how care and feeling can serve to stabilise such
hierarchies. The following chapter will continue to explore emotion in relation to
subjectivity, with a particular focus on the gendering of emotional reproduction. 
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Chapter three: Gendering work
This chapter explores the gendering of work, in order to develop a materialist theory of
gender relations under capitalism. Drawing on the work of WFH and Hochschild, as well as
more recent historical materialist feminist writings, I will focus on how forms of labour, and
emotional labour in particular, are constitutive of contemporary gender relations. As in
previous chapters, I argue that gender is not a stable thing, but rather relations of division
and hierarchy that involve processes of domination and exploitation. 
The concept of gender as laid out here is most applicable to white and heterosexual
gender norms. I have chosen to make this explicit rather than trying to include other forms
of gendered subjectivity. This is because I am interested in how whiteness and
heterosexuality contribute to the organisation of hegemonic gender positions. Other
gender formations will only be theorised in so far as they form a horizon against which
hegemonic gender is constituted. Although I cannot theorise trans subjectivities specifically
in this chapter, most of the following is relevant to trans women as well as cis women, as
femininity is not exclusively linked to a particular type of body. It is true, however, that
people inhabit femininity differently, and thus receive different amounts of the social
rewards and punishments associated with gender. But the work of becoming a gendered
subject is never complete. Gender should thus be understood as ideal forms to which
people are compelled to aspire, with varying degrees of success, but not as forms that can
be fully inhabited by any individual. Gender ideals are often multiple and contradictory,
making it impossible to live according to idealised gender norms. Idealised forms of gender
are a way of extracting a certain amount of labour, which work despite, or because,
actually fitting into hegemonic gender presentations is an unrealisable goal for most
people. While these forms are partly ideological, they are also the simultaneous results
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and preconditions of certain forms of labour. 
In this chapter, I will draw on WFH writings and the works of Hochschild to outline a
materialist theory of gender. The first section will return to the WFH writings explored in
chapter one. After that, I will give an account of Hochschild’s theory of gender, as well as
some writings by followers of Hochschild. However, some additional theoretical work is
needed in order to formulate a coherent theory of the gendering of emotional labour. In the
last section of this chapter, I draw on a broader set of texts, in order to produce a theory of
gendered subjectivity and emotional labour in the contemporary moment. 
Femininity as work function
For the WFH authors, femininity is a work function (RPZ 8). As such, we can understand it
not in terms of a natural trait or a psychological predisposition, but rather as a historically
acquired capacity for a certain type of labour. Both Fortunati and Federici emphasise
femininity as skill, which is learnt from infancy (AR 62, RPZ 34). This capacity, however, is
deeply naturalised, as modern understandings of gendered difference have anchored
hierarchies of gender in bodily types (Federici 2004: 115, 135). The naturalisation of
difference led to an understanding of gender as inevitable biological destiny (RPZ 37). This
has served to hide women’s work as work, and instead conflated this labour with women’s
bodies and personalities. The construction of work as conscious activity has also obscured
the fact that femininity is a work function, as feminine gender becomes equated with bodily
and emotional states, which are in turn constructed as passive. As I argued in my
discussion of emotion, however, such states must be conceptualised beyond the
active/passive dichotomy, which tends to reproduce splits between body and mind.
Gender, like emotion, is neither a passive state nor necessarily fully conscious activity.
This, however, does not mean that it is not labour. Federici writes that housework “has
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been transformed into a natural attribute of our female physique and personality, an
internal need, an aspiration, supposedly coming from the depth of our female character”
(RPZ 16). 
Here, we can see how gender is constructed as expressive of a pre-existing
authentic self rather than as a form of labour that needs to be constantly repeated. Weeks
argues that an understanding of gender based on labour can help us move beyond both
voluntarism and determinism, as the concept of labour invokes both constraints and
continual, creative remaking. Drawing on Judith Butler’s notion of performativity, but
grounding it in an ontology of labour, Weeks understands the labour of gender as
constitutive of an experience of relative coherence of the subject (1998: 124-133). This is
helpful for understanding the WFH reading of gender, insofar as gender emerges as an
effect of labouring practices as well as a precondition for that labour, pointing to the
constructedness yet relative stability and coherence of gendered subjectivity. 
While the focus of WFH is on femininity as an attribute of the main labouring subject
of reproduction, it is important to note that masculinity should also be understood as a
work function. Feminised subjects tend to have a primary responsibility for reproducing
gender (Holmberg 1993: 137, Ward 2010: 240), but men also perform gendered labour,
although of a different type (Floyd 2009: 99). Furthermore, the effects of gendered labour
tend to cohere around masculine subjectivity in such a way that men can reap the benefits
of the gendering labour of others. We can note that there is a tendency to distribute the
burden of gendered labour onto feminised subjects and the rewards of such labour onto
men. This too is a form of gendered exploitation. It is thus not only women’s care work in
the traditional sense which is exploited, but also women’s work of continually reproducing
gender. This exploitation operates through assumptions of heterosexual gendered
complementarity, in which difference is constructed around the need for one’s “other half.”
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Despite women being the primary labouring subject in this relation, they are reduced to the
status of object through notions of complementarity (PWSC 29). Moreover, femininity
comes to appear as gendered particularity, thus hiding masculinity as an effect of
gendering labour. Again, we can see how (gendered) capitalism is based on a series of
ideological inversions, so that the exploiting subjects come to appear as active,
independent, and universal while the exploited come to appear as dependent, passive,
and particular.49
As I remarked in chapter one, the issue of exploitation in the WFH literature is rather
thorny and partly contradictory. WFH authors claim that women are primarily exploited by
capitalist relations of value extraction (AR 50). They do this in order to maintain a notion of
working-class coherence, even as they identify gender as a major strand of difference that
cuts across classes (PWSRC 19, SRC 96, AR 39). Here, I diverge somewhat from the
WFH writers by arguing that women as a group are exploited by men as a group. This is a
stronger claim than the one usually made by WFH theorists, as it suggests that gender is
an inherently exploitative relation. In this way, it prepares the ground for the gender
abolitionist politics which I will lay out in chapter five. This assertion does not entail that all
women are exploited or that they are all exploited to the same extent, nor does it suggest
that all men benefit from the exploitation of women in comparable ways. But it does imply
that all feminised subjects are affected by the exploitation of a majority of women. As
feminist philosopher Diemut Elisabet Bubeck suggests, all women are vulnerable to
gender-based exploitation, even if they as individuals are not exploited (1995: 183). We
can note that the compounded vulnerabilities of race, gender, and class leaves working-
class women of colour particularly likely to be exploited in the most strenuous and least
valued types of reproductive labour.
Arguing for the existence of gender-based exploitation is not the same as embracing
49 For a workerist account of the concept of inversion, see Tronti (2019: 24). 
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a dual-systems model, yet it does imply nuancing the unitary model somewhat. While
capitalism is the dominant mode of production, within which all other forms of exploitation
are situated, capital is not the only hierarchical formation that is structured around people’s
labour. This is because surplus value extraction, while dominant, is not the only mode of
exploitation. Other forms, such as the extraction of use values or surplus labour, are
historically more common than exploitation based on surplus value (Marx 1990: 344-348).
And while exploitation based on surplus value is currently the dominant form of
exploitation, other forms did not disappear with the rise of surplus-value extraction. We can
see this in the organisation of the so-called informal economy, where labour is not
organised by contractual wage relations, but which might nonetheless be integrated in the
circuit of capitalist production. 
The fact that gendered exploitation is not primarily or exclusively organised in terms
of surplus value does not mean that gender-based exploitation should be understood as in
any sense pre-capitalist in nature. The rise of capitalism constituted the condition for
gender-based exploitation as we know it. As I have suggested above, capital depends on
zones of non-value. Gender-based exploitation is thus not outside capitalism, but neither
does it necessarily operate according to the same logic that structures capitalist
production. This does not mean that patriarchy is somehow an independent system, as
dual-systems theorists would argue (Hartmann 1981), nor that it is pre-capitalist in its form,
as some Marxist feminists have suggested (Benston 1969). In order to counter the
tendency to present patriarchy as transhistorical, we must be aware of both continuities
and differences of gender relations in the transition to capitalism. 
It is not simply the case that capital “created” gender exploitation in order to extract
surplus value, as Fortunati suggests (AR 31). Nor is it the case that divisions such as
gender and race exist in order to split the working class, as WFH authors often seem to
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argue (PWSC 45, AR 39, 167). It is true that divisions within the working class are
exploited by capitalists to create competition between workers, simultaneously
suppressing wages and decreasing the political capacities of the working class. But this
argument does little to explain why the divisions within the class are traced along the lines
of race, gender, and other forms of hierarchical difference. Gender is not reducible to its
function as a tool of the capitalist power to divide and rule. Every form of domination
exceeds its merely functional deployment in capitalist value accumulation. 
As I noted in chapter one, Fortunati writes that men do exploit female houseworkers,
and that this exploitation is based on the satisfaction of needs (AR 36, 94). However, she
states that this production is productive for capital, and therefore unproductive for the male
worker (AR 50). Her argument is somewhat confusing since housework could reasonably
be seen as productive both for capital and for male workers. Yet it seems that Fortunati is
committed to using the term “productive” only in its limited sense of being productive of
surplus value, in which case it could not be productive for workers, who are by definition
excluded from benefiting from surplus-value production. However, as Marxist theorist
Michael Lebowitz argues, labour can be productive outside the strict parameters of
capitalist value production (1992: 135). He insists that exploitative relations, based on for
example gender, can exist among workers themselves (1992: 151). Similarly, Bubeck
suggests that exploitation can take several forms under capitalism (1995: 81). Another
example of exploitative relations would be the one in which (primarily white and bourgeois)
mothers transfer some of their domestic “duties” onto less privileged workers. This is a
form of exploitation based on surplus labour, constituted mainly along lines of race,
migration status, and class. It is a way in which, as Roberts suggests, (some) women’s
greater “equality” with men can lead to increased hierarchy and exploitation among women
(1997a: 77). 
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The WFH writers waver somewhat on the issue of exploitation. Often it seems that
they do suggest that gender relations are inherently exploitative. The fact that WFH writers
are not entirely consistent when it comes to the question of whether women are exploited
by men is apparent in their treatment of lesbian relationships. While they suggest that
these tend to take on some of the aspects of heterosexual relations, they nonetheless
argue that lesbianism is less exploitative for women than entering a heterosexual
relationship (WL 114, RPZ 15). This would not make sense if it is only capitalism that
benefits from women’s labour, since lesbian relationships can contain the same work of
reproducing labour power as heterosexual relationships, especially for lesbians who have
children. The difference between lesbian relationships and heterosexual ones, Hall
suggests, is that lesbian relationships do not produce the power hierarchies inherent in
heterosexual relationships (1975: 5). The argument that lesbian relationships are less
labour-intensive than heterosexual relationships suggests that the WFH writers consider
heterosexual arrangements exploitative in ways that benefit capital, but which also benefit
men. This, I would argue, is the logical conclusion of Federici’s assertion that femininity is
a work function. The accumulation of gendered difference that Federici suggests took
place in the transition to capitalism (2004: 63, 115) coincided with men’s use of women as
commons – that is, as natural resources to be exploited (2004: 97). As we have seen, it is
crucial for the existence of this particular exploitative relation that it appears to be outside
of capitalist monetary relations, and that it therefore appears as a natural and personal
service relation (PWSC 26). Dalla Costa insists that the exploitation of gendered
relationships is more intense under capitalism than in pre-capitalist social structures, as
capital brought with it “the more intense exploitation of women as women” (PWSC 21,
emphasis in original). She writes that “between men and women power as its right
commands sexual affection and intimacy” (PWSC 30, emphasis in original). Just as
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capitalist power is the power to command labour, so gender is the power to command the
labour of intimacy. Thus, we cannot conflate exploitation under capitalism with the
capitalist exploitation of surplus value. 
As I have argued, however, this command of gendered labour is not merely external
command. Gender functions through the internalisation of the command for emotional and
reproductive labour. Somewhat paradoxically, this can operate through the internalisation
of the requirement to sacrifice oneself. The WFH authors note that the ideological figure of
sacrifice is at the core of normative femininity (AWNP 73). Giovanna Dalla Costa writes
that especially in the capitalist heartlands, women are made to identify strongly with the
needs of others, particularly their loved ones (WL 85). Mariarosa Dalla Costa notes that
the training that women receive from childhood is “a preparation for martyrdom” (PWSC
41). Not only are women trained to sacrifice themselves for others, they are also
encouraged to derive pleasure from this work (RPZ 17, 25). Like Hochschild’s description
of emotional labour, then, the labour of gender demands that the worker not only performs
the work but also enjoys it (MH 6). The work of love also comes with an imperative to
remodel subjectivity itself in the image of this work, which is similar to the way in which
Hochschild describes the process of deep acting (MH 33). The feminised working subject
is disciplined by this imperative to enjoy work or suffer the individualised blame for failing
to enjoy it. As Federici writes, if you do not like it, “it is your problem, your failure, your
guilt, and your abnormality” (RPZ 17). Through notions of sacrifice, femininity functions as
a disciplinary tool for extracting more work. Emotional labour in particular, as we have
seen in chapter two, should ideally be “infinite” in nature. 
Love, violence, and reproduction
When women fail to enjoy, or start resisting this work, they are met with various kinds of
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violence (RPZ 24). One form of violence is the pathologisation of women’s resistance or
non-enjoyment of emotional labour. Federici describes how women are called “insane”
when they resist housework, and how “going crazy” has historically been one of the only
ways for women to get out of their responsibility to care for others (NYWFHC 129). Those
who fail to perform and enjoy the naturalised labour of femininity, then, are likely to be
pathologised, and even criminalised (Roberts 2017: 189). This is particularly the case for
those who do not perform gendered labour within normative nuclear families. Brown notes
that the ideal of the white, bourgeois family functions as a disciplinary norm, against which
black families, and black women in particular, are pathologised (1976b: 8). This in turn
justifies intense state surveillance of those women deemed deviant, as well as state
interventions such as the loss of custody of one’s children.
Giovanna Dalla Costa describes the forms of psychological violence that structure
women’s labour within the family, which are deeply entangled with normative ideals of
femininity and love (WL 54). Furthermore, resistance can be met with physical and sexual
violence. For WFH, unlike some other feminist currents of the 1970s and 1980s, sexual
and domestic violence is not primary to gendered domination. Masculine domination thus
cannot be located in some psychic propensity for sadism. Violence is not for its own sake
but for ensuring the continued reproduction of the world as we know it. Dalla Costa’s book
The work of love is a detailed exploration of how domestic and sexual violence function to
control reproductive labour. This violence, she suggests, cannot be understood separately
from heterosexual constructions of love. Violence is thus not “deviant” with regards to
“normal” heterosexual relationships. Dalla Costa contends that violence is authorised by
love, because the marriage contract appears as a contract of love rather than labour, and
thus love is what is “owed.” Men have the right to use force to ensure that such emotional
debts are paid (WL 54). As violence takes on the appearance of “love,” then, it is primarily
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a tool for disciplining women’s emotional labour. It is only when the normative demand for
love fails that men’s function as controllers of domestic work becomes explicit through the
use of physical force (WL 55). As Federici puts it, men can “supervise our sexual work, to
ensure that we would provide sexual services according to the established, socially
sanctioned productivity norms” (RPZ 25). They can thus lay claim to women’s bodies,
energy, and time. This violence, Giovanna Dalla Costa contends, is internal to the work
that women perform (WL 39). The threat of gendered violence also acts to keep women
anchored in the domestic sphere, insofar as sexual violence is portrayed as the natural
result of women’s entrance into public spheres (WL 71, see also Wright 2006: 74). 
These forms of violence, according to the WFH authors, are the result of the ways in
which relations of domination are structured under capitalism. Moreover, women are made
to service the male worker physically, emotionally, and sexually, to raise his children, mend his
socks, patch up his ego when it is crushed by the work and the social relations (which are
relations of loneliness) that capital has reserved for him. (RPZ 17)
Here we can see the compensatory function of emotional labour, and how emotional
reproduction is a central condition for the continuation of capitalist labour relations. In the
WFH theory of emotional reproduction as a “safety valve,” there is also the idea that men
can displace the violence of capitalist exploitation onto their partners. As Federici writes,
“the more blows the man gets at work the more his wife must be trained to absorb them,
the more he is allowed to recover his ego at her expense” (RPZ 18). However, we should
be wary of theories that are premised on the notion of a general economy of violence.50
Such theories seem to presume that violence is a vital force, which necessarily passes
from body to body. Similar to the theories of affect that I discussed above, such accounts
50   See for instance Cohen and Monk (2017).
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of violence tend to reify it, thus ignoring the fact that some people do not pass on negative
emotions or violence. As the WFH writers suggest, feminised workers are mainly made to
absorb anger and frustration, without necessarily externalising it and displacing it onto
someone else (PWSC 40).51 However, I think there is something to be said for the theory
that masculinity functions through the displacement of anger onto others, as masculinity is
partly constituted on a seeming monopoly on aggression and violence. As Hochschild
suggest in her account of masculine emotional labour, a failure to perform anger might
threaten a person’s status as a real man (MH 146). Perhaps the most masculinised of all
emotions, anger is often an expression of power and entitlement (Shields 2002: 146). 52
Anger thus creates a position of agency, while constructing other people as receptacles of
negative emotion (Whitney 2018: 639). 
In Dalla Costa’s words, the heterosexual woman must try to emulate the image of
“‘the heroic mother and happy wife’ whose sexual identity is pure sublimation, whose
function is essentially that of receptacle for other people’s emotional expression, who is the
cushion of familial antagonisms” (PWSC 40). There is thus a requirement to perform
happiness while simultaneously being on the receiving end of negative emotions – a
characteristic that is familiar for those who are engaged in reproductive service jobs (MH
171). However, the individualisation of emotional labour within families makes that
relationship more effective while also more burdensome for women (RPZ 17). The people
cared for in the family must believe that they “can only be reproduced by this one woman
in one particular privatized individualized situation” (AR 110). There can thus be no breaks
or holidays for the wife-mother (WSC 54). She is always on call, in order to ensure the
continuous reproduction of her loved ones. As I noted in chapter two, Giovanna Dalla
51 However, women are capable of being violent and abusive as part of their caring labour. On this topic, 
see the description of women’s violence towards children in the WFH text “Portrait of a housewife” in The 
Activist (1975). 
52 In the next chapter, I will look at feminist attempts to constitute collective practices of anger. 
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Costa argues that the mere presence of the woman in the home is a form of work (WL 79).
Her continual presence serves to soothe tensions and offers the promise that care is
available when needed (Seery and Crowley 2000). 
These forms of labour are, as we have seen, produced as natural aspects of
women’s bodies and personalities. As Fortunati argues, it is considered natural that men
consume love, whereas women’s “generous” personalities are productive of love (AR 75).
While women are the main producers of love, their work is simultaneously “paid for” by the
love they receive from their male partners (RPZ 24). The construction of women as
generous also implies that for women, love is its own reward – to perform the work of love
is a sufficient source of pleasure, so that no other remuneration is needed. As Federici
notes, women are expected to express gratitude towards their male partners, as “they
have given us the opportunity to express ourselves as women (i.e., to serve them)” (RPZ
24). 
It is the emotional factor of heterosexuality, Fortunati argues, that forces women into
unequal and unwaged exchange (AR 14). While heterosexual love appears to be a
relationship of reciprocity, women must be prepared to take on domestic and emotional
labour for the men they are involved with (AR 14, 74). It is the legitimacy of normative
heterosexuality, compared to both paid sex work and sexual relations outside the
heterosexual work ethic, that binds women to their work, as it offers the emotional reward
of being a properly gendered subject. This legitimacy produces emotional investment in
the institution of heterosexual monogamy, which, as Berlant suggests, maintains the
association between “the good life” and heterosexuality (2012: 21). The “positive” and
productive force of love, then, rather than just the punitive logic of violence, maintains
inequality and exploitation. We participate in it through our emotional investments in one
another and ourselves. Through investment in the good life of heterosexuality, many
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women also participate in their own exploitation. 
This is not to suggest that women could simply choose not to be exploited, but
rather, that women are active participants in gendered relations and not mere victims of
patriarchy. A central lesson of Marxism is that people are made to engage in work under
conditions not of their own choosing. While gendered relations are exploitative for most
women, they can also produce forms of subjective rewards for those who do gender well,
and in particular for white, bourgeois, and heterosexual women who are able to perform
femininity according to normative standards. While gender is contradictory and unstable,
and no one is fully able to live up to gendered ideals, aspiring to these ideals takes a lot of
work but is also rewarded. Supposed failure or refusal to live up to these norms, or the
racialised exclusion from them, can lead to violent punishment. Brown explores how
gendered ideals are co-constructed with whiteness, so that “white women are the
legitimate objects of beauty, of love, of femininity. Black women are not” (1976a: 4).
Federici argues that femininity in the transition to capital was reconfigured from an
association with uncontrollable sexuality to signifiers such as docility and chastity (2004:
103). While this modern, capitalist construction of femininity was based on an idealised
notion of white, heterosexual, and bourgeois women, it functioned as a disciplinary tool
cutting across races and classes. However, femininity retains some of its contradictory
meanings, which facilitates its manipulation as a technique for extracting labour and
controlling workers (Wright 2006: 29, 37). 
Similarly to black women, lesbians are subjected to punishments for their supposed
failure to live up to heterosexualised norms of femininity – forms of violence and exclusion
that also serve to warn other women not to become lesbians (AWNP 24). Heterosexuality,
while seemingly a private form of desire, is the structure of capitalist family relations (AR
24). Heterosexuality is thus a form of discipline, or a work ethic (Toupin 2014: 107). It is
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from this work, and the approval that comes from it, that women learn to derive their sense
of identity, their sense of being “real women” (NYWFHC 145). Heterosexual desire is also
constructed as a natural bodily instinct, whereas lesbianism is deemed unnatural. Lesbians
are thus often excluded from the subjective rewards that comes from performing gendered
labour well. 
The WFH writers are attentive to how the gendered body, while appearing as a
natural given, is in fact the result of labour. Fortunati argues that this is part of the “non-
material” (that is, emotional) reproductive labour that women do. The feminised body thus
becomes part of the product of gendered labour. In this type of production, she writes, 
the raw materials and the means of work are incorporated within the female houseworker
herself, within the individual. This implies that her non-material needs must not and cannot exist
except as needs to satisfy the non-material needs of the male worker and her children. It also
implies that she, apart from being labor-power is also a mere machine in the continuous cycle of
non-material production. In this sense the female houseworker is capital’s greatest technological
invention. Thus, lipstick, powder, make-up in general are part of the process of non-material
production, because they are added to the woman’s body to effect a material change. (AR 77)
In a similar vein, Federici and Cox suggest that a woman has to “put hours of labor into
reproducing her own labor power, and women well know the tyranny of this task, for a
pretty dress and hairdo are conditions for their getting the job, whether on the marriage
market or on the wage labor market” (RPZ 32). Here, the WFH authors seek to
denaturalise this intervention into the bodily configuration of women by naming this activity
as work. Fortunati’s striking invocation of the feminised body as capital’s greatest
technological invention serves as a reminder of the constructedness of the capacities of
the body, as well as the naturalisation of such capacities so that they appear to be outside
of the labouring subject’s control. 
136
Women’s labour, especially that which is sexual or maternal, is conflated with their
bodies and constructed as a natural instinct. It is turned into a “natural force of social
labour” (AR 11). This naturalisation, as we have seen, is essential for the capitalist use of
reproductive labour. According to Fortunati, it is thereby rendered “simple” labour. She
writes that “reproduction work is work that can be reduced to simple work where the
woman’s simple labour-power – that contained within her body – is used as it is, without
any need of specific development” (AR 107, emphasis in original). The capacity for
reproductive labour is thus turned into a natural quality of certain bodies, whose function is
primarily to carry out that labour. We can note that the naturalisation of feminised labour,
and particularly emotional labour, makes that work appear not only as unskilled labour but
also makes it invisible as labour. There is no separation between the work and the person,
rather the “personality” of the worker tends to subsume the work. Women’s emotional
labour is thus constructed as natural expression of their spontaneous feeling, something
that is in turn used to further exploit this labour. This apparent deskilling of emotional and
bodily forms of labour is thus a central part of the general devaluation of reproduction.
However, we have seen that WFH see gender as the development of capacities rather
than a lack of skill. According to James, race and gender function as imperatives “to
develop and acquire certain capabilities at the expense of all others. Then these acquired
capabilities are taken to be our nature, fixing our functions for life, and fixing also the
quality of our mutual relations” (SRC 96). The “deskilling” and invisibility of gendered
labour is itself a skilled vanishing act, which becomes part of the acquired capacities of
gender. 
For the WFH authors, then, the feminised sphere of love and emotion is a form of
skilful work that becomes conflated with the working subject herself. Her body and
personality, her supposedly passive and unskilled emotionality, become resources to
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exploit – or as Federici would put it, a form of commons. In this process, her labour is
hidden. In the next section, I will look at Hochschild’s understanding of gender in relation to
emotion, before returning to the notions of subjectivity and capacity in the last section of
this chapter. 
Gendered feeling: Hochschild on femininity 
In Hochschild’s work, femininity emerges as a central factor for the performance of
emotional labour. However, it is not the case that emotional labour as such is simply
feminised, in a way that conflates femininity with emotion. Rather, the link between
emotional labour and gender is more complex, and masculinity is also built partly around a
gendered enactment of emotion. Furthermore, emotional labour needs to be thought of not
merely in terms of internal feeling, but in stylised bodily performance of emotion. As
Whitney points out, there is an affinity between Butler’s emphasis on performativity and
Hochschild’s use of the dramaturgical metaphors of surface acting and deep acting. She
writes that “the affective laborer’s deep acting achieves the effect of expressing an
interiority that seems to precede the performance, but in fact is cultivated by it” (2018:
645). Emotional labour thus contributes to the production of gendered interiority, through
uses of bodily performance.
Women, according to Hochschild, tend to do more emotional labour than men, and
they generally do it in a specifically feminised way. She explains this difference with
reference to women’s weaker socio-economic position in society, and their socialisation in
patterns of behaviour which privilege the needs of others. Women generally have a more
restricted access to economic resources, and therefore tend to make a resource out of
emotion (MH 163). However, this resource is one that implies the subject’s subordination
to others, rather than a thing that can be owned or fully controlled. Hochschild writes that
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women thus perform “emotion work that affirms, enhances, and celebrates the well-being
and status of others” (MH 165). This production of other people’s status means that
women’s emotion work continually produces their own lack of status. 
As Hochschild notes, women have traditionally been described as manipulative in
their use of emotion, while paradoxically also being constructed as in the grips of
uncontrollable emotion (MH 164). But although women, like everyone else, are capable of
using emotion to achieve their own ends, femininity prescribes that emotion should
primarily be used in the service of others. Women are constituted as subjects whose
emotional “adaptability” tends to position them as inherently responsive to the needs of
other people. To illustrate this, Hochschild points to women’s tendency to act as
“conversational cheerleaders,” enhancing the social performance of others (MH 168). This
pattern is explored in greater detail in Pamela Fishman’s study of conversational patterns
within heterosexual couples, where she found that female participants were much more
likely to actively demonstrate that they were listening, continuously affirming their partner’s
opinions and choice of conversational topics (1978: 402). While this pattern might seem
insignificant as a form of gendered exploitation, Carin Holmberg demonstrates its
importance when she stresses that men use the confidence they gain from their female
partner’s emotional support to position themselves as superior to their partner (1993: 188).
Small, but reiterated, gestures of support that women make are thus used to perpetuate
their subordination. This does not mean that women are to blame for their own oppression,
but neither are they passive victims of gender oppression and exploitation. Rather, women
tend to actively participate in the continual reproduction of a reality based on gender
hierarchy. 
Hochschild uses the term emotion work to stress this active dimension of women’s
gendered behaviour. While she has been accused of not giving due weight to the agency
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of emotion workers (Wouters 1989: 22, McQueen 2016: 52), Hochschild does not oppose
agency and structure, but instead provides a model where agency works through structure
and vice versa. Emotion workers, and women in general, are active participants in creating
social realities, even when those realities continually marginalise them. Women,
Hochschild points out, are also active in the labour of erasing any signs of emotion work –
that is, they actively disguise their own labour under the banners of niceness and natural
femininity. Hochschild invokes Ivan Illich’s term “shadow labour” to name this “unseen
effort, which, like housework, does not quite count as labor but is nevertheless crucial to
getting other things done” (MH 167). As Jean Duncombe and Dennis Marsden argue,
women’s emotion work may actively obscure the degree of their exploitation (1995: 163).
Emotional labour is a form of invisible background condition that enables more visible
forms of labour and production to take place. 
This invisibility is premised on a differential valuation of emotion based on gender. If
women’s emotional expression is in some sense more visible as emotion, it is because
men’s emotional expressions tend to be interpreted as a statement of fact. Hochschild
writes that when men express anger, “it is deemed ‘rational’ or understandable anger,
anger that indicates not weakness of character but deeply held conviction.” In contrast,
“women’s feelings are not seen as a response to real events but as reflections of
themselves as ‘emotional’ women” (MH 173). While women thus perform more of the
invisible work of catering to others’ emotion, they are nonetheless deemed to be
excessively emotional themselves. David Knights and Torkil Thanen write that women
often have to do the additional emotional labour of controlling undesirable “feminine”
emotions (2005: 39). In a similar vein, Marjukka Ollilainen notes that while seemingly
gender neutral, emotional rules are often gendered in such a way that “appropriate”
emotions come to be regarded as masculine, while those deemed inappropriate are coded
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as feminine. This serves to empower those expressing “proper” emotions, while
marginalising those who are thought to express improper emotions. (2000: 85). There is
thus a circular association of femininity and emotion, in which femininity is devalued due to
its connection with emotionality while emotion becomes devalued when coded as
feminine. The view that women are more emotional, Hochschild argues, is used to
invalidate women’s feelings (MH 173). Similarly to Hochschild, Fishman and Holmberg
both note that this gives men a greater claim to constructing a generally accepted view of
the world, as their arguments are coded as rational rather than emotional. Thus, while
women work harder to maintain social relations, men have greater control over the content
of the world view created in those interactions. Women thus often work to affirm a
construction of the world that persistently subordinates them (Fishman 1978: 404,
Holmberg 1993: 137). This tendency serves the reproduction of gender hierarchy and
women’s subordinate position, especially within heterosexual relationships.
For Hochschild, it is the fact that women tend to form intimate connections with men
that differentiates gendered oppression from hierarchies based on race or class (MH 169).
This intimacy explains the primacy of emotional labour within gendered oppression, as this
labour creates the social relations that perpetuate gender. While race and class
oppression and exploitation primarily play out at work or in public, gender is continually
reproduced through intimate family relations. And while gendered violence is commonly
represented as belonging in the world outside the home (WL 79), in most instances of rape
and gendered violence the perpetrator is known to the victim, and sexual violence primarily
takes place in the home (Hall 1985: 64, 88). Emotional labour has been increasingly
commodified since women started to enter the job market in greater numbers, yet
gendered oppression at work is distinctly shaped by relations formed in the private sphere.
This gives heterosexual gender relations a distinct character, as the subordinated are
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tasked with forming intimate bonds of love with their oppressors, and adapt their emotional
lives to the needs of those who subordinate them. Hochschild writes that since “men and
women do try to love one another [...] the very closeness of the bond they accept calls for
some disguise of subordination” (MH 169). Emotional labour, then, not only reproduces
more general forms of gendered exploitation and oppression, but also masks oppression
as love, while at the same time producing the need for such obfuscation. As Giovanna
Dalla Costa notes, this ensures that even violence and emotional abuse can pass as
expressions of love, rather than control of women (WL 87). 
Hochschild writes that men tend to feel more entitled to their partner’s nurturance
than women do (1989a: 254). Here, she expresses an idea similar to Jónasdottir’s theory
of love power, where women have the “right” only to give love and sexual affection, but not
to receive it (1994: 26). This runs contrary to the received knowledge that women are more
emotionally demanding in intimate relationships, common even in some of the feminist
literature on love, such as Francesca Cancian’s Love in America (1987). These writings,
perhaps inadvertently, reproduce the notion that men are expressing their love differently,
and that it is unfair of women to demand full reciprocity. They thus mobilise the trope of
men as “inexpressive,” and what Stephanie Shields identifies as the paradigm of
masculinity as self-control (2002: 53). This trope, as Duncombe and Marsden point out,
reinforces an unequal division of power, in which men can create distance and power by
withholding emotional expression (1993: 236). It also means that women often have to rely
disproportionately on other women for emotional support, as they are less likely to receive
emotional care from their partners (Holmberg 1993: 167). According to Tamsin Wilton, this
suggests that heterosexual women’s friendships tend to function as support-systems that
serve to uphold male dominance by naturalising men’s lack of reciprocity. Such support-
systems, Wilton argues, are analogous to battlefield hospitals, aiming to minimise the
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emotional harms of heterosexual relationships without challenging the source of that harm
(1992: 507).
However, the fact that women are generally more trained in handling the feelings of
both self and others does not imply that men are less emotional. Hochschild argues that it
is plausible that “men may manage feelings more by subconscious repressing, women
more by conscious suppressing” (MH 165). As noted above, it is not necessarily the case
that men experience fewer emotions, but that such emotions are expressed, perceived,
and interpreted in gendered ways. In fact, emotions are an essential aspect of what
Hochschild calls gender strategies, for both men and women. The term strategy is meant
to denote the active element of people’s relationship to gender, implying that gender
consists not just of received ideas or socialisation but lived practice. Hochschild argues
that gender strategies are not “merely” ideological, in the sense of a set of ideas covering
over social hierarchy. Rather, such strategies consist of the sum of ideology, emotion, and
action (1989a: 192). A gender strategy, Hochschild writes, is “a plan of action through
which a person tries to solve problems at hand, given the cultural notions of gender at
play” (1989a: 15). Often, gender strategies correspond to our sense of an authentic self
(2003b: 130). As Bromberg argues, the concept of emotional labour indicates that gender
is not experienced as external but rather conceptualised as an inherent aspect of the
subject (2015: 112). As I will argue in chapter five, the internalisation of gender through
emotional attachment makes it more difficult to abolish. However, as Hochschild notes,
gender strategies are often fractured and incoherent (1989a: 190). This opens a space for
developing contradictions within those strategies, and potentially changing them in the
process. 
In The second shift, Hochschild explores the thesis that women’s gender strategies
have changed quicker than those of men. She calls this a stalled revolution, in which
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women have partly abandoned ideologies of the nurturant housewife, in favour of an ideal
of combining housework with waged work. However, the material support for this
ideological shift is missing, which forces many women into the position of having to
perform the majority of unwaged work while having less time to do so (1989a: 8-11, 267).
Furthermore, men have changed more slowly than women, holding on to a model of
gender more closely associated with Fordism, where men were breadwinners and women
caregivers (1989a: 12). The contradictory demands of gender ideology and reality,
Hochschild found in her study, force women and their partners to develop family myths,
which cover up the gap between ideal and practice (1989a: 207). These myths are
themselves a form of emotional labour, as they must be continually affirmed and
reproduced in order to maintain the relationship of affective intimacy between family
members. 
While this account is compelling, it produces a notion of men as “behind the times” –
as just needing to change their ways in order to produce a more egalitarian future. This
seems to suggest that it is not gender itself but men’s non-contemporary attitudes towards
gender that must be changed. In Hochschild’s most recent book, Strangers in their own
land (2016), this morphs into an account of the white men “left behind,” whose anger at the
economic and political developments of post-Fordism we must empathise with.53 In a
similar vein, some arguments in The second shift already point to Hochschild’s later
valuation of the emotional intimacy of family life over the “cold” capitalist logic of the work
place. For instance, her notion that women have abandoned the traditionally female
subculture of nurturance in order to pursue careers, and thus assimilated to male culture
(1989a: 208), suggests that someone should ideally hold on to the ideology and practice of
femininity. It also neglects the fact that much of that “feminine subculture” has in fact
moved into the sphere of waged work, a trend which The managed heart was one of the
53 See Bhambra (2017) for a trenchant critique of this book.
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first books to explore. 
Women have thus not necessarily abandoned the “warm” logic of emotional labour
just because they are increasingly engaged in waged work. While some women, deriving
status from their class and race, have been able to participate in high-status waged work
on almost the same terms as men, they have done so on the backs of less privileged
women who engage in traditionally feminised work. Hochschild’s argument in The second
shift and The time bind, that women have abandoned the values of the home, runs
contrary to the argument of The managed heart, where Hochschild notes that many
women have been made to commodify exactly those values (MH 171). While the
specificity of the oppression of women is deeply rooted in the intimate sphere, this sphere
has never been disconnected from its outside, and the exploitation of women has always
been shaped in various ways by the constitution of those spheres as parts of a totality.
Contemporary forms of gender oppression depend on the mutual constitution of these
spheres.
This claim is supported by Hochschild’s own insistence that male and female flight
attendants are doing different jobs, as men tend to specialise in more physical tasks
whereas women are assigned the work of creating good feeling (MH 174). Women joining
the waged labour force to an increasing degree does thus not necessarily imply that they
have become part of the male culture of work. Rather, as we have seen, it is at least
partially the case that the “female subculture” of nurturance has been increasingly
commodified – a tendency which Hochschild is also worried about. Hochschild’s claim that
female service workers are constructed as a different type of workers from their male
counterparts has been supported by several subsequent studies of emotional labour in
different sectors (Adkins 1995: 148, Pierce 1996: 187, Brannan 2005: 433). This also
implies that there is a problem with the type of quantitative measure that is sometimes
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employed in the literature on emotional labour, including by Hochschild herself, which
attempts to list the number of workers employed in sectors requiring emotional labour (MH
244-248, Wharton 1993). While Hochschild states that numerically more women are
employed in these sectors (MH 171) that claim is not necessary for supporting the
argument that emotional labour is carried out primarily by women. For example, male flight
attendants are included in the list of service workers who are assumed to be carrying out
emotional labour. But Hochschild found precisely that male flight attendants could often
avoid aspects of the work that required such labour (MH 176). 
In Hochschild’s study, male flight attendants were also less likely to be the targets of
negative emotion, which is a feminised position according to what I have called the safety-
valve theory of emotional labour. Customers were much more likely to unburden their
negative emotion, such as anger and distress, on female service workers. Here, we can
return to Whitney’s notion of emotional labour as that which does not necessarily create a
good feeling in the customer but is rather the offloading of negative feeling onto the worker
(2018: 643). While I am hesitant to adopt Whitney’s metaphor of by-products, for reasons
outlined above, I agree with Whitney that this function is important to explain the continual
production of subjectivity and hierarchy through the process of emotional labour, and that
Hochschild does not fully account for this form of production. Whitney argues that
Hochschild’s understanding of gender and subjectivity as preceding the process of
emotional labour tends to obscure how gender (as well as race and class) is continually
and dynamically reproduced in the affective transfer of the labour encounter (2018: 653).
However, in my account in this section, I have emphasised a reading of Hochschild in
which femininity is co-constitutive with the emotional labour process. It is thus important to
stress the role of what Hochschild calls “emotion work,” for it is only by understanding how
unwaged and seemingly “private” types of relationality constitute the feminised subject that
146
we can understand that the person entering a job requiring emotional labour does not
enter it with a pre-social or authentic form of subjectivity, which is then merely
“commercialised.” Rather, we must think about how emotion work and emotional labour
are parts of a continuum of gendering work. 
In Hochschild’s account, masculinity functions as a “status shield,” which protects the
subject from emotional abuse. It also affords men a higher degree of authority than
women, to the point of young men being mistaken for the managers of their more senior
female colleagues (MH 177). Hochschild notes that both male and female flight attendants
not only accepted this distribution of authority, but “made it more real” by acting as if their
gendered status corresponded to their status within the workplace. This allowed men to be
less tolerant to abuse than women (MH 178). In this sense, gender and status are not
merely pre-given in the labour process, but rather continually enforced through gendered
agency. In a footnote, Hochschild adds that only heterosexual men tended to act as if they
had more authority than they actually did, signalling that heterosexuality is an important
factor in stabilising gendered hierarchy (MH 179). Hochschild writes that women were
expected to have a higher tolerance for abuse, an assumption that resulted in female
workers being targeted and scapegoated, while simultaneously decreasing their ability to
defend themselves from such abuse. Instead, women are expected to show deference to
customers, especially male customers, and to respond to abuse with a smile (MH 6, 178).
As Whitney points out, these processes are part of the production of gender as such. She
notes that
the exploitation of affective labor that happens at its intersections with race and gender works
by producing depleted embodied subjectivities: ones whose affects are diminished in their force
as affections, constructed as non-intentional, non-agentic, or nonauthoritative, and who thereby
are constructed as affect disposals. (2018: 639)
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Here, the notion of depletion becomes important for naming the effect of emotional labour
on those who perform it, as agency is often constructed as an opposite of “being
emotional,” while emotional labour at the same time reinforcing other people’s capacity to
act.
However, this does not affect all feminised subjects in identical ways. As Whitney
argues, drawing on the research of Gutiérrez-Rodríguez (2010), migrant and racialised
women tend to be affected differently by emotional labour than the white, middle-class
women that Hochschild studied (2018: 650). Hochschild’s flight attendants performed
various versions of the idealised femininity of the white bourgeoisie. These draw
simultaneously on sexiness and care, producing an ideal mother-girlfriend figure, who is
constructed as both emotionally and sexually available to (male) customers. As Hochschild
puts it, female flight attendants are expected 
to enact two leading roles of Womanhood: the loving wife and mother (serving food, tending the
needs of others) and the glamorous ‘career woman’ (dressed to be seen, in contact with strange
men, professional and controlled in manner, and literally very far from home) (MH 175,
emphasis in original)
This form of emotional labour is more explicit than that of the domestic workers
interviewed by Gutiérrez-Rodríguez. It is built on the performance of a limited but flexible
set of gendered norms, which can respond to differing emotional needs. Because women
are expected to respond to a number of needs in others, it is essential to femininity that it
can contain multiple and sometimes contradictory versions of womanhood. Hochschild
shows how flight attendants developed various bodily techniques to perform femininity,
from “sexual queen” to “Cub Scout den mother” (MH 180, 182). These forms of femininity
are highly limited and constricted by normative patterns, yet they afford female workers
148
some flexibility in using different types of femininity to achieve various ends. This gives
female workers some agency to act through femininity, but it does very little to undo
gendered emotional labour as such. As I will show in the next section, more flexible types
of gender presentation do not necessarily undo gender, but can sometimes make
gendered divisions more adaptive and thus more persistent. 
Hochschild’s theory of emotional labour enables us to understand the gendered
subject as deeply shaped by labour practices. While Hochschild has been rightly criticised
for overstating the instrumentalisation of emotion in waged work and thus neglecting how
emotional labour is itself productive of emotion (Whitney 2018: 645), a reading which
emphasises the continuities between waged and unwaged work can to some extent
mitigate such issues. Hochschild can also help us understand gender in terms of flexible
and sometimes contradictory strategies and performances, which nonetheless
fundamentally shape the subject’s self-perception and sense of an authentic interiority.
Writing The managed heart in the transition from the Fordist to the post-Fordist economic
system, Hochschild managed to capture how notions of femininity based on unwaged work
could be commodified and turned into a type of waged work. However, as Hochschild
notes, the terms of this commodification would be different for the feminised worker than
they had been for the hegemonic male worker of previous capitalist eras. She articulates
this in terms of alienation of feeling, a concept which is inadequate because it seems to
assume that earlier forms of subjectivity were more authentic (Weeks 2011: 86). But we
can take up the problematic that Hochschild gives us, namely how femininity, the seeming
antithesis of the logic of capital, could be turned into a commodity on the capitalist labour
market. 
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Contradictory requirements: Contemporary labour and femininity
In contemporary capitalist societies, the gender model has shifted since the WFH authors
described all women as housewives. If Fordism produced relatively homogenous
experiences among women in the core capitalist countries, post-Fordism seems to have
given rise to increasingly stratified conditions. Many women have achieved prominence in
the “masculine” spheres of finance and politics. The second-wave feminist movement won
legal rights and increased sexual freedom for women. Yet gender hierarchy persists. In
this section, I will argue that an emphasis on emotional labour and its attendant forms of
subjectivity can help us to think through persistent patterns of gendered power. A focus on
domestic labour is not sufficient for this. Rather, emotional reproduction as a perspective
allows us to see the continuity between domestic and non-domestic settings. I therefore
complement the perspectives of WFH and Hochschild with a theory of gendered
subjectivity. This, I argue, can account for the persistence of gendered differentiation in
contemporary liberalism, even as the breadwinner model of the family is no longer
hegemonic. 
Neoliberal, post-Fordist society has brought with it an increased valuation of flexibility
(Weeks 2011: 70, Adkins 2002: 8). As we have seen in chapter two, this is part of what is
included in the concept of feminisation of labour. Yet in the post-workerist tradition, the
connection between flexibility and femininity is not entirely clear. Flexibility has often been
understood as a form of detraditionalising of gender, so that gender expression appears
less rigid (Adkins 2002: 16). However, as Lisa Adkins points out, such detraditionalisation
does not necessarily mean that gender hierarchies disappear; rather they are reconstituted
in new ways (2002: 84). This is because the post-Fordist economy and the neoliberal
political system continue to rely on hierarchical divisions within the workforce, as well as
the availability of devalued reproductive labour, even as those hierarchies seem to have
150
disappeared. 
In chapter two, I discussed how emotional labour implies the creation of status and
subjectivity. These forms of labour are processes in which dominated subjects participate
rather than passively endure. For example, Holmberg found that the women in her study
were more likely to express a high valuation of traditionally masculine traits than were their
male partners (1993: 137). Yet as Whitney argues, feminised forms of labour function to
decrease the degree of perceived agency that labouring subjects possess, as their
emotional expression is not understood as making something happen in the world, but
merely a reflection of their own susceptibility to emotion (2018: 653). 
Agency and sovereignty, Marek Korczynski suggests, are associated with masculine
forms of subjectivity (2013: 32). In this context, sovereignty denotes the capacity to act as
the ruler and owner of oneself, and to not be influenced by others or by “irrational”
emotion. This form of subjectivity can be understood as produced by the work of feminised
subjects, who are lessening their own agency through the production of masculine
sovereignty. In this section, however, I will also explore how some women have been able
to lay claim to this type of sovereignty, even if this claim is necessarily partial and unstable.
This has occurred as a result of both feminist agitation and neoliberal modes of
subjectivation, which emphasise choice and individual responsibility (Barbagallo 2016:
131). As we will see, however, this individual responsibilisation simultaneously quietly
enforces gendered norms and forms of labour, as well as supporting “traditional” family
patterns, while seeming to allow for more agency for women. 
The increased participation of women in the waged labour force has enabled white,
bourgeois women to achieve a greater degree of power and independence. These women
might have their own needs met to a higher extent because they can appear as carriers of
valuable, “skilled” labour power. It has also enabled them to at least to some degree refuse
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the burden of reproductive labour, often by partially outsourcing it to designated
reproductive workers. In capitalist society, reproductive labour is devalued and deemed
incompatible with sovereign subjectivity, since this type of labour privileges the needs of
others. Such needs, rather than individual will, become the orienting force of this labour
subject. Inhabiting sovereignty therefore means refusing the work of reproducing others.
The fact that some women have been able to lay claim to sovereignty and agency has not
done away with the distinction between those who perform reproductive labour and those
who do not. It has merely redrawn the lines of these groups, allowing for some flexibility for
a highly select group of women. These women might themselves struggle to fully inhabit
this form of subjectivity, since it is constructed as the opposite of the femininity that they
were often raised to perform. “Career women” may thus also feel the need to emphasise
that they are mothers first and foremost, in order to inhabit normative femininity. In
Macdonald’s study, such women emphasised that they were investing in their own careers
in order to produce a better future for their children (2010: 35). 
Barrett and McIntosh argue that under capitalism, the unit for “self-support” is not the
individual but the family (2015: 47). Similarly, Melinda Cooper and Wendy Brown both
suggest that the constitution of sovereign liberal personhood depends on what it has
disavowed, namely a form of subjectivity that creates community and dependence (Brown
1995: 155-157, Cooper 2017: 57-58). For Cooper, this matters in neoliberal politics
because it simultaneously celebrates individualism and depends on traditional family
values. She writes that “the neoliberal position [...] does not so much eliminate moral
philosophy as posit an immanent ethics of virtue and a spontaneous order of family values
that it expects to arise automatically from the mechanics of the free market system.” She
adds that “[t]he nature of family altruism in some sense represents an internal exception to
the free market, an immanent order of noncontractual obligations and inalienable services
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without which the world of contract would cease to function” (2017: 57-58). The
supposedly “traditional” world of family values is thus a precondition for the production of
the forms of sovereign subjectivity on which neoliberalism depends, and the construction
of the notion of the market as a site of freedom through contractual models of obligation.
This contradicts much of the theoretical work that has viewed neoliberalism as the
disappearance of “traditional” and non-contractual values.54 Individualism cannot subsist
on its own, since people are vulnerable and require other people to meet their need for
care. Liberalism thus produces split forms of subjectivity, one hegemonic form and one
that is necessary for that hegemony to persist. 
The term possessive individualism, as coined by C.B. MacPherson, is helpful for
understanding the constitution of the hegemonic form of subjectivity under capitalism. As
MacPherson writes:
Its possessive quality is found in its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of
his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them. The individual was seen neither
as a moral whole, nor as part of a larger social whole, but as an owner of himself. [...] The
individual, it was thought, is free inasmuch as he is proprietor of his person and capacities.
(1962: 3)
As we have seen, however, not every subject can inhabit possessive individualism to an
equal degree (Bhandar 2018: 179, 183). As the hegemonic subject position of capitalism, it
hides other forms of subjectivity. Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon suggest that when wage
labour was re-coded as a sign of independence, white working-class men came to appear
as independent at the cost of other subjects (2011: 91). In this way, possessive
individualism can be understood as the commodity form of subjectivity. As I touched upon
in chapter one, Marx argues that the commodity appears to have an inherent value, thus
54 See Adkins (2002) for an overview of this literature.
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hiding the social source of that value in relations of production. The commodity form thus
makes invisible the labour it took to produce that commodity. We can note that possessive
individualism is simultaneously a result and a precondition of the commodification of our
capacity to labour, so that such capacity appears as a commodity belonging to ourselves
and thus ours to sell for a wage. As with the case of the commodity form, the form of
possessive individualism makes invisible the labour that goes into forming that very
subject position. 
The production of possessive individualism, however, is not an automatic result of
capitalist economic relations, but requires continual reaffirmation. As Fraser and Gordon
show, independent subjectivity relies on its outside – the gendered, classed, and racialised
modes of dependency which have been increasingly constructed as psychological traits
rather than social positions (2011: 94). The labour of affirming individualism becomes
invisible through the very form of possessive individualism, as the possessive subject
appears to owe his capacities only to himself. Furthermore, it depends on a subject that
does not inhabit possessive individualism. As Coontz argues, “[s]elf-reliance and
independence worked for men because women took care of dependence and obligation”
(1992: 53, emphasis in original). Emotional reproduction is not merely concerned with
maintaining existing relationships, but with creating such relationships in the first place.
That is why the subject of emotional labour appears as the opposite of possessive
individualism – it is a subject fundamentally concerned with building the relationality of
society. Capitalist subjectivity is thus organised around a split between possessive
individualism and emotional altruism – a split that maps onto gendered subjectivity. The
labour of building affective relations is structurally hidden in a world where the term “work”
appears as the opposite of intimacy and emotion. This construction of individualism is
related to the supposed “emotionality” of women. Individualism is built around self-
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possession and control of one’s own emotional life. Women are constructed as lacking
precisely the ability to be the master of their own feelings (MH 166). Femininity is thus
understood as the condition of not being a sovereign individual, but rather being the
passive victim of emotional states (Shields 2002: 9, 38). 
The split subjectivity that is produced by capitalist economies creates a contradiction
at the centre of many women’s lives, as they are increasingly called upon to embody both
of these forms of subjectivity. Under capitalism, Joan Acker remarks, the worker is
constructed as abstract and disembodied, thus lacking ties to other people (1990: 150).
However, feminised people are often tasked precisely with producing such ties. For these
women, post-Fordist society implies a contradictory state, especially since neoliberal
politics has been based around the reduction of state provision of reproductive services
and the reprivatisation of much reproductive labour (Glazer 1993: xi, Gonzalez and Neton
2013: 89). This serves to bind many women to particular forms of work, as well as creating
a continuing disadvantage for the women who are engaged in “masculine” types of work.
The conflation of femininity and motherhood reinforces this relation, even as many women
do not have children. Hochschild writes that
because [women] are seen as members of the category from which mothers come, women in
general are asked to look out for psychological needs more than men are. The world turns to
women for mothering, and this fact silently attaches itself to many a job description. (MH 170)
Given that they are positioned as “mothers” at work, feminised workers are clearly
differentiated from the disembodied worker that Acker describes. Moreover, motherhood
attaches itself even to those female workers who are not engaged in mothering work. As I
noted in chapter one, Fortunati understands this in terms of the subordination of women’s
productive capacity to their reproductive capacity (AR 15). Gonzalez and Neton argue that
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the naturalising assumption that all women are potential mothers forms the basis for
women’s low value on the labour market, as a potential cost of reproduction is turned into
an expression of women’s worthlessness (2013: 76).55 
While biological reproduction thus appears to be the essential function of feminised
bodies, it is in fact unevenly distributed across such bodies (RPZ 73). Enslaved black
women, excluded from the construction of femininity, were subjected to regimes of forced
biological productivity, while simultaneously being denied the right to relate to their children
as kin (Federici 2004: 89-90, Roberts 1997b: 33). Thus not all women have been
constructed as mothers in similar ways. Racialised women have often been denied the
status of motherhood, based on the assumption that they are naturally unqualified for the
“spiritual” labour required to raise a child (Roberts 1997a: 62). Instead, these women have
been more valued for their waged reproductive labour, and are made to take on the work
of “mothering” white families while at the same time being made invisible as carers
(Prescod 1980: 14). For many working-class women, especially women of colour and
migrant women, the contradictory demands of waged work and domestic work are nothing
new. But many of these women are engaged in the sector of waged reproductive work. For
these workers, there is less an issue of the contradictory claims of various forms of
subjectivity, and more of lacking resources and time. This creates a situation where
workers might become depleted from their caring labour in both waged and unwaged
forms of work.56 These women might thus experience the downsides of the exploitation of
femininity without the rewards of being understood as a properly (white, bourgeois)
feminised subject. 
As proper femininity is simultaneously rewarded and devalued, professional women
55 This point is supported by the argument that the gender pay gap is in fact a “motherhood penalty,” as 
women are penalised for having children while it does not affect the earnings of men. See for example 
Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann (2012). According to Melissa Wright, the assumption that female factory 
workers in the Global South will want to become mothers means that they can be legitimately be fired 
after two years of work (2006: 37).
56 For an account of depletion as a result of care work, see Rai, Hoskyns, and Thomas (2014). 
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might find themselves in a double bind. In many cases these women are pressured to
distance themselves from reproductive labour and “traditional” femininity, while at the
same time preserving some aspects of it so as to not appear as gender deviants (Whitney
2018: 652, Hochshild 1989a: 221, Gutiérrez-Rodríguez 2010: 135). Here, we can use
Hochschild’s notion of gender strategies to understand how people try to cover over the
contradictory construction of femininity. The disavowal of “traditional” femininity is often
mapped onto race, where women of colour and migrant women are constructed as
inhabiting a more “backwards” type of femininity, compared to the modern and more
sovereign subjectivity that white, bourgeois women can claim (Whitney 2018: 651). As
Farris shows, this has been translated into the political demand, coming from both right-
wing politicians and some feminist organisations, that migrant women should be compelled
to perform wage work in the reproductive sector, in order to escape their “backwardness.”
However, these women are made to engage in the very sectors that white women,
aspiring to inhabit a “modern” subjectivity, are seeking to escape (2017: 119, 130, 137).
Having a career thus becomes the test of “modern” (or masculine) subjectivity, compared
to the devalued position of “traditional” (feminine) wagelessness. Ironically, this ignores the
fact that women of colour have historically been more likely to perform waged work than
white women (Glenn 1992: 3). Even when passing the test of having a waged job, migrant
women of colour are often stuck in a devalued form of feminine positionality due to their
persistent association with care work. 
Gender, flexibility, and emotional labour
Feminised subjectivity is itself not necessarily internally coherent. As Melissa Wright has
shown in her study of feminised factory work in China and Mexico, the coexistence of
several versions of femininity means that different aspects of femininity can be mobilised in
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ways that increase gendered domination and exploitation. Underpinning what she calls the
myth of the disposability of the “Third World Woman” are contradictory constructions of
women as more docile and dexterous than men, and simultaneously as mere unskilled
physicality in need of constant control, as the unruly feminine body constantly threatens to
disrupt the flow of production (2006: 2, 37). The construction of feminine passivity and
docility is thus unstable and flexible. Yet this flexibility itself enables the hyper-exploitation
of women workers, as well as their vulnerability to violence, both inside and outside the
sphere of production. Here, gendered subjectivities emerge as the effects of gendered
forms of production and control. In places of work, both the home and the formal economy,
gendered subjectivity is simultaneously presupposed and reproduced. 
It is important to note, with Robin Leidner, that such flexibility does not necessarily
undo the naturalisation of gender. Instead, people are often able to fit more flexible gender
presentation within their conceptualisation of a gender binary (1993: 196). This implies that
various forms of femininity can coexist and sometimes come into contradiction, without
undoing the continual devaluation of what is deemed feminine. A more flexible
construction of gendered work, where women are not only housewives but waged workers,
does not necessarily threaten this devaluation. Federici notes that women are now
increasingly exploited for their cheap labour power rather than just their unwaged services
(2018a: 53). Yet this devaluation is centrally connected to the unwaged nature of much of
reproductive labour, which remains even as we have seen a trend towards
commodification of some reproductive work over the past decades. Nona Glazer notes
that this trend is not unilinear, and that there is a significant degree of flexibility in the
reproductive sphere, where various forms of reproductive work tend to shift back and forth
between waged and unwaged spheres according to the commodification cycles of the
market and the expansion and retraction of state services. She suggests that women are
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supposed to act as “sponges” that can absorb unwaged and waged work (1993: 12).
Again, femininity is constructed as a form of receptivity, whose flexibility is the capacity to
adapt to the varying needs of others. 
The neoliberal and flexible construction of femininity might thus imply the increasing
exploitation of women across the waged and unwaged spheres. While women’s
participation in the waged labour force puts temporal limits to their unwaged work in ways
that necessitate the use of commodified reproductive services (Farris 2017: 174), many
women are nonetheless participating in the unwaged care of family and friends, often in
ways that impinge on their leisure time. These women thus have less time and capacity to
reproduce their own labour power. The reproductive labour these women perform need to
be fitted with naturalised understandings of femininity and care in order for them to be de-
and recommodified according to the needs of various people and institutions. Women’s
flexibility becomes the work of responding to these needs, accepting previously waged
work back into the private sphere according to the current organisation of state services,
and the always partial and limited forms of commodified reproductive services that the so-
called free market provides. 
Flexibility, then, means different things for different subjects within the post-Fordist
economy. For feminised subjects, it means the ability to absorb the work that has been
relegated to the private sphere after the reduction of state services, as well as the stresses
and shocks of an increasingly precarious economic position for many people. As Federici
writes, “women have been the shock absorbers of economic globalization, having had to
compensate with their work for the deteriorating economic conditions produced by the
liberalization of the world economy and the state’s increasing disinvestment in the
reproduction of the workforce” (RPZ 108). As in the sphere of waged labour, the notion of
flexibility tends to have negative connotations for those who are exploited. For masculine
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subjects, neoliberal constructions of flexible subjectivity might entail more desirable forms
of mobility and reflexivity – the ability to change according to the subject’s own desires.
Adkins suggest that this form of flexibility, while presented as the undoing of hierarchy, is
in fact more available to some, in her examples men and heterosexual people (2002: 84).
Selberg, in her study of nurses in a hospital deploying neoliberal management techniques,
notes that some female nurses are allowed upward mobility, insofar as they can inhabit a
form of youthful, modern energy and individualism that is seen as desirable within these
regimes of the self. In liberal versions of feminism, this is portrayed as a form of the
undoing of gendered norms and as a less strict gender division of labour. However, as
Selberg points out, this does nothing to ease the burden of those women who are left
doing the undervalued and often invisible work of caring for patients (2012: 314-315). In
fact, neoliberal “rationality” tends to exacerbate the pressures of these positions, through
regimes of austerity and outsourcing. Thus, liberal feminism has often simply neglected
issues of reproduction while celebrating women’s entrance into management positions. 
The production of caring labour subjects is not exclusive to women, but extends to
other people in feminised positions. Christopher Carrington explores how gay and lesbian
relationships tend to produce a more feminised partner, whose main responsibility is the
reproduction of the couple. This position is not predetermined by gender, but tends to be
contingent on external factors such as employment and income. However, Carrington
describes how the division of domestic labour within the couple becomes retrospectively
justified with reference to internal factors such as personality and proclivity for domestic
work (1999: 193, 200). Furthermore, this creates a hierarchy in which the person investing
more time in reproductive work tends to be more dependent, since they have less access
to material resources and less time for participation in waged work (1999: 222). Even in
couples who present themselves as more egalitarian and flexible, then, the division of
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reproductive labour tends to be naturalised and attributed to the personality of the
caregiver. 
However, feminised subjects of emotional labour are not themselves necessarily
harmed from the labour practices of emotional care. Emotional labour is ambivalent in its
effect, both on work subjects and on recipients of care. Several critics of Hochschild have
pointed to the fact that she only accounts for the mental costs of emotional labour, and not
its rewards (Korczynski 2013: 57, Erickson and Ritter 2001: 149, Wharton 1996: 102). The
rewards of emotional labour, according to these authors, are one of the redeeming
features of this work. However, we should be wary of deriving moral or political value from
the pleasures that some people performing emotional labour can derive from their work. It
is not necessarily the case that such pleasures make labour practices better. In fact,
people can derive pleasure from practices that are limiting and harmful for themselves and
others. A case in point is the pleasure that heterosexual women derive from their
participation in intimate coupledom, which is a source of exploitation as well as rewards.
As Berlant argues, we often have optimistic affective investments in the very things that
damage us (2006: 21). Contra Hochschild, Amy Wharton suggests that women are not
more likely to suffer from the psychic costs of emotional labour than men are (1993: 224).
While this might be true, this statement does not imply that women as a group benefit from
performing emotional labour. Rather, some subjects can derive pleasure from the fact of
their proper performance of femininity that is often embedded in emotional labour
practices. Conversely, men who are performing feminised emotional labour might have to
deal with the cognitive and emotional stress of combining their work with their investment
in masculinity (Simpson 2007: 65-72). Berlant suggests that women, while shouldering the
burden of routing their own emotional needs through the needs of others, might also derive
some pleasure from receiving their “own value back not only in the labour of recognition
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she performs but in the sensual spectacle of its impact. In this discursive field, women’s
emotional labour places them at the centre of the story of what counts as life” (2008: 19). 
As women and other feminised people are made disproportionately responsible for
the needs of others, they become hyper-exploitable across waged and unwaged spheres.
Adkins and Lury read gendering through the sexualisation of women’s work on the waged
job market, in which feminised workers cannot fully be the owners of their own labour
power (1992: 180). Female workers, according to Adkins, are made into sexual objects by
managers, colleagues, and customers (1995: 134, 139). They lack the status of subjects
able to freely sell their labour power through the wage contract, as men can lay claim to
their effort and time (Adkins 1995: 159, Pateman 1988: 135). Similarly, Rosemary
Hennessy argues that feminised labouring subjects have a looser grasp of their labour
power, as their capacities have never really been their own, and thus not theirs to sell. She
uses the term “second skin” to articulate this loose relation to one’s self as commodity:
“When a feminized second skin accompanies the exchange of labour power for a wage, it
offers a tacit promise to the buyer that the supervision of the physical life and living
personality of the bearer of this commodity is out of her hands” (2013: 142).
Because of this, emotional labour itself is often only semi-commodified. It cannot
achieve the status as a saleable product separable from its seller, because it is deeply
naturalised and seen as inherent in the personality of the worker. This is part of the reason
why emotional labour is often not a service in itself but rather an invisible component of
other services. Furthermore, as Tyler and Taylor argue, there are “aspects of women’s
work which take place outside of formal, contractual relations of exchange, yet upon which
formal contractual relations of commodity exchange depend” (1998: 166, emphasis in
original). Mulholland similarly stresses the paramount yet unrecognised status of emotional
and reproductive labour in capitalist economies, when she suggests that emotional labour
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is essential to entrepreneurial masculinities and an indispensable input into capitalist
accumulation (1996: 148-149). 
Similarly to Hochschild’s argument regarding gift-giving, Taylor and Tyler utilise
models of gift exchange to understand feminised emotional labour. Yet as we have seen,
this labour is not necessarily recognised as a gift. While Hochschild suggests that
domestic labour within couples works through an economy of gratitude (1989a: 85),
emotional labour cannot necessarily be recognised as such. Its essentially invisible quality,
where its visibility as labour would undo its appearance as “authentic” emotional
performance, separates it from other reproductive types of work (Shane 2019: np).
Hochschild does note that not everything can be acknowledged as a gift (1989a: 18), as
this depends on the given social context, in which gender sets the framework for what is
“owed” by a person of a specific gender (MH 79). 
Emotional gift-giving, even when recognised as such, cannot be seen as a truly
voluntary form of participation in emotional exchange. Bolton uses the term “gift” to denote
nurses’ chosen work of care of patients, outside the demands of the wage contract (2005:
97). However, such “gifts” are hardly voluntary. Rather, Selberg notes that a sense of duty
compels nurses to give more care than they are paid for (2012: 223). Emotional labour
becomes a form what Taylor and Tyler call “compulsory altruism” (1998: 169). This, in turn,
is closely connected to the emotional logic of sacrifice discussed above. The psychic
structures that the WFH authors identified as belonging to femininity in general, then,
remain powerful especially for those women who are engaged in care work, and who are
emotionally invested in being a “good person” (Selberg 2012: 237), that is, good women.
The compulsory nature of much emotional labour, and care more generally, is particularly
evident when care is decommodified. When state provision of reproductive services is cut,
or when capitalist investment retreats from unprofitable forms of reproductive labour,
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family and friends are often made to perform the work of care in an unpaid capacity. Here,
the emotional attachment to the person in need of care, as well as the feminised
imperative to perform emotional labour, might compel women to pick up care for family or
friends even when it limits their capacity to care for themselves. 
Gendered skill
In this section, I return to the theme of gendered labour in terms of skill and capacity. As
we saw in chapter one, Fortunati remarks that the construction of labour power as a
saleable commodity is based on various historically acquired capacities. In line with the
WFH argument outlined above, I argue that such capacities are deeply gendered, thus
emerging as the natural capacities of the gendered body. Kevin Floyd, drawing on Butler,
underscores that “skill refers to nothing if not fully corporealized knowledge” (2009: 95).
Gendered skill is the knowledge of the body, enacted through repeated practices which
bring gendered subjectivity into being. The gendering of the self, then, takes place through
various routinised operations which, as Weeks argues, become incorporated in the subject
through habit and memory (1998: 133). Expanding on Floyd’s notion of skill as corporeal
knowledge, I want to emphasise that bodily performance is also part of emotional skill.
Emotional skill is embodied knowledge, as supposedly pre-existing inner states are
communicated through words and bodily expressions – a process which simultaneously
constitutes emotion through verbal and bodily communication. As I have shown in chapter
one, the construction of the body as having certain capacities is a way of enabling
particular kinds of exploitation. This, as James points out, also frees others from doing
such labour (SRC 96), thus facilitating workers’ exploitation by other workers. 
Through the framework of gender complementarity, the emotional labour that women
do is constructed as something men lack or are incapable of doing. Barrett and McIntosh
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suggest that men have “deskilled” themselves in order to avoid responsibility for domestic
work (2015: 145). As I argued in chapter two, emotional labour is a central organising
principle of various forms of care, especially the unwaged care work of the home.
Mulholland notes that men’s “incapacity” for feeling has absolved them of responsibility for
care work, while also obscuring their own emotional need. Women’s supposedly natural
emotional skill frees men from having to take responsibility for reproductive labour, while
simultaneously allowing them to enjoy the benefits of such work (1996: 144). Through the
separation of men from emotional skill, men are excused from carrying out emotional
labour, while appearing as “self-made” and not owing anything to the people who have
cared for them. Similarly, Duncombe and Marsden write that men are less likely to
perceive and be influenced by the emotions of others (1993: 230). This suggests that men
do not possess the same capacity for emotional reproduction. Masculinity thus appears as
lack of capacity for care, or an emotional ineptness, allowing men to ignore the needs of
others and giving them the right to the care of women without having to reciprocate
(Coontz 1992: 63). In this way, gendered exploitation is essential to the construction of
gender as such, as supposedly complementary sets of skills. According to Coontz, the
construction of gender in capitalist economies “meant specialization in one set of
behaviours, skills, and feelings at the cost of suppressing others” (1992: 53). 
As women are generally tasked with the work of adapting to the emotional needs of
others, the creation of good feeling, or “the good life,” becomes part of feminine skill for
emotion management. Hochschild suggests that the creation of “natural niceness” is a key
feminised skill (MH 132, 167). Feminised waged workers are hired for this skill – their
supposedly natural personality – thus facilitating their exploitation in both waged and
unwaged spheres. As we have seen, Hochschild notes that the performance of feminised
emotional labour relies on a set of bodily techniques, which are drawn from private life but
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also taught to women in some professions. Here, there seems to be some recognition that
emotional capacities have to be created through social processes, and form part of the
constitution of particular social relations. Yet, Hochschild argues that such training often
draws on an imaginary of the home as the natural site for emotion, and crucially, as a
scene of non-work (MH 105). Emotional skill is thus presented as something that
feminised workers merely need to transfer from their intimate life to their workplaces – a
natural capacity that can be expanded to include customers and colleagues. 
As I noted above, Hochschild also looks at the masculinised emotional capacity for
anger, which is required in certain jobs. This work is not directly reproductive, in the sense
of contributing to the wellbeing of other people, yet it might serve to maintain certain
hierarchies which are important to the current organisation of society. Hochschild writes
that more masculine types of emotional labour “typically deflate the customer’s status”
through expressions of anger and the use of aggressive, derogatory language (MH 144-
146). As we have seen, failure to perform such deflation is read as a sign of not being a
man (MH 146). 
For Floyd, industrialisation typically meant the deskilling of traditionally masculine
types of work, so that masculinity in the 20th century had to be expressed through skilled
consumption and leisure activity such as sports and do-it-yourself home improvements
(2009: 99-114). However, Fraser and Gordon argue that masculine independence was
created precisely through the form of waged work, in contrast to other subjects’ perceived
inability for independence (2011: 94). Similarly, Federici describes the masculinity of the
industrial era as a “patriarchy of the wage” (2004: 97). With regards to traditionally
masculine, manual forms of waged labour, Cynthia Cockburn notes that the construction of
“skill” depends on a process of exclusion of women from certain types of work. She writes
that “men have built their own relative bodily and technical strength by depriving women of
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theirs, and they have organised their occupation in such a way as to benefit from the
differences they have constructed” (1983: 204). In Hochschild’s study, we can note that
masculine skilfulness can be created not just through traditionally masculine types of work
such as heavy physical labour or mental labour, but also through the usually feminised
work of emotion management. 
As I have emphasised above, it is not the case that the skills of femininity are best
conceived through the construction of leisure time, which as DeVault argues is typical of
masculine experiences of work (1991: 5). Rather, femininity as a set of skills implies the
blurring of women’s waged and unwaged labour. Much women’s consumption is often best
conceived of as working on the body, rather than a result of leisure time (AR 77). 
Despite this skilled performance of feminised emotional labour across private and
public spheres, femininity is constructed as fundamentally passive, a mere “receptacle” for
the displaced emotions of others (PWSC 40). The naturalisation of feminine labour
requires the skilful erasure of femininity as activity. As I argued at the beginning of this
chapter, the ideological inversions of life under capitalism places activity on the side of the
exploiting subjectivity. Similarly, Whitney argues that femininity emerges as non-agentic
through the displacement of others’ emotional expression (2018: 639). Put differently,
women’s naturalised skill in managing the emotional needs of others seems to reduce their
own capacity for independence and sovereignty. The labour of care becomes read as an
expression of the personality of the carer, inverting the dependency of others on this
labour. According to Fraser and Gordon, “the persons of female nurturers became
saturated with the dependency of those for whom they care” (2011: 109-110). They note
that women’s heterosexualised economic dependency on men historically has been
constructed as a “good” type of dependency, but as more women have entered into waged
work, all forms of dependency are increasingly characterised as psychological deficiency
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(2011: 99). As we have seen, then, the feminised skill for emotional adaptability is
increasingly constructed as undesirable and backwards, while remaining structurally
necessary as a complement to possessive individualism. 
This chapter has drawn out some points from WFH writings on gender, emphasising
gendered exploitation and violence as well as the construction of femininity as a work
function. Looking at Hochschild’s writings, I have explored the entanglement of emotional
labour and gendered performance, in particular through the constitution of various forms of
feminised emotional labour. In the final part of the chapter, I have outlined a theory of
gendered subjectivity, in which the sale of labour power is tied to a model of subjectivity
that both excludes and depends on the emotional labour of others. This theory seeks to
explain the continued existence of gendered hierarchy in neoliberal capitalist economies.
In contemporary capitalist economies, I argue, many women are put in the contradictory
position of having to work both for wages and for the subjective rewards of attending to the
needs of others. While women’s positions have become more flexible and the gendered
division of labour is less rigid than it was at the start of the second-wave feminist
movement, feminised forms of labour and subjectivity have endured. To a large extent, the
most devalued forms of reproductive labour have been displaced onto working-class
women of colour. The persistence of binary, complementary models of heterosexual
gender, however, means that most women are made to develop capacities for feminised
labour. Exploring gender as a type of skill or capacity for labour, I argue, is an important
way to denaturalise gendered positionality. In the next chapter, I will look at how our
capacity for emotion can be changed and expanded, in ways that are conducive to a
materialist feminist project of remaking reproduction.
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Chapter four: Wages for Housework and the strategy of refusal
In this chapter, I will explore the political perspective of WFH. Through a reading of the
movement’s pamphlets, I highlight the strategy of refusal of work that stems from the WFH
perspective. This will include attention to the formal elements of these writings, in
particular the manifesto form that characterises much of the WFH writings (Weeks 2011:
117).57 The particularities of this form lead me to return to the question of political
subjectivity, which is a precondition for collective forms of resistance. Here, I argue that we
need to be attentive to the emotional practices that WFH propose, which are essential to
their political strategy. Reinventing emotional practices as a way to build counter-power,
WFH members sought to create new pathways for organising seemingly disparate groups
of women. WFH endorsed organisational autonomy as a way of constituting collective
feminist subjects, which foster solidarity without erasing specificity. This is particularly the
case for the autonomous groups within the WFH network, Black Women for Wages for
Housework and Wages Due Lesbians. Through a study of the WFH writings of lesbianism,
I ask what it means to refuse the labour of love. In the last section of this chapter, I return
to the demand for wages for housework, and its political potential for feminism. 
Manifestos, form, subjectivity
The power of women and the subversion of the community, the founding document of
WFH, mobilises the capacity for struggle in its very title. It establishes both the subject and
the scene of refusal. Recalling my discussion in chapter one, it performs the inversion of
57 It is interesting to note that the key WFH texts that do not seem to fit the formal characteristics of the 
manifesto, The work of love and The arcane of reproduction, were both published after the decline of the 
international WFH movement, in 1978 and 1981 respectively. In The arcane of reproduction in particular, 
we find a style more akin to Capital than The communist manifesto.
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power that is typical of WFH and workerism more broadly. The title of Dalla Costa’s
pamphlet stages a form of workerist inversion, by placing power on the side of the
seemingly disempowered subject of women, and opens the struggle against capitalism to
the site of the community. In this, it uses a common rhetorical gesture of the manifesto
form – namely to call into being its own audience. Manifestos, Martin Puchner notes,
typically address a recipient who does not yet fully exist, through the use of performative
figuration (2006: 31). Similarly, Janet Lyon argues that the manifesto tries to unite its
audience by naming an oppressor and exhorting to action (1999: 15). By invoking the
power of women, as well as naming the community as the site of women’s subversive
potential, the pamphlet attempts to name a struggle while at the same time calling it into
being. 
While this founding document does not present a coherent list of demands, and the
first version did not even advocate for wages for housework, it prepares the ground for an
autonomous feminist subject capable of struggle on the terrain of the domestic. It
establishes the manifesto’s characteristic pronoun “we,” the collective subject which will
struggle against exploitation (PWSC 38, Lyon 1999: 24, Weeks 2011: 215). In this, it
rhetorically performs a movement that does not yet exist. It inaugurates the WFH practice
of forming collective feminist subjects through a shared relation to work and exploitation;
as Dalla Costa asserts, “all women are housewives” (PWSC 19). On this basis, a “we” of a
shared exploitation can come together across differences. It performs the denaturalising
argument so common in the WFH literature, by suggesting that the quality of being a
woman is nothing more than having a particular relation to work. Variations of this
statement appear in later WFH manifestos, in more complex and sometimes contradictory
ways. Here, the WFH writings perform a form of anti-aspirational identification. Federici
writes that “career women” do not want to identify as housewives, since this position has
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been posed as one of weakness, “a fate worse than death” (RPZ 15). But, she adds, “[w]e
want and must say that we are all housewives, we are all prostitutes, and we are all gay,
because as long as we accept these divisions, and think that we are something better,
something different than a housewife, we accept the logic of the master” (RPZ 22). WDLs
foundational manifesto “Fucking is work” contends that “all women are straight [...] all
women are lesbians” (1975: 25-26). This contradictory statement reads sexual identity not
as a given but as a shifting identification that depends on perspective and the potential for
subversion. While “all women are straight” from the perspective of the dominant power of
heteronormativity and heterosexual work relations, all women are potentially lesbians in
the sense of engaging in a collective refusal of this work. Across the differences located by
the various WFH manifestos, there is a feminist collectivity struggling not against
difference per se, but against political hierarchies based on those differences. 
Another typical mode of WFH’s political writings is more similar to the form of the
workers’ inquiry,58 in that it offers a more detailed interrogation of the conditions of various
groups of women, typically using the “I” pronoun to describe the daily practices of different
groups of working women.59 These texts are intended to interrogate the practices of work,
and locating potential points of struggle in the commonalities of this work, while remaining
attentive to the differing labouring conditions of various groups of women. I think the term
workers’ inquiry is more appropriate than consciousness raising to name these practices.
WFH (together with many in the Italian women’s movement) were critical of the framework
of consciousness raising, as it seemed to place undue emphasis on psychological states
as a tool for change (WSC 234). Instead they sought to tie women’s situation to material
conditions, and change these through struggle concepts such as the wage. However,
58 A type of investigation, proposed by Marx and frequently used by the workerist movement, which often 
used questionnaires or self-description to explore the routines and conditions of labour. For extended 
discussions of this type of writing, see Viewpoint Issue 3 (2013), and Ephemera 14(3) (2014).
59 See for example Toronto Wages for Housework Committee’s pamphlet Women speak out (1975), various
texts in All work and no pay (Edmond and Fleming 1975), and “Portrait of a housewife” in The Activist 
(1975).
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these forms of inquiry are not divorced from the concept of consciousness, as the
sometimes blurry line between descriptive inquiry and the constitutive manifesto form
indicates. 
The power of women and the subversion of the community also performs another
characteristic feature of manifestos, namely to create a sense of antagonism and
uncompromising immediacy (Lyon 1999: 9, Pearce 1999: 314). The new subject of WFH
feminism refuses to negotiate with capital, but rather aims to overthrow it. “[W]e must
discover forms of struggle which immediately break the whole structure of domestic work,
rejecting it absolutely” Dalla Costa contends (PWSC 34). The demand for wages for
housework later became the perspective that embodied such total rejection. It draws the
line between those who perform this work and those who currently benefit from it. This line
constitutes an antagonism that up until now has only existed as a potential, because of
women’s lack of a collective subjectivity which could constitute a counter-power to the
exploitation by capital. Such collective subjectivity depends on the total refusal of
reproductive work, not an individualist strategy of moving into traditionally masculine types
of work (PWSC 48). In the WFH document “Notes on organisation,” the authors stress that
“[w]e need a campaign for WFH because we need to struggle not around or against some
particular aspect of housework but against the totality of this work, against housework as
such” (NYWFHC 36). While this demand has often been understood as reformist by the
majority of the feminist movement (Toupin 2018: 46), its proponents present it as the only
demand which could challenge the capitalist structure of reproduction (RPZ 39). The
demand for wages, Federici contends, “is a revolutionary demand not because by itself it
destroys capital, but because it forces capital to restructure social relations in terms more
favorable to us and consequently more favorable to the unity of the class” (RPZ 19).
While the form of the struggle, the demand for a wage, is still to be discovered in The
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power of women and the subversion of the community, Federici’s “Wages against
housework” takes the WFH perspective as a given. The text begins with the naming of the
conditions of exploitation against which the feminist movement must struggle:
They say it is love. We say it is unwaged work.
They call it frigidity. We call it absenteeism.
Every miscarriage is a work accident.
Homosexuality and heterosexuality are both working conditions... but homosexuality is workers’
control of production, not the end of work.
More smiles? More money. Nothing will be so powerful in destroying the healing virtues of a
smile.
Neuroses, suicides, desexualization: occupational diseases of the housewife. 
(RPZ 15, emphasis in original)
This short verse stages an antagonist relation between a “they,” that mystifies these
conditions, and a “we” that reveals seemingly disconnected incidents as part of the
collective situation of feminised subjects. Neuroses and miscarriages are no longer private
misfortunes, but rather occupational diseases and work accidents. The text invokes the
emotional aspects of this work – smiles will not come for free anymore since they are not
expressions of love but of a labour practice. The struggle for the wage fundamentally
changes the meaning of those smiles, and even destroys their healing virtues. Women’s
supposed “frigidity” is turned into a moment of struggle against sexual labour by being
renamed absenteeism. The WFH writings are full of examples of how women’s
expressions of discontent with their conditions are individualised, and therefore need to be
reinterpreted and reinserted into a political framework of resistance. As noted in chapter
one, Federici observes in the same text that “[w]e are seen as nagging bitches, not
workers in struggle” (RPZ 16). The text, however, performs a reinterpretation of this
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“nagging,” so that the women engaged in it can understand themselves as already
participating in this collective “we” and ready to take their hitherto individualised complaint
to a new level of collective antagonism. 
This reinterpretation is necessary for the text to move from a description of the
conditions of housework to a call to action. Again, there is an immediacy and urgency to
the text. The writing is suspended between the need to describe women’s working
conditions in order to bring a collective subject into being, and the need to treat this subject
as already in existence, on the verge of grasping the power necessary to abolish
reproductive work completely. Puchner refers to this as the manifesto form’s impatience
with itself (2006: 22), a desire for the words to immediately translate into action and a
direct intervention into the world. Similarly, Lyon writes about the manifesto’s appearance
of being both word and deed (1999: 14). Federici contends that
[f]rom now on, we want money for every moment of it, so that we can refuse some of it and
eventually all of it. Nothing can be more effective than to show that our female virtues have
already a calculable money value: until today only for capital, increased in the measure that we
were defeated, but from now on, against capital, for us, in the measure that we organize our
power (RPZ 20)
The repetition of “from now on” and “until today” creates a textual temporality of
intervention, and sets the stage for the uncompromising threat of refusing “all of it.” The
temporality of this refusal stages a utopian present from the moment of reading. From this
very moment, we will refuse to work for capital, calling into being an active politics of
refusal and antagonism which starts now. Here, the antagonistic relation between women
and capital appears more clearly. The wage measures the contribution of women, “against
capital, for us.” It is capital, then, which is the main enemy, a move that allowed WFH to
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claim for themselves a pivotal role in working-class struggle, and stage a epistemological
and political inversion – what appeared as the most intimate (the smile, the miscarriage) is
now the most political. The shift in verb tense in the last sentence (“we were defeated [...]
we organize our power”) produces a “foreshortened history of oppression” (Lyon 1999: 14)
that becomes a call to action, producing the future in the present moment. 
James’ writings are exemplary in creating interventions in left political discourse, in
which the seemingly marginal becomes central. We have seen in chapter one that this
move produces a redefinition of the working class, in which those excluded from waged
work become essential political actors in the struggle against capital. I want to highlight
how this rhetorical practice stages what Lyon refers to as the manifesto form’s habit of
challenging the universality of modernity’s political subject. She sees this as particularly
typical of the feminist manifesto, which is “both a challenge to and an affirmation of
universalism” (1999: 39). In the WFH writings, that problematic universalism is the bland
leftist understanding of the typical member of the working class as white, straight, male,
able-bodied, and supportive of the police (Wages Due Lesbians London 1991: 28). For
James, the aim of the feminist struggle must be to build enough power to make men join
the feminist, anticapitalist revolution: “Now we demand unity on our terms: they must
support us” (SRC 81, emphasis in original). WFH constitutes its own selective universality
by producing an array of “all women are...” statements, which can be shifted and
transmuted according to the needs of the political moment. WFH members understand the
totality of the working class as a fractured collective constituted by shared exploitation, and
an antagonistic relationship to the wage relation which facilitates that exploitation. This
shared enemy produces a fractured universality from the specific point of view of the result
of such exploitation for differentiated groups, and the call to unite behind those most
harmed by the current organisation of work and resources. The movement sought to
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intervene in the field of revolutionary politics to institute a political subject not dependent
on sameness, but rather differently located groups with a shared desire for an end to their
exploitation. 
James produces the type of writing that is typically associated with the manifesto –
that of a list of demands. This is familiar from the modern foundation of the manifesto
genre, The communist manifesto, which presents a list of ten demands for the nascent
communist movement (Marx and Engels 2018: 61-62). Like the Communist League, the
WFH campaign sought to produce demands that “appear economically insufficient and
untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, necessitate further inroads upon the
old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionising the mode of
production” (Marx and Engels, 2018: 61). In the WFH formulation, the demands that would
revolutionise the mode of (re)production were characteristically antiwork in nature. In her
pamphlet “Women, the unions, and work,” James puts forward six demands for the
movement, the first two of which are: “1. WE DEMAND TO WORK LESS. [...] 2. WE
DEMAND A GUARANTEED INCOME FOR WOMEN AND FOR MEN, WORKING OR
NOT WORKING, MARRIED OR NOT. WE DEMAND WAGES FOR HOUSEWORK” (SRC
72). The tone is similar to many WFH pamphlets, which tend to conclude with lists of
demands (NYWFHC: 54-77). In its most poignant form, a WFH flyer from 1974 states: 
Now we want to decide WHEN we work, HOW we work and WHO we work for. We want to be
able to decide NOT TO WORK AT ALL. [...] Now we want back the wealth we have produced.
WE WANT IT IN CASH, RETROACTIVE AND IMMEDIATELY. AND WE WANT ALL OF IT
(NYWFHC: 44)
Through its threatening tone and its immoderate demand, the statement inverts the
emotional “blackmail” that WFH writers contend is characteristic of women’s condition
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under capitalism (AWNP 10). Instead, WFH assert that now “we” will take control of the
exchange between labour and capital. This demand for the reclamation of wealth recalls
the workerist contention that capital is the passive side of the class antagonism, merely
supervising the work and capturing what workers produce. It also performs what Felicity
Colman refers to as the affective praxis of the manifesto form (2010: 383). Through its
demanding and immoderate tone, WFH seeks to constitute an autonomous feminist
subject capable of collective emotional practices. I will return below to the question of
which emotional states the WFH campaign sought to evoke. Here I want to note that these
texts derive their power not necessarily from their political stringency but from their
capacity to produce subjective states. Weeks points out that early versions of The power
of women and the subversion of the community objected to the demand for wages for
housework. In later editions, however, that demand could be made with “strength and
confidence,” thus persuading Dalla Costa to embrace it (2011: 136, PWSC 53 n16). The
emotional charge of the demand, and its capacity for creating a collective feminist subject,
are as central as its content. 
The centrality of subjective demands is apparent when thinking of the goal of the
manifesto form – to make a group of people unite behind the perspective and demands
advanced by the manifesto. For the manifesto’s word to materialise as action, it has to
enlist people who can carry out its vision. In Constituting feminist subjects, Weeks argues
for the utility of deriving feminist subjectivity from the practices of feminised labour, so that
Marxist feminism can move beyond a mere description of structural determinations (1998:
88, 129). This framework is useful for understanding WFH writing practices, which are
centred on a type of workers’ inquiry on the one hand and the manifesto on the other,
seeking to explain how a forceful feminist subjectivity can arise from the conditions that
exploit it. Rather than just abandoning reproductive labour, or searching for a subjective
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formation which escapes it, the WFH strategy seeks to constitute antagonistic practices on
the very terrain on which we are exploited. The textual task is “to find a place as
protagonist in the struggle” (PWSC 36, emphasis in original). WFH authors are invested in
transforming gendered labour from a technique of management to a technique of
resistance. 
Weeks suggests that it is these characteristics of the WFH writings, rather than their
theoretical contributions, which make these texts non-functionalist. She argues, in line with
her earlier critique of “systems theory” in Marxist feminism, that the WFH manifestos seek
to disrupt a form of writing where “capital is attributed a kind of monolithic unity and sole
agency, and workers are reduced to the victims of its machinations” (2011: 127). Drawing
on the traditions of Italian workerism and American working-class self-activity (SCR 291),
WFH indicated that “[w]hat might be functional constituents of capitalist production have
the potential to be, and at various moments in history have in fact become, its active and
potentially subversive antagonists” (Weeks 2011: 127). Capitalism creates contradictory
conditions which constitute the possibility for non-functionalist, antagonistic subjects and
practices to develop. Weeks cautions that feminist standpoints and subjectivities are not
given within these conditions, but must be achieved (1998: 136). For that, they need to
affirm autonomous struggle as a mode of organising. 
According to the WFH authors, autonomy from male-dominated organisations on the
left is essential for revolutionary feminism to create antagonistic practices that can develop
the specific contradictions inherent in the sphere of reproduction (PSWC 26). This entailed
women’s self-organisation, as the workers most directly affected by such contradictions.
As WFH members state in their collectively authored “Theses on wages for housework”:
“Autonomy from men is Autonomy from capital that uses men’s power to discipline us”
(NYWFHC 34). Autonomy is not the same as separatism, as its goal is to develop
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solidarity with other movements and sufficient power to force the male-dominated left to
concede to the demands and perspectives of revolutionary feminism. The purpose of
autonomy is not to withdraw from organising with men but to find the demands on which
such organisation would become possible, without erasing the specific exploitation of
reproductive labour. The point is not to plead with men or enlighten them, but to show that
autonomous organising in the community is a source of power for the working class. As
Federici succinctly states: “Power educates. First men will fear, then they will learn
because capital will fear” (RPZ 36-37). Similarly, black and lesbian women formed
autonomous groups within the WFH network, and sex workers organised autonomously in
WFH-affiliated groups such as the English Collective of Prostitutes (SRC 117). This idea is
most forcefully formulated by Brown. In her text “The autonomy of black lesbian women,”
she argues that organising autonomously, and putting forward “our particular vantage
point of struggle” enables black lesbians to connect with other women without being
marginalised as black women, made invisible or assumed to be heterosexual (1976a: 6-7).
This argument is connected to the WFH thesis that potential points of struggle can be
found everywhere, and that one does not have to “join” the industrial proletariat in order to
be a revolutionary subject. Autonomy, then, is construed as a source of strength for
groups traditionally marginalised within left movements, so that all of the working class can
gain the power necessary to confront capitalism.
Emotional antagonisms
In terms of emotional states, autonomous subjectivity must move from one form of
affectivity to another in order for this confrontation to become possible. The emotional
states associated with femininity, such as fear, guilt, and anxiety, can be shifted through
the constitution of collective subjectivity. This shift does not necessarily imply more
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“positive” emotional states. Somewhat contrary to Weeks, who proposes laughter as an
affirmative model of feminist engagement (1998: 137-142), I argue that feminist
movements can make use of “bad” feelings. These feelings, however, must be
collectivised in order to become useful. Here, I use Jaggar’s concept of outlaw emotions to
think about how this shift can come into being. Jaggar observes that emotions, while
socially constituted, are not fully determined by social structure. Those who “pay a
disproportionately high price for maintaining the status quo” are more likely to experience
outlaw emotions – that is, feelings that are not condoned in a certain social situation
(1992: 131). In Hochschild’s terms, such emotions do not pay the social “debt” owed by
particular individuals (MH 81). When isolated, the individuals experiencing outlaw
emotions might be understood by themselves or others as insane or emotionally disturbed
(Jaggar 1992: 131).60 As Federici writes, “[m]any women have rebelled and are rebelling in
this way. They are called ‘insane.’ In reality, they are women who have not found any
other way of refusing being exploited except by putting themselves out of use, out of being
used” (NYWFHC 129). In reading the “insanity” of women as a tacit form of refusal, non-
normative or undesirable feelings can become “politically (because epistemologically)
subversive” (Jaggar 1992: 131).61 Forming a collective feminist subjectivity, which is also a
collective of feeling, allows people to find other ways of refusing. Such refusals seek to
turn the effects of exploitation outward rather than internalising them.
One way of refusing was explored by the Geneva WFH group Collectif L’Insoumise.
Their practice, more radical than many of the other WFH groups, included direct actions,
occupations, collective fare dodging, and prisoner solidarity. It also included a more direct
appeal to the emotional elements of struggle, as they focused on collective forms of
organisation for “bad” and “angry” mothers. Refusing the glorification of motherhood as
60 This is similar to Sara Ahmed’s notion of an “affect alien” (2004: 221).
61 There is a long history of writing on women and madness, including Phyllis Chesler’s Women and 
madness (1972).
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self-sacrifice, Collectif L’Insoumise celebrated the mothers “whom society and right-
thinking people consider bad because they don’t do exactly what the state, the family, the
Church, and the cops want them to do.” These women “don’t have the smell of resignation
and sacrifice; instead, they have the good scent of revolt and freedom!” (cited in Toupin
2018: 196). The recuperation of anger as a political practice allowed Collectif L’Insoumise
to move beyond individual fear of punishment for risky behaviour. They used their writings
to inspire collective feelings, such as the anger, frustration, and discontent that Lyon sees
as the typical emotional states of the manifesto (1999: 61). Refusing to be “good” mothers
– that is, refusing the work demanded by the ideal of self-sacrificing, white, bourgeois
motherhood – the group sought to mobilise those women who wanted more for
themselves. They called on “Those who are trying to live as they like, Those who complain
everywhere, at unemployment, at taxes, at the job, [...] Those who don’t live only for their
kid” (cited in Toupin 2018: 201). 
Their practice was thus not one of fostering “better” feelings than the resentment they
already experienced, but rather to mobilise those feelings in a way that amplified liberatory
possibilities (Jaggar 1992: 133). Outlaw emotions, Jaggar argues, are not in themselves
subversive but can be put to use in revolutionary political projects when integrating
revolutionary values. They are appropriate to radical politics when characteristic of a
society in which human suffering and exploitation is lessened, or conducive to establishing
such a society (1992: 132-133). She suggests that emotions have a valuable
epistemological function, as “conventionally inexplicable emotions may lead us to make
subversive observations” (1992: 133). 
In terms of emotional labour in particular, it is easy to see how outlaw emotions are
essential to its refusal. Emotional labour can be described as the work to suppress or hide
such emotions, in order to foster more “appropriate” feelings. I want to highlight the
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collective production of anger as a way of refusing feminised emotional labour. While
anger is a common emotional state in more masculine forms of emotional labour (MH
146), it is the feeling that must be managed and suppressed in feminised occupations, as
well as absorbed from others, in order to create a spirit of “niceness” (MH 24, 113, 167).
While the recuperation of anger within a feminist project might seem to simply affirm a
more masculine emotional style, I want to suggest that it is essential to the refusal of
emotional labour. This does not imply that it is the only emotional state worth amplifying, or
that more feminised emotional states are to be discarded. Rather, we should recognise the
political power of anger when put in the use of those who are exploited and oppressed,
who are expected to respond to violence with compliancy. This also implies a more
equitable access to various emotional states, thus moving away from the constitution of
“authentic” gendered being through emotion. In this way, the broadening of the feelings
available to feminised subjects might lead us towards a horizon of gender abolition, which
I will discuss in the next chapter. A different and wider emotional practice could open the
potential for a different, non-feminised subject without affirming the emotional practice of
possessive individualism which I discussed in chapter three.
Anger is an ambivalent feeling, often used to oppressive ends, not only by men but
also by women against other women (NYWFHC 102). As emotion is contextual in its
nature, we must pay careful attention to the political nuances of anger. In her “A note on
anger,” Marilyn Frye suggests that female anger is not an outlaw emotion per se. Women
are allowed to express anger within their “proper domain” – that of the kitchen (1983: 91).
It is when women’s anger exceeds the reproductive sphere that it becomes threatening to
the emotional ordering of the world. As Audre Lorde observes, “[e]very woman has a well-
stocked arsenal of anger potentially useful against those oppressions, personal and
institutional, which brought that anger into being. Focused with precision it can become a
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powerful source of energy serving progress and change” (1997: 280). Lorde argues for the
use of anger to resist white, heterosexual, bourgeois femininity, which also perpetuates
oppression of other women. Yet, anger can be dampened by individualised feelings of fear
and guilt. Federici remarks that “one of the main obstacles women have always met, every
time they have wanted to refuse this work, has been the fear of damaging their families,
the fear of being seen as bad women rather than as workers on strike” (NYWFHC 25).
Similarly, Lorde writes:
For women raised to fear, too often anger threatens annihilation. In the male construct of brute
force, we were taught that our lives depended upon the good will of patriarchal power. The
anger of others was to be avoided at all costs, because there was nothing to be learned from it
but pain, a judgment that we had been bad girls, come up lacking, not done what we were
supposed to do. And if we accept our powerlessness, then of course any anger can destroy us.
(1997: 283)
From a WFH perspective, there is no need to accept powerlessness, as women are in fact
not powerless. In mobilising through the refusal of work, women display their power. This
can be through small acts of defiance, such as when the female flight attendants in
Hochschild’s study stop smiling, or refuse the work of presenting their smiles as “genuine”
(MH 129). Through the escalation of collective anger, this could turn into Shulamith
Firestone’s “dream action for the women’s movement,” the smile boycott (2015: 81). Or in
the WFH formulation, only smiling when we are paid for it, thus undermining the supposed
authenticity of women’s emotional display. Hochschild notes that women who do not smile
tend to be read as being angry (MH 128).62 Failure to show “positive” emotion, then, is
automatically understood as anger. This clarifies the link between anger and refusal, in
which refusal to produce niceness immediately marks one as an emotionally deviant
62 This is especially true of black women, who are frequently constructed as angry and threatening (Lorde 
1997: 282)
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subject.
As noted above, WFH authors interpret many types of behaviour as forms of refusal
of feminised work. Individual acts such as divorce and shoplifting, and states such frigidity
and depression, are all read as symptoms of a more generalised disenchantment with the
ideological power of gendered work. Through refusing to perform work, especially work
that is normally invisible as such, a feminised collective subject could lay bare a source of
power that was previously unknown. However, refusal can take many different
expressions, and is dependent on what kind of labour is demanded of particular subjects.
As I have shown in chapter one, Brown reads black women’s higher birthrates as a form of
refusal of the racist attempts to discipline black women’s sexuality into normative, white,
and bourgeois forms of reproductive labour (1976b: 9). 
The WFH strategy of refusal can also be understood as a refusal of the
individualising and isolating features of emotional labour. WFH authors take aim at the
conditions of the reproduction of labour power, which under capitalist conditions are
necessarily isolating. Refusing to reproduce oneself and others as labour power also
means opening up the possibility for other forms of sociality. Weeks, drawing on Firestone,
reads feminist refusal in terms of diffusion of the capacity for affectivity, which is currently
narrowly situated in the sphere of the family and romantic love, and increasingly, in the
sphere of waged work (2017: 55). This takes us beyond the binary framework of refusal
versus valorisation of reproductive work, which Federici sets up in her 2012 introduction to
Revolution at point zero (RPZ 1). Refusal instead becomes a tool for the valorisation of a
different form of life. As I noted in chapter one, Federici’s later writings, such as Re-
enchanting the world (2018b) downplay the importance of refusal of reproductive labour in
order to go straight to its valorisation, leaving her with few tools for criticising its
exploitation (Vishmidt 2014: xii, Gotby forthcoming). 
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In the earlier WFH writings, however, refusal is central. Here, refusal is also a
strategy of denaturalisation. Refusing the work of love also means cutting the link between
womanhood and reproduction, something which the strategy of valorisation cannot do.
Through refusing to work for love, women simultaneously undermine the apparent
givenness of femininity. In “Wages against housework,” Federici argues that we must
“refuse that work as the expression of our nature, and therefore [...] refuse precisely the
female role that capital has invented for us” (RPZ 18, emphasis in original). Through a
feminist antiwork politics, femininity stops being functional to capital. 
However, as the Tri-Veneto WFH Committee noted in 1974, “[t]he price we women
pay for this refusal is high. Men block our struggle, they blackmail us, they beat us, they
kill us” (NYWFHC 260). In order to protect women from such violence, feminist
collectivities need anger, but also solidarity, as an alternative form of sociality. This
depends on the development of alternative emotional practices. WFH writings and
activism encouraged the emotional practice of solidarity with other women. In The power
of women and the subversion of the community, Dalla Costa argues that solidarity exists
not for defence but for attack, coming “together with other women, not only as neighbors
and friends but as workmates and anti-workmates” (PWSC 36). This means that solidarity
relies not only on empathy, as a feeling-with more vulnerable others, but an unlearning of
emotional responses that obstruct coalition-building. With the WFH political inversion, in
which those seen as the most powerless are re-described as powerful, there is a need for
a similar reinterpretation of emotional practices. Again, we can think of the WFH writers’
strong identification with the frequently dismissed position of the “backward” housewife,
but also their identification with welfare women and sex workers. For WFH writers,
solidarity can act as a check on women’s anger against those in more marginal positions,
as in when housewives display anger against women on welfare. Federici writes of such
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housewives, “[h]er anger is an immediate expression of her envy for the fact that she, the
housewife, is not able to refuse that portion of her work and does not have some money of
her own” (NYWFHC 102). Here, the feeling of anger towards those who are more
stigmatised is reinterpreted as a feeling of envy of those who are able to refuse. This
emotional response of individualised anger has to be unlearned in order for feelings of
collective anger and power to develop.
Similarly, several WFH groups put out statements in solidarity with sex workers, in
response to the increased repression they faced from the state.63 WFH interprets this as
another form of violent response to women’s refusal of dependence and wagelessness.
The San Francisco Wages For Housework Committee states that “[a]lthough the
government tries to isolate our struggles, we refuse to be divided. All work is prostitution
and we are all prostitutes. We are forced to sell our bodies – for room and board or for
cash – in marriage, in the street, in typing pools or in factories” (2012: 225). This should be
read in contrast to feminists who consider sex work as an exceptional form of violence
against women, and thus separate sex workers from “non-deviant” women. 
Sexual refusals
Against the respectability politics of the anti-sex work position, WFH authors read sex
workers as being on the forefront of the struggle against sexual labour. BWFWFH draw
connections between the policing of black women’s supposedly excessive and deviant
sexuality with the repression of sex workers (2012: 229, see also Austin and Capper 2018:
452). Similarly, WDL London state that “[a]s lesbian women we, like prostitute women,
refuse to accept that it is women’s ‘nature’ to sleep with men and to sleep with them ‘for
love’” (2012: 226). As I noted in chapter one, the WFH authors understand lesbianism, like
63 See LIES Journal Issue 1 (2012) for a collection of such statements.
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paid sex work, as a form of refusal. The lesbian refusal to sleep with men undermines
men’s power to command sexual labour. This does not mean that lesbianism is reducible
to abstinence, or refusal in the merely negative mode. Refusal, as I suggested above, is
not a passive act of withdrawal of labour, but rather the construction of alternative modes
of being.64 In the remainder of this section, however, I will focus on lesbianism from the
perspective of refusal of the labour of love, as a way of moving away from a merely
individualised notion of lesbian identity, towards the idea of queerness as political practice.
The WFH authors describe lesbian relationships as a form of resistance to the work ethic
of heterosexuality. Heterosexuality, WDL Toronto write, is the morality that says that all
women “naturally” serve men sexually and emotionally (1975b: 21). Furthermore, as the
group states in its founding document, the existence of lesbianism makes sex visible as
labour, and a woman refusing this work is engaging in a partial refusal of her work as a
woman (1975a: 25). Hall argues that the rejection of heterosexuality is also a rejection of
the notion that sexuality is a private matter (1975: 1). Lesbianism, for WDL, thus has an
explicitly political meaning when integrated in the overall WFH perspective. Like sex
workers, lesbians refuse to sleep with men “for love” (Wages Due Lesbians London 2012:
227). In the WDL critique of heterosexuality, “love” is, as Weeks puts it, a way of desiring
one’s own unfreedom (2017: 49). Refusing the narrow, institutionalised form of love opens
up a space for practices of resistance. 
 For the WFH authors, lesbianism thus has an important role as a political practice,
rather than as a given identity category. Lesbians occupy a pivotal position in the WFH
struggle, as they are at least partially prefiguring the direction of the movement as a
whole. In Toupin’s words, WDL presents lesbianism as “an organizational form of
women’s struggle against work” (2018: 214). In refusing part of the sexual and emotional
64 Here, there are some similarities with the Autonomia concept of exodus (Virno 1996). However, like the 
WFH authors, I prefer the notion of autonomy as it does not indicate a moment of withdrawal. 
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labour that is assigned to most women, lesbians show that such resistance is possible –
that there are other ways of being. Coming out as a lesbian, Federici states, is going on
strike (NYWFHC 144). Similarly, Fortunati writes that homosexuality reflects a refusal of
capitalist organisation of personal relationships (AR 24), and Giovanna Dalla Costa
contends that lesbianism is an attack on the naturalisation of heterosexuality as the only
form of sexuality (WL 71). While this refusal does not completely free lesbians of the
labour of femininity, it does attack the structure of the family and its attendant work
relations (Hall 1975: 1). 
Lesbian practices thus strike at the heart of gendered relations of labour. It is a
rejection of the isolation of heterosexual institutions (Wages Due Lesbians Toronto 1975a:
22). It is also a rejection of the narrowing of the sexual field, where romantic relationships
with men are defined as fundamentally different from friendship with women. As Federici
writes, 
early in our lives we must learn to draw a line between the people we can love and the people
we just talk to, those to whom we can open our body and those to whom we can only open our
‘souls,’ our lovers and our friends. (RPZ 24-25)
Lesbianism implies the work of beginning to undo some of these lines, and the separate
emotional spheres they impose. These lines, Federici suggests, were never stable in the
first place. Indeed, WFH writers frequently argue that lesbian identities stem from a
capitalist organisation of labour, in which women are more likely to work with other women
than with men (James 1971a: 13). Here, capitalist conditions are contradictory in that the
gendered division of labour encourages homosociality while excluding homosexuality, and
organises “leisure time” heterosexually (Hall 1975: 2). This demarcation is never fully
sustainable since “our bodies and emotions are indivisible and we communicate at all
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levels all the time” (RPZ 24). Lesbianism thus counters the restrictions on emotional and
sexual practice imposed by the heterosexual work ethic. 
However, WDL did not only present lesbianism as refusal, but described the forms of
violence and labour that lesbianism entails. Because lesbian relationships are made
invisible by the societal celebration of (heterosexual, romantic) “love,” and lesbians are
frequently subjected to physical and emotional violence, lesbianism brings its own form of
emotional reproduction. Thus the very refusal that lesbians stage when they reject the
labour of loving men also makes lesbians more likely to be marked as targets for
disciplinary violence. As I suggest in chapter two, such violence in turn increases the need
for a different kind of emotional labour. Hall argues that while lesbianism is a refusal of
emotional labour, it can also bring more work because “there’s so much pressure all the
time on all of us that we are continually having to struggle to hold each other together and
keep sane” (1977: 7). Such emotional pressure, however, might point to the uses of
negative emotions in creating and sustaining counter-hegemonic forms of collective
subjectivity. Heather Love writes that “[m]odern homosexual identity is formed out of and
in relation to the experience of social damage” (2007: 29). The experiences that Hall
describes can thus tell us something about how damage can lead to the creation of new
and collective forms of care. 
Lesbianism, while containing some utopian elements, is not in itself a revolutionary
form of sociality because it still exists within a structurally violent system of capitalist
reproduction. Opting out of this system is not an individual choice. Hence, WDL authors
reject the idea that moving to a separatist lesbian commune could somehow solve the
contradictions of reproductive labour (AWNP 23). Against a strategy of withdrawal and
separatism, WDL practiced solidarity with heterosexual women, based on partially shared
material conditions. The autonomous structure of WDL made sure that lesbian concerns
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would be heard in WFH activism, and WDL members were aware that solidarity could not
come at the cost of ignoring difference under the generic label of “women.” However, they
did pay careful attention to the ways in which lesbian women are not liberated from being
interpellated by feminised labour (Toronto Wages For Housework Committee 1975: 22).
Contra Monique Wittig (1992: 20), the WDL writings suggest that lesbians are
unfortunately still women, to the extent that they are called upon to perform various forms
of reproductive work. This is because reproduction is not confined to the heterosexual
relationship, but stretches across a range of different social relations, including waged
work. WDL members argue that lesbians constitute a precarious labour force likely to be
concentrated in low-paying service work.65 While lesbians are denied the label of “real
women” because of their rejection of the intimate labours of heterosexual romantic “love,”
they are nonetheless captive in a broader logic of gendered reproduction (Toronto Wages
For Housework Committee 1975: 23). For the WFH writers, the most important limitation
of lesbian separatism is that lesbianism does not exist outside of the capitalist organisation
of the reproductive sphere. As we have seen, Fortunati argues that the form of
heterosexual coupledom is difficult to escape, even for people in homosexual relationships
(AR 34). It is thus not enough to make the individual decision to not take part in
relationships with men. As long as heterosexual formations dominate the social totality,
lesbian relationships are likely to reproduce at least some of the structures of reproductive
work that operate in heterosexual families. As Federici puts it, “homosexuality is workers’
control of production, not the end of work” (RPZ 15). Only the end of capitalist production
and reproduction could fundamentally change the current organisation of the heterosexual
nuclear family, the household, and the gender division of labour, and vice versa; only the
65 According to Margot Canaday’s research on queer work in the US in the 1950s and 60s (2019), this was 
more likely to be true for femme lesbians, whereas butches were more often engaged in blue-collar work 
or excluded from waged labour. Such exclusions led to a widespread acceptance of femmes as the 
breadwinner in working-class lesbian couples. 
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abolition of the family could spell the end of capitalism. 
Thus, WFH did not advocate for political lesbianism in the same way that many
radical feminists did. Federici writes that the movement cannot impose a new model for
sexuality when the goal of the movement is self-determination (NYWFHC 145). In the
WFH literature, there is also a sense that relationships with men could be different. Men
are only the enemy in so far as they have been assigned a role of control over women.
The deeper problem is a gender division of labour that sets men and women against each
other. Heterosexual relationships would have to be radically reconstituted through the
subversion of that division of labour, which according to the WFH authors would require
the overturning of the capitalist system as we know it. While some WFH writers could be
read as what Adrienne Rich calls heterosexual reformists (1981: 9), they do not think
heterosexuality can be “fixed” just by changing the division of labour within the household,
as the socialist feminist authors who Rich cites argue. This is especially true since so
much of gender as we know it is organised around heterosexual arrangements, and it
would perhaps be misleading to even speak of heterosexuality if those formations of
gender were drastically subverted. 
 The WDL authors add that we do not know how many women are (or could be)
lesbians, because for many lesbianism has not yet become a viable choice for many
women (Wages Due Lesbians London 1991: 1). They argue for wages for housework on
the basis that it would give women, both lesbian and (currently) heterosexual, more time
and freedom, and more options to build emotional and sexual relationships differently
(Wages Due Lesbians Toronto 1977: 4). The demand for wages thus becomes not only a
way of refusing some of the labour of femininity, but also a tool for undermining
heterosexual institutions. As WDL Toronto members poignantly state: “Wages for
housework means wages against heterosexuality” (1977: 12). 
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Wages for refusal
Here, we need to return to the question of what the demand for wages for housework is
supposed to do. As noted in chapter one, Federici contests the argument that a bit of
money would not make much of a difference, and argues that we could never get that
money “without at the same time revolutionizing – in the process of struggling for it – all
our family and social relations” (RPZ 15). This is especially true of currently unwaged
emotional labour, which as I argued in chapter two, changes its meaning in the process of
becoming commodified. As we have seen, however, the unmeasurable quality of
emotional labour places limits on its commodification. The political potential of wages for
housework as a demand is also its unreasonableness – it would be impossible to
adequately remunerate all currently unwaged and low-waged work. Oksala states that
gender equality could only be reached under capitalism if all currently unwaged feminised
labour was commodified (2016: 300). Yet waged work in capitalism depends on the
unwaged work of producing sociality and wellbeing, thus making a total commodification
structurally impossible. The demand for wages for housework, and in particular for the
totality of emotional labour to be remunerated, is thus unrealisable under the current order
of things. Far from being a reformist demand for an allowance, wages for housework as a
political demand becomes a tool for pointing to the structural exclusions in the production
of value. It is an immoderate demand for the totality of that immeasurable work to be
remunerated retroactively. As I have noted above, WFH rejected the “myth of liberation
through work.” The demand for wages for housework was meant to allow women to say
“we have worked enough” (PWSC 47).
This leads us to the strategic potential of the WFH demand. By locating the struggle
in the sphere of the home and the community, the members of WFH wished to highlight
that rather than being a non-political and non-productive domain, political struggle over
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reproduction could cause significant disruption to the capitalist circuit. While WFH never
became a mass movement, and never accomplished their aim of refusing reproductive
labour, its members understood the potential of an antiwork struggle on the site of the
community. As Dalla Costa contends: “No strike has ever been a general strike” (WSC 54,
emphasis in original). The political potential of a coordinated refusal of work is thus as of
yet unexplored. A nascent wave of feminist organising, however, is using the name of the
strike to invoke the refusal of reproductive work – a refusal which is simultaneously
impossible and necessary (Barbagallo 2018, Gago 2019). 
 I agree with Federici’s claim that the demand for wages for housework cannot be
understood divorced from its context – that is, the attempt to constitute an antagonistic
feminist subject capable of refusal (RPZ 15). As we have seen, this also depends on a
politics of emotion, in which anger and the emotional practice of solidarity constitute
modes of refusal which are essential for the struggle for a different world. These emotional
practices involve both recuperating “bad feelings” and unlearning habitual and
constraining emotional responses. The WFH project thus depends on recuperating outlaw
emotion, to broaden the horizon of possible emotional practices. Here, emotion becomes
communal. It is no longer the “inner truth” of an individual, but a collective habit that can
become a political tool. As Weeks points out, the feminist collective is also a desiring
subject (2011: 134). It wants more than what is offered. It refuses to be content with
reforming the site of reproduction, and refuses the call for men to “help” with domestic
labour. Such calls leave the social relations of domestic work intact, which explains why
women continue to carry the primary responsibility for reproduction. WFH wanted to bring
into being a collective feminist subject with the capacity for making demands for a different
world. What does this subject want? The abolition of feminised labour, and its attendant
work relations. 
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In this chapter, I have investigated the textual and emotional practices of WFH.
Through a focus on the manifesto form, as well as the adaption of the workers’ inquiry, the
WFH movement sought to establish a feminist subject constituted by feminised labour
while also capable of refusing it. This is intimately tied both to the organisational form of
autonomy and the emotional practices which refuse feminised forms of “niceness” and
good feeling. The last chapter of this thesis will explore the potentials of such refusals
today. Taking up the framework of gender abolition and queer modes of reproduction, I
ask what forms of sociality we can develop to help us find new ways of being.
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Chapter five: Towards a different (re)production
This last chapter offers some reflections on the contemporary state of gender, the family,
and emotional reproduction, and how current modes of reproduction could be challenged
and undone. Drawing on the WFH perspective, in particular its refusal of equality politics
and its desire to abolish the nuclear family as a primary unit of gendered exploitation, I
outline some directions for a future politics that would take us beyond the family. Here, I
complement the WFH writings with contemporary queer Marxist and black feminist work.
While I present demands and strategies that depart from those suggested by WFH, I still
rely on the core tenets of the WFH perspective outlined in the introduction. The political
demands presented in this chapter thus build on the principles of antiwork politics, critique
of identity, inversion of power, and the abolition of exploitative relations of labour. While
the WFH perspective is primarily a critique of the current state of things, and does not
directly point towards a different future (Cleaver 2019: xiii), I think it can help us clear the
ground for a different form of reproduction. The first part of the chapter traces the WFH
critique of equality as a framework for feminism, before introducing the demands of family
abolition and gender abolition as more productive avenues for a contemporary feminist
politics. The second part continues on this theme, looking at what constructive
perspectives we can find at the intersection of feminism, queer politics, and Marxism.
Here, I am interested in modes of subjectivity and sociality that take us beyond dominant
forms of emotional labour and reproduction. 
Beyond equality
What political framework does a WFH perspective imply? What are the end goals of the
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movement? In this section, I will argue that feminist politics needs to move away from a
focus on “equality,” towards a politics of abolition of gender and the family. The WFH
members’ critique of both unwaged and waged work led them to a critique of equality as
the hegemonic mode of feminist engagement. WFH is thus a feminist perspective against
equality. They recognise the limitations of equality discourse in a socio-economic system
fundamentally based on restricted access to material and social resources and
differentiating divisions of labour. This is not to say that the concept of equality can never
be mobilised in a radical way. In the course of feminist history, the term has been used to
give women access to previously masculine spheres and a degree of independence from
men. However, many women today are exploited in both waged and unwaged forms of
labour. Precisely because equality is a core term in the liberal political imagination, it can
be both useful and limited. I want to suggest that the discourse of equality has taken us to
a limit-point in feminist politics, and it must now be replaced with a move towards the
abolition of feminised labour, the family, and gender. 
The politics of equality has mainly resulted in women’s increased access to waged
work, and indeed the increased compulsion to participate in such labour. WFH writers do
not condemn women seeking waged employment, and are sensitive to the need for
financial self-determination. However, they are highly critical of the notion of employment
as a road to liberation. In the previous chapters, I have argued that WFH stage a refusal of
reproductive labour. However, it is important to emphasise that this does not imply
embracing women’s participation in traditionally masculine, “productive” work. Dalla Costa
remarks that “[s]lavery to an assembly line is not a liberation from slavery to a kitchen sink”
(PWSC 33). For WFH, “equality” with exploited male workers is not a very attractive
political vision.66 Unlike most mainstream feminisms of the time, which encouraged women
66 In a similar vein, Adrienne Roberts suggests that increased equality the sphere of waged work has mainly
been achieved through the stagnation or deterioration of men’s working condition, rather than the 
improvement of women’s wages and employment conditions (2017: 161-165).
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to leave the home to get a career (Friedan 1963), the WFH members predicted that a
majority of women would be performing less attractive, repetitive and low-waged forms of
work outside the home. Coming from an antiwork perspective, the WFH theorists argue
that more work is a way of increasing women’s subordination (AR 34, PWSC 47).
Furthermore, it leaves less time for resisting exploitation. While they argued that “[w]e
must get out of the house; we must reject the home,” (PWSC 39) such refusal must
happen in order to join other women in struggle rather than becoming invested in a career.
Federici emphasises that the refusal of housework is also a demand for more time for
ourselves, as “what we need is more time, more money, not more work. And we need
daycare centers, not just to be liberated for more work, but to be able to take a walk, talk to
our friends, or go to a women’s meeting” (RPZ 57). 
As I discussed in chapter three, the reorganisation of gender relations in the
neoliberal era has deepened the divisions between women who are able to (at least
partially) live up to the ideals of masculine subjectivity, and those who are stuck with
traditionally feminised labour. The politics of equality has allowed some (mostly white,
bourgeois) women to gain more power, while obscuring the increasing inequality between
women. In her 1984 essay “Putting feminism back on its feet,” Federici criticises both
liberal and socialist feminisms for espousing equal access to waged work as a path
forward for feminism (RPZ 55). For liberal feminists, the main concern is sexist
discrimination within the waged workplace, with little examination of how waged work itself
is built on a system of unwaged work. For socialist feminists, the emphasis is on making
sure that women could join men in performing productive work, and thus join the working-
class struggle against exploitation. This is a long-running theme in socialist and Marxist
writings on “the woman question,” going back to Engels’ 1884 book The origin of the
family, private property and the state (2010: 105). The focus on women’s entrance into
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wage labour entailed a struggle for state services that would allow women to work outside
their homes, most importantly child-care provision. Such services have historically played
the role of supplementing the family as the sphere of reproductive work while allowing
more women to become part of a low-waged proletariat (Toupin 2018: 3, Marie 2017: np). 
Moreover, “equal opportunities” within the formal economy has not translated into a
reorganisation of the division of labour in the household. As Ann Stewart writes, the model
of a male breadwinner and a female homemaker has been superseded in the sphere of
waged work, but assumptions relating to the provision of informal care have not
necessarily changed (2013: 71). This means that the overarching responsibility for care
still falls disproportionately on the shoulders of women. In Federici’s words, as long as
care work is women’s responsibility, “any notion of equality is doomed to remain an
illusion” (RPZ 62). The paradigm of equality within the women’s movement has translated
into a double burden for women, exacerbated by increased precarity in the sphere of
production and the decimation of state services within the sphere of reproduction.
Giovanna Dalla Costa suggests that the “feminine mystique” of the housewife and the
“emancipated mystique” of the career woman who still cares for her husband and children
are two sides of the same coin, both keeping women in a subordinate position within
various labour relations (WL 93-94). 
What Federici calls “the myth of capitalism as the great equalizer” (RPZ 67) cannot
account for the contradictory organisation of capitalist reproduction, and the continuing
stratification of the labour market. While equality feminisms have sought “the
universalization of the male condition” (RPZ 61),67 the WFH perspective allows us to see
that such a political horizon is both undesirable and structurally impossible, given the
continued reliance on unwaged and low-waged reproductive work. Neoliberal politics often
67 It is interesting to note that WFH share this critique of equality with the other main strand of Italian 
feminism, represented by thinkers like Carla Lonzi (1991: 41).
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utilises a gender-neutral language of equal access. But the invocations of “individual
responsibility” and “community care” in fact depend on the reproduction of more or less
normative family relationships (Glazer 1993, Cooper 2017). This, as we have seen in
chapter three, is because liberal notions of individuality simultaneously disavow and
depend on the existence of reproductive labour and emotional reproduction in particular. 
Within the sphere of unwaged reproductive labour, equality politics tend to be limited
and individualising. Because this aspect of life has been marked as private in capitalist
economies, individual choice reigns as a hegemonic political discourse. Equality discourse
in the domestic sphere has focused on getting men to do their fair share, rather than a
rethinking of the domestic as such. James writes that the male-dominated left is unable to
think beyond the current organisation of the domestic sphere. “The men, they say, must
share the slavery of the home. So they must – until slavery is abolished. They can as little
conceive of destroying the institution of the family as they can of the factory” (SRC 84).
Here, the mainstream left’s emphasis on productivity is connected to its attachments to
normative family values (Cooper 2017: 9-15, O’Brien forthcoming). The WFH authors are
critical of the idea that men should help out at home, arguing that this does little to
rearticulate the labour relations and relations of power that instituted the domestic in the
first place. In that way, equality politics tend to accept the domestic sphere as a given
reality, merely reshuffling some of the work within this sphere, rather than trying to break
down the divisions that separate domestic and waged work. 
As we have seen, Hochschild articulates a version of the equality argument,
suggesting that the contradiction in contemporary reproductive conditions lies in the fact
that women have moved into a new phase of reproductive work whereas men are lagging
behind (1989a: 11). In Hochschild’s argument, this disjuncture, where men are seen as
inhabiting a different and less modern temporality than women, can be solved by men
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doing more chores in the home and by more family-friendly policies at work. However, this
argument does not fully address the fact that women tend to retain the overarching
responsibility for making sure that domestic work gets done, even when the tasks of
domestic work are shared more or less equally. As we have seen, domestic labour cannot
be reduced to a set of chores, but rather implies a relation of labour exploitation. Equality
politics has been less able to address this relation, thus leaving the mental and emotional
labour of the domestic sphere untouched. As Hochschild herself notes, these more
invisible forms of labour remain even in apparently egalitarian relationships (Hochschild
1989a: 8, see also Carrington 1999: 219, Shane 2019: np). In The managed heart,
Hochschild writes: “An equalitarian couple in a society that as a whole subordinates
women cannot, at the basic level of emotional exchanges, be equal” (MH 85). Due to the
link between the family form and the organisation of the waged economy, both intimate
inequalities and broader hierarchies continue to be reproduced. 
A politics of equality, moreover, does not fully address the hierarchical structure built
into the very notion of gender. Equality, as a conceptual framework, operates within the
paradigm of sexual difference. The term equality cannot help but invoke the notion of
difference, since it implies equality between different parties, which supposedly pre-exist
inequality and will continue to exist in the absence of oppression. However, sexual
difference already contains a construction of hierarchy, making “gender equality” an
oxymoron. Because it is built around an understanding of this equality as operating within
the heterosexual couple, whose very relation is based on subordination, gender equality
cannot be realised within its own terms. As James writes, “[u]ntil the roles themselves are
destroyed, we can never escape the domination of men” (1971b: 194). Equality politics,
then, especially in the sphere of the domestic, remains a type of heterosexual reformism.
Patricia Cain argues that equality discourse continues to privilege masculinity as the
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standard against which women’s sameness or difference is measured (1990: 805).
Similarly, the authors of The xenofeminist manifesto suggest that “the notion of what is
‘gendered’ sticks disproportionately to the feminine” (Laboria Cuboniks 2015: 6). This
means that heterosexual masculinity, which is produced through difference from femininity,
implicitly becomes the (impossible) standard for femininity. Femininity, then, is what needs
to be erased in a politics of equality, as some women are encouraged to adopt the subject
position of possessive individualism in order to enter the work force on the same terms as
men. As we saw in chapter three, however, this leads to contradictory demands even for
those relatively privileged women who are able to precariously inhabit possessive
individualism. Because of the supposedly “independent” capitalist subjectivity’s hidden
reliance on its opposite, the dependent reproductive labourer, femininity cannot be fully
erased. Equality politics thus end up with a punitive and contradictory situation, even for
white and bourgeois women, in which the erasure of femininity is a precondition for their
success in the public sphere, while they are simultaneously punished if they become too
masculinised. Although gender equality has been realised in some limited and often formal
senses, this has often served to reproduce gender relations in less apparent and visible
ways. 
However, this does not mean that a better feminist politics should consist in valuing
femininity on its own terms. As the WFH writings point out, there are limits to merely
counting and valorising feminised work. In her introduction to The work of love, Mariarosa
Dalla Costa states that such counting might contribute to the “draining and dispersal of
women’s energies in the long run, and with respect to a goal of dubious value” (2008: 30).
Later writings by James embrace the measurement of women’s work (SRC 203) and as
we have seen, Federici has moved to a position of valorising domestic work (RPZ 1).
Similarly, Hochschild calls for sharing and valorisation of domestic and emotional labour
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(2003b: 170). But it is difficult to understand how a moral valorisation of this work could
come about. Under capitalism, valorisation is tied to value. Part of the reason that
reproductive work, and particularly white, bourgeois motherhood, is morally glorified is that
it lacks monetary rewards. As I have noted above, Oksala suggests that only the full
commodification of currently unwaged work could lead to equality under capitalism, as
women’s unwaged obligations mark them as less valuable labour subjects and vice versa.
However, Oksala also stresses that the intimacy of emotional labour and the work of
pregnancy in particular makes it impossible to commodify those relations without
drastically changing their meaning (2016: 300). According to this argument, then, it would
be impossible to reach full equality while retaining the nuclear family form as the privileged
reproductive arrangement.
Moreover, even if women’s large-scale entry into the sphere of waged work had
resulted in a genuine redistribution of labour in the home, this would not necessarily solve
the issues around social reproduction. Reproductive work would still have punitive effects
for those inside and outside of normative family arrangements. As Macdonald argues,
increased paternal participation in child care is at most a partial solution, since it is based
on the idea of nuclear family as an isolated unit with its own limited resources (2010: 5).
Men’s increased participation in domestic labour would thus not provide a solution to the
constricted time and resources allocated for reproduction under capitalism. While state
services could mitigate this issue to some extent, they tend to be patch-work and focused
on facilitating parents’ participation in waged work while raising children, thus not providing
a solution to the many issues surrounding childcare. Furthermore, state services are often
inaccessible to those who do not live up to certain conditions, and thus function to
discipline families (Marie 2017, Roberts 1997b). The implication that the family should be
the primary source of care does not address the uneven distribution of emotional labour for
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those who are for various reasons excluded from the family. Nor does a politics that
promotes equality within the domestic sphere account for the fact that the family is a
privileged site of care because of its structural exclusions of those who are not
participating in normative family arrangements. Rather than campaigning for men’s
increased participation in domestic work and state services to compensate when parental
work is not enough, I contend that a WFH perspective leads us to strive for the abolition of
the family, and its attendant relations of gender and labour. In “Theses on wages for
housework,” the authors state that revolution is the abolition of our wageless and waged
enslavement to work (NYWFHC 33). A successful reproductive revolution, then, would
have to intervene within the domestic sphere in order to undo the division between waged
and unwaged labour. 
Abolishing the family
Family abolition is not merely about breaking down existing forms of kinship and work
relationships. Instead, what is needed is a positive abolition, capable of producing a viable
alternative to the present; in other words, negation and affirmation together (Eden 2016:
240). Abolition, as I understand it, is therefore closely linked to the political strategy of
refusal outlined above, in that the aim of the “negative” strategy is not merely destructive
but rather provides the imaginary for something new. This is the case, I would argue, for all
types of abolitionist projects. When thinking about the abolition of gender and the family,
we can usefully draw on other abolitionist traditions, such as the project to abolish slavery
and the current movement to abolish prisons. Liat Ben-Moshe, citing WEB Du Bois, argues
that the abolition of slavery failed to end racial oppression because it was a merely
negative reform, and suggests that prison abolition must have a positive programme
(2013: 85). For Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, prison abolition is “[n]ot so much the
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abolition of prisons but the abolition of a society that could have prisons” (2004: 114). This
means that in order to fully undo the punitive and violent social logic of prisons, we must
find other forms of care that can address the root causes of violence. Similarly, the
abolition of family and gender must contend with the logics that continually reproduce
gendered inequalities and hierarchical forms of kinship, as well as reproducing the need
for families. We cannot abolish gender or the family simply by ignoring them. Rather, we
must address and disrupt the underlying causes and contradictions of gendered
reproduction.
Abolition means the destruction of the repetition of sameness. Sara Ahmed argues
that heterosexuality, based on notions of gendered difference, is bound up with the desire
to reproduce the same. The heterosexual bond “gets structured around the desire to
ʻreproduce well’. Good reproduction is often premised around a fantasy of ʻmaking
likeness’” (2004: 128). After all, what is the good life apart from the repetition of the same –
those who already have access to comfort ensuring its continuation? In this way, abolition
can be understood as the proliferation of difference, both in terms of the proliferation of a
multitude of subject positions and in terms of a break from the present (Hester 2018: 31,
64). As such, it involves the conscious failure to reproduce as labour power, in terms of its
subjective orientation towards docility and discipline. It also involves the failure to engage
with the work ethic of heterosexuality. 
The political framework of family abolition has been increasingly discussed over the
past few years, although the path towards it remains unclear (Gleeson 2017a: np).
However, it is not a new position. As Michelle O’Brien notes in her detailed account of the
demand for family abolition, the perspective has a long history in the communist tradition,
and can traced back to The communist manifesto (O’Brien forthcoming). For Marx and
Engels, the call to abolish the family stems from a rejection of the bourgeois family form,
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bound up with private property and men’s claim to ownership over their wives (2018: 54).
Here, then, it is important to stress that families are more than carriers of normative
values. Throughout this thesis, I have argued that families are work relations, and in
particular, a central site of emotional labour. Furthermore, they function to structure kinship
and lines of inheritance, or lack thereof – forms of (dis)possession that are tied to the
reproduction of classed and racial difference. Lewis writes that “‘family’ refers to ‘blood’
ideology and organized care scarcity: a kind of anti-queerness machine for shoring up
race/class and producing binary-gendered workers” (2019b: np). Here, the family is tied up
with the exclusion of queerness, the production of gender, and the continued reproduction
of overlapping racial and classed dynamics. In a similar vein, Jules Joanne Gleeson and
Katie Doyle Griffiths argue that the family is an economic unit, and therefore critiquing the
patriarchal or heteronormative values of family relationships is insufficient. They write that
“not many will accept their children losing social advantages which they possess. The
absence of alternative institutions of obligation ensures that this is felt as a binding burden:
beyond the family, there are merely individuals” (2015: np). The challenge of abolitionist
projects is to think of how the work that families do can be restructured and diffused, rather
than just abandoned, and how we can create other forms of bonds so that we can be more
than “merely individuals.” We cannot replace family units with detached individuals, as
individuals, both adults and children, cannot meet many of their own needs. In Gleeson
and Griffiths’ words, “[a] purely negative effort to destroy the family would simply result in
starving infants” (2015: np), and, I would add, many lonely and sick adults. 
With O’Brien, I contend that the demand for family abolition must be articulated
according to the specific form the family has taken in different historical phases. Whereas
for Marx and Engels, “the family” indicated the emerging hegemony of bourgeois family
values, the WFH writings target the 20th century male breadwinner model of a working-
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class family. This family model was won through extensive working-class struggle and
therefore family abolitionists had to position themselves against the grain of the
mainstream workers’ movement (O’Brien forthcoming). As Firestone contends, the failures
of previous revolutions are “traceable to the failure of [their] attempts to eliminate the
family and sexual repression” (2015: 190, emphasis in original). As I have outlined in
chapters two and three, shifting models of (re)production have further unravelled the
already limited access to the kinds of protection and emotional security that the mid-
century white nuclear family model offered. Today, a heightened dependence on
commodified reproductive services indicates that the family has become increasingly
precarious – something that parts of the left consider a worrying sign of neoliberalism’s
impact on communities (Cooper 2019: 9-15). Hochschild’s later writings, for example,
articulate a socialist position that defends an expanded notion of “the family,” now
including single parents and homosexual couples raising children (2003b: 171). According
to this logic, the family is under threat and we thus need to find solutions that would shore
up family life. With Lewis and Sarah Brouillette, however, I argue that the family has not
been destroyed enough (Lewis 2019a: 119, Brouillette 2017: np).
What can account for the persistence of nuclear family models after the end of the
family wage and the breadwinner model? I argue that the failure to construct a viable
alternative to the family is the reason it remains a hegemonic form, even as it has become
more precarious and flexible than it was under Fordism. The nuclear family appears
increasingly unstable, as indicated by higher divorce numbers and seemingly more
expansive norms surrounding family arrangements. Yet no new model has taken its place,
and access to care and resources often remains tied to membership in a family. People
are thus made to keep imagining familial relations as the source of “the good life,” despite
their inadequacy in terms of meeting the emotional and physical needs of most people.
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The social relations that could support non-hierarchical, reciprocal, and non-proprietarian
modes of kinship cannot be fully realised under capitalism. Therefore, the movement to
abolish the family must be concomitant with the abolition of capital, as well as other
structures of dominance such as race and heterosexuality. The family as we know it is
intimately tied up with these structures through naturalised notions of genetics and blood
lines. It is also entangled with capitalist property relations through practices of inheritance
and the privatisation of kinship, and the imaginary of family as a form of ownership of other
people. Family abolition must thus be the abolition of naturalised, proprietarian forms of
kinship and labour (Lewis 2019a: 116)
In undoing the privatisation of family, we must also attack the privatisation of feeling.
As I have argued throughout this thesis, the family under capitalism functions as a nexus
of privatised emotional bonds. In chapter four, I argued that emotional labour must be
refused for a feminist movement to be able to mobilise emotion in an emancipatory
fashion. This refusal means doing emotion differently, and rethinking what David Eng calls
the feeling of kinship (2010). I am not arguing against emotional care for other people.
Rather I want to articulate a politics in which we struggle against emotional labour as we
know it – that is, as tied up with forms of sociality that continually recreate privatised social
bonds and hierarchically constituted subjectivities. Abolishing the family and gender thus
involves the ungendering of emotion. It also involves moving away from “niceness” as the
dominant good feeling, and sometimes accepting, even cultivating, bad feeling. Niceness
has a tendency to obscure social hierarchy, exploitation, and antagonisms. It is arguably a
dominant family value of the bourgeoisie. In Hochschild’s terms, niceness has a propensity
to travel upwards in the social hierarchy, accumulating at the top and associating those at
the bottom with bad feeling and emotional stigma (2003b: 85). In order to abolish
emotional labour and bourgeois family values, niceness has to be disprivileged as a
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socially desirable feeling. This would mean that we all have to live with some emotional
discomfort, rather than allowing comfort to adhere to the most privileged. It would mean
refusing “the good life” as we know it. 
It is important to remember the compensatory function of emotional labour – it is
often the work that makes up for unsatisfactory conditions, and creates niceness where,
for most people, there is none. As such, the movement to abolish emotional labour can
only happen in conjunction with the struggle for conditions that do not deplete us
emotionally. Emotional reproduction, then, cannot be resisted on its own but needs to be
put in the context of the conditions that give rise to it – conditions which I have highlighted
throughout this thesis. The abolition of emotional labour is in turn a necessary condition for
abolishing the gendered and racialised subjectivities to which it gives rise. In refusing the
normative good life, then, we are struggling for something else. This something would be
better for a majority of people, since it would resist the punitive and harmful effects of “the
good life” on those aspiring to it as well as those who are excluded from it. “Will that
association be a family?” James asks, and continues: “It can only be so different from what
humanity has known before that we may find a new name for it” (1971b: 196). 
It is important to note that in seeking to abolish “the family” and “gender,” the target of
this perspective is nuclear families and white, binary heterogender. These social forms are
hegemonic, yet they impact various subjects in different ways. The present, while
dominated by hegemonic forms of reproduction, is not a coherent totality but contains
elements that can be mobilised for a different future. Black feminists, including Wilmette
Brown (1976a), Angela Davis (1981), Hazel Carby (1982), Hortense Spillers (1987), and
bell hooks (1990), have long argued that black kinship has a different political meaning
than white nuclear families, and is less dependent on female subordination. However,
hooks suggests that black families have become increasingly invested in white, bourgeois
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family ideals, in ways that undo the radical potential of black kinship (1990: 47). Similarly,
several scholars have pointed to the normative ideals that structure many gay and lesbian
couples and families (Carrington 1999, Warner 1999, Duggan 2002, Montegary 2018). We
thus cannot take for granted the anti-normative or subversive character of marginalised
subjects’ reproductive lives. As we have seen, Fortunati suggested in the early 1980s that
gay and lesbian couples might find it difficult to escape the grasp of heterosexual models
of family (AR 34). Hence, the lives of some subjects within marginalised groups might be
at least partially and precariously integrated into the logic of family values, in a way that
may in fact strengthen such values by making them appear more tolerant and flexible. We
should, however, pay attention to how many arrangements existing in the present are
already marked as deviant or “queered” (Cohen 1997: 458). These traditionally devalued
and “deviant” kinship structures, I argue, can contain at least the inspiration for a radical
practice on the terrain of reproduction. 
Gender abolition
In abolishing the family and feminised forms of labour, the feminist movement should also
strive to abolish gender. As we have seen, this involves a project of denaturalising gender,
and moving towards a form of subjectivity where assigned gender is increasingly felt as an
“external constraint” (Gonzalez and Neton 2013: 90). However, merely negative efforts to
abolish gender, without addressing its economic structure in the family, are highly limited.
For instance, Alyson Escalante’s gender abolitionist essay “Gender nihilism” (2016)
consciously refuses to articulate a position that could be turned into a political practice. In
simply rejecting existing categories, the text stages a negative refusal of gender. This,
however, only amounts to the relinquishing of important conceptual tools for feminist
theorising and activism. Rather than moving through identity by using it as an organising
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tool, the text prematurely decrees the end of gender. 
By contrast, Gonzalez’ influential text “Communization and the abolition of gender”
links abolition to the movement of communism. Here, communism as “the real movement
which abolishes the present state of things” (Marx and Engels 1998: 57) also involves the
abolition of gender as one of the central antagonisms that structure the present (Gonzalez
2012: 220). However, Gonzalez reads gender abolition primarily in the context of capitalist
population control, and therefore in relation to pregnancy (2012: 224). From Gonzalez’
account, it is difficult to answer how gender will be abolished, other than through the
invention of extra-uterine biological reproduction. But gender abolition cannot be reduced
to the undoing of pregnancy, as gender cannot be reduced to the difference of the
pregnant body. As we have seen, it includes the construction of certain subjects as caring
and intersubjective, whereas others are marked as essentially independent of social
constraints and needs. 
Both Escalante’s nihilism and Gonzalez’ account of biological reproduction fail to
articulate a sufficiently expansive notion of gender, which links it to a range of social
relations. For Firestone, the abolition of gender could only come through the radical
restructuring of households and models of kinship, which is arguably more important for
her than technological interventions into pregnancy (2015: 202-216).68 With her, we can try
to think about the necessary conditions for the remaking of gender through the material
conditions of reproduction. If femininity is a work function (RPZ 8), the abolition of gender
is necessarily part and parcel of a feminist antiwork and antifamily position. The abolition
of gender is thus tightly intertwined with family abolition. As James suggests in her essay
“The American family,” the radical rethinking of reproductive work and gender
arrangements would lead to the end of the family as we know it. She writes that “[i]t is not
only the division of labor between men and women which must be altered but the nature of
68 See Gotby (2018a) for an account of Firestone’s writings on love and sexuality.
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that labor itself” (1971b: 197). This, she suggests, would spell “the end of bourgeois
society and of the bourgeois family with it” (1971b: 195). 
Going beyond radically changing the conditions and relations of labour that currently
structure reproduction, gender abolition would involve undoing all the restrictions of gender
identity, and stripping bodily markers of their social significance (Hester 2018: 29-30). This
means following black, indigenous, trans, and intersex feminists, who have long struggled
against the physical and psychic imposition of binary, white heterogender. Reading trans
femininity not as an affirmation of womanhood but its partial destruction, Gleeson situates
trans feminism as a movement against womanhood. The inclusion of trans women in the
naturalised category of womanhood threatens the logic of that category. She writes: “If  co-
existence cannot be achieved, abolition is inevitable” (2017b: np). A trans feminist project
of abolition should thus be understood as more than either a merely nihilist or negative
undoing of gender, or a simple affirmation of pre-existing models of gendered subjectivity.
Rather, it stages a more complicated project of gender abolition in which binary gendered
subjectivity is undermined through the denaturalising choice of a gendered life other than
that which is socially imposed. This does not imply that all trans people are committed to
abolishing gender, but rather that trans feminist perspectives are essential for an
abolitionist project that refuses to take biological sex as the underlying truth of gender.
Gonzalez and Neton argue that as sex and gender are two sides of the same coin, they
can only be abolished together (2013: 80). 
In chapter three, I discussed how gender identities are never fully coherent and
stable. In Hochschild’s terms, people’s gender strategies contain contradictions and
instabilities. However, such contradictions can in many cases be incorporated into binary
constructions of gender. Contemporary models of gender in particular seem to allow for a
degree of flexibility. A gender abolitionist project must thus seek to highlight and heighten
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the contradictions of gender, pointing to its inherent instability. In such a way, gender can
hopefully be experienced less as an “inner truth” of the subject, internalised in part through
the performance of emotional labour. Rather, it could come to be experienced as a
management technique and an external imposition. This, as I have argued throughout this
thesis, is the first step towards moving beyond gender.
Furthermore, the abolition of gender is impossible without the abolition of
heterosexuality, and sexual identities more broadly. This might entail giving up some of the
pleasures that people currently experience as part of their internalised, heterosexual
gender performance. Queer thought and practice, however, gesture towards the possibility
of other pleasures, currently made unthinkable by the imposition of sexual identity as an
inner truth. For James, the gay movement opens the way for an individuality free of sexual
identity (1971a: 13). James describes gay politics, and the lesbian movement in particular,
as being on the forefront of the struggle against current gender relations. Here, we can
draw a parallel to Floyd’s queer Marxism, in which both heterosexuality and homosexuality
are described as reified social categories. For Floyd, like James, we must move through
these identity categories in order to go beyond them (2009: 224). However, James links
this to a feminist project in which the abolition of sexual identity is tied to a refusal of
normative reproductive relationships. Queer and trans feminism, as I will explore in greater
detail in the next section, are thus essential for the positive abolition of gender through the
invention of new gendered and sexualised ways of being. 
In this section, I have started to unpack what a politics of abolition would mean. It
involves the undoing of privileged forms of subjectivity and reproduction, which have real
and violent effects on all of us, especially those who fail to live up to these forms, or refuse
to aspire to them. However, such excluded forms of reproduction can tell us something
about alternative forms of life, and how to build a different future. This requires not only the
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rejection of binary norms and nuclear family structures, but radical intervention into the
lived forms of reproduction in which people engage. Gender and family abolitionism
involves pursuing “a n active formulation of anti-familial politics” (Gleeson and Griffiths
2015: np, emphasis in original). This cannot be a politics that merely aims to expand the
privileges of the family to include less normative family constellations, as such privileges
are the result of the exclusions on which the family form depends. The remainder of this
chapter will be concerned with mapping out some of the potentials and limitations of a
queer politics of abolition. 
Queering emotional reproduction
In this section, I explore modes of sociality that move away from individualism, privacy,
and property. Starting from the position that our current organisation of social life cannot
adequately meet the needs and desires of most people, I will gesture towards alternative
modes of being. I will not more than sketch these possibilities, both for lack of space and
because I want to heed Weeks’ warning against knowing “too much too soon” – that is,
having a ready-made blueprint for future sociality (2011: 213). As Firestone remarks,
however, we might still need to make “dangerously utopian” gestures towards the future, in
order to counter “the peculiar failure of imagination concerning alternatives to the family”
(2015: 203). While the material in this section gestures towards some directions for further
research, we should also note that a materialist standpoint demands that we work out
these possibilities in practice rather than just conceptually. Such work is often fraught, as
we struggle against material restrictions and to unlearn habitual emotional responses, but
it is a crucial aspect of moving towards a more liveable world. 
In this section I use the concept of queering to highlight how currently “deviant”
practices of reproduction can be mobilised to undo some of the institutionalised modes of
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reproduction that structure the present. Here, then, queerness refers to a mode of political
engagement rather than merely addressing people of certain sexual and gendered
identifications (Fraser and Lamble 2015: 64). Queering is on the side of a different future
because heterosexuality is so tightly imbricated with social and material forms of property
– that is, with the preservation of sameness. This section, while focusing on modes of
sociality, will explore the connections between the emotional and the material, as new
forms of sociality will require the innovative reorganisation of material resources. I am
interested in material practices that “can create and sustain alternative values, needs, and
desires” (Weeks 1998: 145). These are modes of queer world-making, in which counter-
hegemonic practices of sociality can be formed. 
I am not suggesting that such practices are the only or even most important form of
politics. Alternative practices of care cannot prefigure the new forms of gendered and
sexual relations that we might want to see under a different mode of production (Drucker
2015: 321, O’Brien forthcoming). The existence of material constraints on these alternative
practices suggests that alternative forms of sociality are structurally limited. This means
that we need to engage in efforts to break down the boundaries of production and
reproduction, and struggle across currently divided spheres. Rather than prefiguring a
different world or offering a ready-made alternative to the existing mode of production,
non-normative forms of reproduction offer sites from which to struggle. These attempts at
queer world-making, always limited in their scope, can illustrate “that this world is not
enough” (Muñoz 2009: 1). Like outlawed emotions, then, experiments in alternative forms
of reproduction can provide epistemological tools for an anticapitalist politics, while also
providing some of the material and emotional support required for such politics. A politics
based on queer reproduction will constantly come upon constraints, where capitalist forms
of work, property, and sociality block alternative modes of being. But these limits are in
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themselves important – by identifying them, we can find ways to struggle against them.
Queer reproduction is thus an expansive project that seems to remake not just the
domestic sphere but the world as we know it. 
We can use outlawed needs and feelings to orientate our radical politics (Jaggar
1992: 131, Hennessy 2013: 228). As these needs and emotions point to a world that is
more just and less exploitative, they form an expansive horizon for radical politics. Our
unmet needs can shape our desire for a different world. I want to give emotion and desire
a central place in radical politics, and look at how our struggles are bound together through
emotional practices. Larne Abse Gogarty and Hannah Proctor, in their essay “Communist
feelings” (2019), argue for the exploration of the emotional worlds of radical politics.
Political struggles, they suggest, can involve feelings of both disillusion and comradely
love. We thus need to be attentive to how emotional relations are built and sustained in left
movements. Such attention to emotional investments are necessary for left movements to
sustain themselves – it is essential that we create spaces where the immediate
experiences of “ecstasy and warmth” can co-exist with political ideas and long-term goals
(Automnia 2015: np). 
This concern for feelings and needs can also raise questions of scale. How do we go
beyond the worlds of queer and left-wing political cultures, to realise a reorganisation of
reproduction for everyone? Such a project implies the abolition of waged work, which
currently dominates and devalues reproduction, and limits our emotional horizons. It also
puts into question the activity of the welfare state, whose politics of reproduction often
involve a normative vision of gendered and sexual relations (Dalla Costa 2015: 94, Cooper
2017). It would mean a politics that goes beyond patch-work welfare reforms that merely
complement unwaged reproductive work in the family. Instead, large-scale innovations in
housing, city planning, education, elder care, and health (including mental health) are
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needed in order to generalise less oppressive and exploitative forms of reproduction.
These interventions, moreover, would need to resist implicit assumptions of the family as
the central site of reproductive work. We need to abandon the notion that the family is
necessary or desirable as the centre of reproduction and the social world of needs.
Instead, such interventions could help us overcome the “organized care scarcity” that
Lewis sees as essential in upholding family values (2019b: np). As Barrett and McIntosh
suggest, family abolitionism might be less a project of replacing the family with a new
hegemonic social model, and more one of making family unnecessary for people’s
survival, by constituting non-familial means of satisfying needs (2015: 149). 
Currently, child care and elder care are often organised along normative
understandings of social property and propriety. A queer framework recognises how these
forms of care are regulated through welfare politics and structures of family law. A queer
critique of reproduction thus implies a critique of the state, and offers ways of going
beyond heteronormative forms of kinship. Over the past decades, a wealth of research
surrounding queer kinship has focused on the relation to children. Gay and lesbian people
have gone from being considered non-reproductive to being increasingly integrated in
legalised forms of reproduction.69 However, as Laura Heston shows, queer familial
innovations outside legal and culturally normative boundaries show that gay and lesbian
people raising children are not waiting for the state’s permission to queer their families,
and that queer parenting often exceeds legitimised forms of legal and biological
parenthood. She discusses multiple and non-legalised parenting forms, where children are
raised by people who are not necessarily recognisable as parents, either in the sense of
being “blood relations” or according to legal models of custody rights (2013: 261, 263).
Here, queer parenting resists the zero-sum game of emotional exclusivity that structures
69 See for instance Weston (1991), Ryan-Flood (2005), Gabb (2017), Austin and Capper (2018: 456), and 
Montegary (2018).
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normative kinship forms. Queer models of parenting thus refuse the exclusive,
proprietarian logic of heterosexual families, where there can be only one person primarily
responsible for the emotional care of children. However, parenting practices which exist in
heterosexual families, such as adoption, surrogacy, and reliance on nannies, already
implicitly question the logic whereby a child can only have one mother (Grayson 1998:
542, Park 2006: 218, Eng 2010: 94, Macdonald 2010: 13, Lewis 2019a). A queer critique
of reproductive labour, then, points to the necessarily unstable aspects of the institution of
heterosexual reproduction. It explores all the potentials for a different form of reproduction,
and dependencies on the reproductive labour of various subjects, which have had to be
excluded and made invisible in order for the nuclear family form to become intelligible. A
radical queer movement can utilise those gaps for a politics of multiple and currently
unintelligible forms of reproduction.
While queer parenthood is increasingly familiar, queer elder care has been less
explored. However, I argue that elder care should be central to rethinking models of
reproduction. Ageing, illness, disability, and death imply a loss of autonomy, and therefore
challenge ideals of liberal subjecthood and possessive individualism. As such, ageing is
conspicuously absent from much political discourse. There is a sense in which the elderly
have to be removed and made invisible in order for ideals of the productive subject, and
the family as the reproduction of life, to become sustainable. Moreover, the valuation of
capitalist production serves to devalue the lives of the elderly (Hochschild 1973: x, RPZ
116). Old age is therefore made socially invisible, a tendency that is replicated both in
theory and left-wing political movements (RPZ 120). The material organisation of
reproduction also facilitates this invisibility of the elderly. Federici writes about how
gentrification threatens the forms of working-class community and solidarity that have
provided a social and material safety net for elderly people, outside the nuclear family
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(RPZ 115). Hochschild’s first book, The unexpected community (1973), explores how such
solidarity can be recreated. The old people she studied were mostly widows, who were
inventing new forms of sociality after their nuclear family life had ended. Together, the
elderly women negotiated sickness and death, but also communal activity and friendship.
The project of queering elder care can look to such practices for inspiration for how to go
beyond our currently privatised models of sociality and reproduction. 
 Here, it is important to note the ways in which the politics of child care and elder
care fit together, through a more generalised logic of heterosexual temporality and
genealogy. As Kath Weston points out, the fear of ageing and dying alone may be a
motivating factor behind the decision to have children (1991: 26). Family is one of the few
structures that encourage intergenerational solidarity, thus offering some support in an
increasingly age-stratified society (Hochschild 1973: 21). Participating in the logic of
property, normative family based on generational reproduction therefore functions as a
form of insurance against one’s future exclusion from reproductive relationships. Capitalist
society creates distinct domains for both children and the elderly, separating them from
those participating in waged work (PWSC 22, 38). A heteronormative model of life under
capitalism assumes distinct stages of life, such as childhood, adolescence, young
adulthood, middle age, and old age. These correspond to separate phases of waged work
and reproductive labour, and various life events, including marriage and childbirth. Queer
theorists such as Muñoz are sensitive to the normalising aspects of this form of temporality
(2009: 22). Thus, I am critical of the model suggested by Gleeson and Griffiths in their
essay “Kinderkommunismus” (2015), in which family abolition proceeds through the
institution of crèches that segregate infants and young people from not only their parents
but also other generations and extra-familial bonds. A queer and communist politics of
reproduction, I argue, must strive for generational integration and the undoing of separate
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institutions for different age groups. 
This political project might proceed from the needs of elderly queer people, who are
often isolated from kin and face higher levels of economic precarity (Drucker 2015: 358).
The goal should be to make elder care and intergenerational solidarity generally
accessible, thus counteracting the privatisation of care within kinship structures as well as
the abusive and exploitative relations of care within many private and state facilities.
Moving away from a model where having children becomes an investment in one’s own
future access to care is essential for allowing for other forms of reproduction, which are
less based on property and obligation. Jane Ward argues that seeing children as an
investment in the future prevents pleasurable parent-child relations in the present, and
obstruct more comradely and non-exclusive forms of child care (2013: 232, 233). We thus
need to work against forms of child care as the emotional reproduction of class relations
that I outlined in chapter two. Rather than focusing on child care and elder care as
separate issues, I suggest we need to explore how notions and practices of familial
descent foreclose alternative forms of care, which are less age-segregated and less based
on notions of property.
Moving beyond the family
In this project, we can draw inspiration from the African American tradition of multiple
forms of parenting. As Patricia Hill Collins suggests, these models are not exclusively
about the care of one’s own children, but a form of guardianship of the community as a
whole. Othermothering, the practice of being an extra parent of someone else’s child, can
become community othermothering, a form of political leadership centred on questions of
care. These practices, she writes, can be invoked as symbols of power, as black traditions
of mothering are central in the reproduction of resistance (1994: 67, 70). Community
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othermothers, Stanlie James suggests, see that problems that many people suffer from
can only be solved through collective action (1993: 47). These multiple and overlapping
practices of mothering thus adhere to a less proprietarian model, and are geared towards
forms of collective political action. Following Alexis Pauline Gumbs, we might distinguish
between motherhood as a status of ownership and mothering as a practice (2016: 22).
Gumbs draws on Hortense Spillers’ writings, which point to the legacy of slavery in
practices of black mothering, where the child was not seen as owned by the mother (1987:
73). While these practices stem from histories of extreme oppression and exploitation, they
also point to a tradition of resistance and a mode of being that departs from normative
logics of care. Rather than relying on exclusive models of kinship, which tend to place the
burden of care on one person, they are capable of integrating different people with various
needs into caring relationships. They are also capable of undoing the individualising logic
of care, which is particularly pronounced under neoliberal regimes. Othermothering thus
counteracts the idea that a lack of care or “delinquent youths” are the result of individual
failure. Instead, it articulates black mothering itself as a resistance to patriarchal and racist
modes of governance. Here, we can think of Brown’s argument that black women’s
supposed failure to raise disciplined workers is a form of resistance (1976b: 5)
As Gumbs suggests, black mothering is often pathologised and criminalised (2010:
196). Her concerns resemble those of BWFWFH, which centred on access to welfare for
black women and resistance to racist practices of sterilisation (NYWFC 54). Racialisation
involves the marking of certain groups as worthless, which facilitates their exploitation as
surplus populations (Hong 2012: 92). In order to expand our understandings of racialised
and working-class resistance, we also need to explore the so-called lumpen proletariat as
a political subject (Boggs 1963: 50). O’Brien argues that while Marx and Engels rejected
the lumpen proletariat in favour of the industrial proletariat, the working class of their time
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“was not a unified, homogenous proletarian mass disciplined by factory life, but a
cacophony of crime and social chaos” – more suggestive of “Fourier’s queer communism
than Engels’ gravitation to a natural monogamy” (forthcoming). Criminalised modes of
survival can be read as a form of resistance to property and propriety. As such, informal
economies also create the context for non-familial modes of solidarity. As I argued in
chapter four, learning from these practices of solidarity involves unlearning habitual
emotional responses which tend to discount marginalised subjects as political actors.
Resistance to our reproduction as labour power thus also implies resistance to the
production and demarcation of surplus populations, including the refusal of the
criminalisation and pathologisation of non-normative forms of reproduction. We can look at
these forms as models from which we can learn, even though they are shaped and limited
by histories of extreme exploitation and violence. 
This applies especially to queer forms of racialised reproduction. While we should be
careful not to romanticise such arrangements, which may also contain exploitative labour
relations (Raha 2018: 114-115), they can serve as sources of inspiration from which we
can draw selectively. As Chandan Reddy argues, the queer, racialised forms of kinship
portrayed in Jennie Livingston’s film Paris is burning founded their cohesion on the
damage produced by heteronormative modes of familial reproduction. Coontz argues that
black families have historically been less likely to institutionalise orphans and the elderly,
as these people were cared for within extended kinship networks (1988: 315). However,
many queer people are excluded even from more expansive forms of kinship. We can
understand such exclusions in terms of hooks’ notion of the normativising of black families
under the influence of white bourgeois subjectivity (1990: 47), and Gumbs’ description of
the heteronormativising influences of some black nationalist and pro-natalist discourse
(2010: 214). As I argued above, currently marginalised people are not immune to
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normalising and exclusive modes of kinship, but can themselves become participants of
the exclusions of normative family values. Again, negative queer histories and emotions of
trauma and exclusion can be productive for alternative models of solidarity and care. 
While the arrangements portrayed in Paris is burning participate in the language of
houses and family, Reddy suggests, they do not succumb to the logic of sexuality as
privacy, which tends to further isolate queer subjects (1998: 373). The collective queer life
of metropolitian cities, such as New York’s ball scene explored in Paris is burning, has
historically revolved around criminalised or grey-market forms of reproduction. These
forms of survival are not necessarily mediated through the gendered practices of the state,
the wage, or the family (O’Brien forthcoming). Here, I want to introduce the criminal queer
as a figure for political thought. Similar to the figure of the housewife in WFH writings, and
the elderly people in Hochschild’s first book, the criminal queer is devalued as a result of
exclusion from formal wage economies. Moreover, this figure struggles from a position of
exclusion from normative familial structures. If the figure of the proletarian, in Marx’s
characterisation, only owns to his capacity to labour, the criminal queer owns even less.
Throughout this thesis, I have pointed to the conditions that underlie the traditional
proletarian’s capacity to labour – conditions from which the criminal queer is excluded.
This produces a life world often marked by mental and physical illness, imprisonment, and
death. But it also allows us to glimpse traces of a different form of sociality and solidarity,
as communities are created to protect their members from various forms of violence. This
particular form of lumpen proletariat, we might speculate, may be politically important as it
simultaneously fulfils and exceeds the demands of capital (Ferguson 2004: 15, Raha
2018: 119). 
One example of this practice was Street Transvestite Action Revolutionaries (STAR),
a group of trans, queer, and gender non-conforming people of colour, founded in 1970 by
222
Sylvia Rivera and Marsha P. Johnson. Simultaneously an activist group and a collective
based on reproductive labour, STAR provided housing, food, emotional support, prisoner
solidarity, and advocacy for the black and latinx trans community (STAR 2013, Shepherd
2008). For young trans people of colour who had been turned away by their families,
Rivera and Johnson offered a place to sleep in the STAR house. It also extended some
forms of care to the local community, including food and child care. STAR relied on
criminalised means of reproduction – paying the rent with money from sex work and
feeding its members through shoplifting (Raha 2018: 135-137). Here, we can note a link
between what Hennessy calls outlaw needs, and acts which are actually criminalised. The
desire for a different world is intimately tied to an economy of criminalised practices to
satisfy need. 
These practices prefigured the system of “houses” portrayed in Paris is burning.
Weeks suggests that the houses constitute a form of self-valorisation, a selective practice
of immanent resistance that allows us to constitute new collective subjectivities (1998:
145-150). More so than the ball scene houses, STAR understood themselves as engaging
in a revolutionary practice, explicitly politicising their needs and desires. They also
intervened in, and supported, diverse political movements, such as the gay liberation
movement, feminism, and antiracist movements (STAR 2013: 13). In their practice of
reproduction, they used many of the tools advocated by WFH, such as shoplifting or
“proletarian shopping” (Toupin 2018: 207, SRC 77). In the WFH literature, such practice
emerges as a form of sabotage on the site of consumption, asserting the collective power
of the proletariat to intervene in reproduction despite the threat of state violence. In their
political practice, WFH supported collective housing for those who had been harmed by
nuclear families (Toupin 2018: 177). As we have seen, they also constructed sex work as
a form of women’s self-determination within the constricting possibilities of feminised
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labour, although they did not articulate this explicitly in terms of trans politics. In a later
essay, however, Federici names queer, trans and intersex movements as part of the
contemporary horizon of struggles against reproduction and the gender division of labour,
suggesting that 
these phenomena point not only to a breakdown of disciplinary mechanisms but to a profound
desire for a remolding of our humanity in ways different from, in fact the opposite to, those that
centuries of capitalist industrial discipline have tried to impose on us. (2018b: 195)
With Reddy, we can think about how STAR and the ball scene do not mimic white,
heteronormative notions of home, but rather provide an unstable and flexible definition of
the house, shifting from “family” to “street gang” (1998: 371). While these arrangements
are limited by various material constraints, and do not constitute ideal forms, they still
provide practical examples for how to struggle for better, less exclusionary reproductive
arrangements. Through engaging in criminalised economies, they also exist at least
partially outside gendered distinctions between production and reproduction, and public
and private spheres. 
Projects such as STAR present challenges for how to sustain and generalise
alternative forms of reproduction. The STAR house was a relatively short-lived experiment,
and the untimely deaths of its founders show the need for a continued struggle for the
survival of trans women of colour. Yet it can map out some directions for activism on the
site of reproduction. Such activism, as Berlant and Warner show, is frequently dismissed
as being merely engaged with “lifestyle.” By contrast, they refer to it as a queer public
culture or a world-making project, 
where “world,” like “public,” differs from community or group because it necessarily includes
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more people than can be identified, more spaces than can be mapped beyond a few reference
points, modes of feeling that can be learned rather than experienced as a birthright. (1998: 558)
They cricitise Fraser’s model of politics, presented in her book Justice interruptus (1997:
17-19), which posits gay and lesbian movements as struggles for recognition, and thus as
the opposite of class-based demands for redistribution. Berlant and Warner assert that to
understand the queer politics of world-making “only as self-expression or as a demand for
recognition would be to misrecognize the fundamentally unequal material conditions
whereby the institutions of social reproduction are coupled to the forms of hetero culture”
(1998: 561). I argue that these projects of world-making are a necessary aspect of radical
politics, which strive to uncouple social reproduction from both heterosexuality and
capitalist institutions. Their limitations can in themselves be instructive for new directions
for struggle. For example, difficulty in scaling up these projects due to lack of suitable
housing can lead us to struggle for the production of affordable or free homes that do not
assume a normative family model or individualising modes of property ownership. As we
have seen, WFH argued that free and decent housing is an important aspect of
reconfiguring reproduction, which can help us expand the horizon of reproductive needs.
WFH struggles also addressed the working conditions of reproductive labour in terms of
free access to adequate public spaces, transport, and city planning, thus extending
beyond the private sphere towards a project of world-making (Pompei 1972: 4, Toupin
2018: 211). 
When considering the direction of an emancipatory politics of reproduction, it is worth
asking what demands would facilitate non-normative forms of reproduction, and ensure the
survival and wellbeing of those currently most marginalised. In this way, queer politics and
theory can become less concerned with antinormativity as a goal in itself,70 and more
70 The stakes of such a focus on antinormativity are discussed in a 2015 special issue of Differences, edited
by Robyn Wiegman and Elizabeth A. Wilson.
225
concerned with overcoming the material constraints that currently bar a different future.
This might be a daunting task, as there are presently a multitude of structures that limit
more emancipatory forms of reproduction. Yet it is necessary to keep searching for the
limits that currently curtail a liberatory reproductive politics, and struggle to surpass those
limits. This also means that there is no one site that can be privileged in struggling for a
better future – reproductive struggles must be waged in a number of different sites, and
call for a politics of coalition between variously marginalised and exploited groups. Such
coalitions would need to start from James’ principle of unity on the basis of the needs of
the most precarious and oppressed groups, rather than on false universality on the basis
of the perceived interest of the majority. Such politics, as James suggests, would
strengthen the working class by giving increased power and visibility to its most vulnerable
members, combining struggles against oppression with those against exploitation and
economic precarity (SRC 63, 81). This, I argue, is a necessary part of undoing the
subjective and emotional hierarchies that currently structure left politics, as well as society
more broadly. 
We can see, then, that material conditions of work are very tightly imbricated with
subjective structures of emotional reproduction. O’Brien describes her family-abolitionist
vision as 
communes of a couple hundred people who pool reproductive labor and share in child-rearing,
include some attention to sexual pleasure and fulfillment, and work to meet everyone’s
interpersonal and development needs without barring chosen affective, romantic or parental
bonds between individuals. (forthcoming)
Here, the housing unit serves as the material condition for affective needs and desires. It
combines needs for various types of care with the desire for sexual and emotional
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satisfaction. We can see how this type of project would both represent and require a large-
scale challenge to the current organisation of reproduction, reorganising housing, work,
care, and sociality. Contemporary feminist politics can thus learn from the visions of the
history of materialist feminist intervention in collective reproduction explored in Dolores
Hayden’s 1981 book The grand domestic revolution.71 While many of these projects were
severely limited in various ways, they share the belief that the domestic is not a static unit,
but that it can and must be changed in order for society to change. 
New horizons of feeling
It is important, then, to think about the material conditions for new forms of sociality. In his
investigation of the current politics of friendship, Alan Sears notes that the current
organisation of waged work, together with increased pressures on families to provide
unwaged care work, leaves little time for pleasurable interactions with friends.
Furthermore, the relatively low level of commodification of friendship compared to romantic
or familial attachments means that it is currently increasingly marginalised in our lives
(2006: 36-37). Focusing on such constraints might enable a radical politics of friendship to
emerge, which is a distinct political project from Hochschild’s focus on facilitating family
relationships. In her later work, Hochschild posits a zero-sum game between the public
culture of work and the intimacy of family, where the more work in the public realm is
valued, the more private life is devalued. She thus calls for a renewed emotional
investment in family life (1997: 198, 249). However, a politics which seeks to remodel
sociality beyond the boundaries of private and public, and beyond the spheres of waged
work and family life, might do well in exploring the queer potentials of a politics of
friendship. Friendship, and other non-kinship forms of sociality, are neither on the side of
71 See also Hester and Srnicek (forthcoming) for an exploration of the material conditions of reproduction.
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the family nor on the side of waged work. This queer history predates the emergence of
stable lesbian and gay identities, emerging in 19th century cultures of romantic friendship
in which same-sex intimacy could flourish (Drucker 2015: 72). As Weston points out in her
study of “chosen family,” queer people have often created intimate networks where there is
little symbolic differentiation between erotic and non-erotic ties, or friends and family. As it
crosses lines of households, chosen family is also a means of undoing boundaries
between the public and private (1991: 205-206). 
It is in this context of public intimacy and queer world-making that we should be wary
of the mainstream LGBT movement’s recent turn to the politics of love. Rather than
politicising emotion, the now commonplace slogan “love is love” serves to privatise queer
erotic bonds in the name of romance. As I have argued elsewhere (Gotby 2018b), such
focus tends to erase the specificity of queer life in favour of a political argument based on
the purported emotional similarity of queer and heterosexual lives. While this political focus
has undoubtedly brought material benefits to many gay and lesbian couples, it is part of a
more generalised attack on the possibilities of queer world-making. Such privatisation of
feeling is part and parcel of the privatisation of care under neoliberal regimes (Cooper
2017: 174). A queer politics, I argue, should not concern itself with expanding discourses
of romantic love. Instead, we need to counter the organisation of life that makes romance
and familial ties the precondition for access to emotional and material forms of care and
resources.72 A contemporary queer politics needs to attack the construction of exclusive
familial bonds through law. Such politics would centre on friendship as a more open form
of relationality, which could potentially traverse generational boundaries, as well as
allowing for more expansive constructions of intimacy. A focus on friendship could also tell
us something about how to remodel caring relationships in more comradely ways, in which
72 Cooper’s account of ACT UP underscores how their activism sought to detach access to care from 
privatised models of family responsibility and employment (2017: 211).
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care is not based on bonds defined according to legal or biological standards (Lewis
2019a: 22).73 
 Queer Marxist feminist Rosemary Hennessy has suggested that the concept of love
should be reclaimed as the name for “an affect-culture of collaboration and passionate
reason that accompanies the conversion of living labor into organized resistance” (2013:
206). Her project is close to those of Kollontai (1980: 285, 289) and Firestone (2015: 205),
who argue for the generalisation of feelings currently reserved for romantic intimacy.
Making use of a Spinozist notion of affirmative affect, Hennessy re-articulates love as a
collective political practice.74 Weeks, drawing on a Nietzschean tradition of affirmation,
articulates a politics built on forms of laughter, where ironic and joyful laughter can
articulate a politics against ressentiment, which she understands in terms of the reduction
of capacity for action (1998: 137-143). I appreciate Weeks and Hennessy’s emphasis on
affective cultures linked to collective resistance. However, I have argued for a politics
where “negative” feelings are not necessarily understood as capacity-reducing. Rather, in
a politics against normative patterns of emotional labour, I argue that it is necessary to
reclaim some of the “bad” feelings that emotional labour most often serves to manage and
outlaw. Contrary to a Spinozist logic, I contend that good feeling is sometimes what
reduces our capacity for action. The reclamation of outlaw feelings increases the width of
our affective capacity, and makes radical use of those feelings that are deemed bad or
harmful. This also implies the degendering of feeling, where currently gender-coded
emotions become accessible to all people. I am also concerned that the emotion of love is
too overburdened with meanings of romantic and familial intimacy and exclusivity, in a way
that makes it difficult to reclaim for a more collective project. As I argued in chapter two,
love is especially closely associated with demands for privatised arrangements of care and
73 See also Gotby (2019) for an account of criminalisation, reproduction, and comradeship.
74 For a critique of Spinozist conceptions of love, see Wilkinson (2017).
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emotional labour. 
A political project of refusing emotional labour must strive to make sociality less like
work by freeing it from current constraints. Emotion becomes labour through its
privatisation and individualisation. Gendered work is not something that we can simply
step outside of. Rather, it is dependent on material constraints and structures of
production. Yet such labour could also entail playing or experimenting with different forms
of sociality, without denying that these experiments depend on labour.75 As the writings of
WDL show, reproductive labour is not automatically free when performed in the context of
queer relationships, yet it does not necessarily carry with it the reproduction of the same
coercive structures and forms of devaluation of the labouring subject. Rather, it can be
geared towards producing outlawed pleasure and power. As Hall puts it, “[o]ur ability to
live without men, our ability to express ourselves and our feelings for each other are in turn
a source of power” (1975: 4). Power and freedom are thus not individualised but rather
understood within the context of relations of shared labour and care, as well as a
commitment to a politics of reproducing against capital’s normativising tendencies. 
Interventions into alternative forms of reproduction and gendered being, then, do not
automatically allow us to step outside the sphere of work, but might position that work
differently within dominant and coercive structures. Queerness, historically lacking ties to
the privatised sphere of the family as well as the normative gender formations produced
through waged work, might offer some tools for inventing a different form of emotional
reproduction – one which can undo some of the boundaries that currently restrict
emotional experience. Queerness also offers tools for politicising intimacy, which no longer
appears as naturally given. Here, we can draw on a long history of working-class sociality
75 Here, we can think of Meg Wesling’s concept of queer value, which uses the distinction between labour 
and play to argue that “drag (as playful work) paradoxically reveals not just the social construction of 
gender but its status as labor, as the coercive or compulsory efforts that produce the gendered body 
which capital needs for its productive system” (2011: 111). 
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outside the family (O’Brien forthcoming). Coontz argues that in the early 20th century, “the
idea that the family and the sexual division of labour were presocial and sacrosanct
imparted a new sense of both privacy and universality to family life and gender roles”
(1988: 332). Queerness can produce a form of subjectivity that is not understood as pre-
social but rather emerges as a political subjectivity. Sociality and emotional bonds then
come to have an immediately political and collective character, which can be mobilised for
various projects of solidarity and coalition-building. Here, there is no strict boundary
between the political and the pleasure of intimate connections. In fact, queerness as a
form of political subjectivity can draw on the experience of public forms of feeling, and
acquired capacities for emotional labour, in order to undo the distinction posited by
capitalist constructions of public and private. By using modes of work and play, emotional
labour can be turned against the coercive management of feeling, instead using our
acquired skilfulness of emotion to experiment with new forms of sociality. 
This requires that we try to undo the practices of individualism that structure much of
our daily lives, including much activist work. As I have argued, emotional labour is
essential for creating individualised modes of subjectivity, which also require that such
labour remains invisible. However, as Lewis writes, “[w]e are the makers of one another.
And we could learn collectively to act like it” (2019a: 19-20). Similarly, Cynthia Dewi Oka
argues that we need to become “encumbered with and responsible for each other” (2016:
57). Such ways of relating to other people would require the undoing of the invisible
dependency of individualism on various forms of reproductive labour. Challenging current
forms of emotional labour could threaten individualism, and conversely, the refusal of
affective individualism would lessen the need for emotional labour. Instead, we could move
towards the forms of non-sovereign relationality that Berlant gestures towards. For Berlant,
this will involve “unlearning the expectations of sovereignty as self-possession, a
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mechanism for control and evidence of freedom” (2016: 408). Experimentation into new
forms of being together, then, would have to search for new forms of freedom, through
collective subjectivity. When we no longer posit individualism as a precondition of freedom,
we can recognise that it is produced through coercive forms of labour. 
Here, it is useful to return to Weeks’ reformulation of feminist standpoints, as
collective forms of subjectivity constituted by labour, selectively using the histories and
practices available to them (1998: 136). Rather than affirming or valorising feminised work
or emotional labour tout court, then, we can use historical practices and modes of being as
a way to simultaneously denaturalise and mobilise particular capacities. In this section, I
have briefly sketched some modes of alternative sociality that exist in the present, and
which provide directions for new forms of sociality through challenging the boundaries that
currently limit such practices. We can also selectively draw from historical examples of
different modes of being. Coontz outlines working-class life in the US in the late 19th and
early 20th century, in which the boundaries between private and public were not drawn as
rigidly as in later versions of working-class sociality (1988: 295). Marginalised and surplus
populations, who never had access to the forms of institutional security that came to
dominate working-class sociality in the Fordist era, continue to carry this legacy today,
despite, or rather because of, significant hardship. There is a link between these forms of
sociality and the project of reclaiming social wealth, the means of production, and access
to space. As Federici and Hochschild show in their considerations of elder care, forms of
solidarity and care depend on appropriate spatial and material conditions. Conversely, the
politics of reclaiming material wealth cannot do without a focus on the emotional
dimensions of ownership and belonging, and how these must be changed in the process
of creating more liveable futures. Radical politics cannot do without an emphasis on
emotional reproduction and social forms, and we must assume that our current forms of
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sociality will be transformed within the process of transforming society. 
This chapter has moved beyond the writings of WFH and Hochschild, while retaining
their focus on emotion, subjectivity, and antagonism. Working towards a radical politics of
reproduction in the 21st century, I have explored the demands for family abolition and
gender abolition. Moreover, I have outlined alternative modes of sociality that move
beyond the privatised relations of family and labour. These demands and experiments, I
argue, are in line with the core tenets of the WFH perspective, as sketched in the
introduction to this thesis. In this way, a WFH perspective on emotional reproduction can
lead us to imagine and practice new and liberatory forms of living. 
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Conclusion
In this thesis, I have presented a theory of emotional reproduction, in which emotional
labour forms an integral part of social reproduction more broadly. Rather than seeing
emotional labour as a phenomenon emerging with the post-Fordist economic system, I
have traced a longer history and a broader concept of emotional reproduction, as a part of
both waged and unwaged forms of reproductive labour. The commodification of emotional
labour has made such labour more visible, but it did not create it. I have argued that
emotion forms a key part of reproductive work, and that emotional labour is often
necessary to tie together disparate acts into more coherent forms of care, which can
subsist over time. In this way, emotional labour indicates that reproductive work is not only
necessary for those who are very young, very old, sick or disabled, but that all of us rely on
other people to fulfil our needs. As emotional labour is tied up with the work of producing
gender hierarchies, it also becomes exploitable, and some people’s emotional needs are
regarded as more important than those of others. 
Emotional reproduction is a term that names the ways in which emotion participates
in the continual remaking of this world. This remaking is currently tied to unequal forms of
labour and reward, but could potentially be turned into a project of making the world
differently. The world as we know it is marked by disparities in which some people
experience a lack of emotional comfort, leading to perennial loneliness and poor mental
health. Other people experience an excess of emotional comfort, as they are shielded from
experiencing other people’s discomfort and emotional depletion. In The second shift,
Hochschild diagnoses a culture in which the standard of emotional need is drastically
reduced (1989a: 242). While I do not agree with her solution, which is premised on the
continued existence of nuclear families, I sympathise with her suggestion that the current
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organisation of labour is ultimately detrimental to the emotional wellbeing of most people.
Like reproduction more broadly, emotional reproduction is seriously constrained by
capitalist imperatives to produce value, as well as structures of racism, sexism, and
homophobia. Emotional reproduction is currently based on the exploited labour of some
people within families, as well as the lack of attention to the emotional needs of those who
are excluded from family bonds. Improving the emotional lives of the majority may thus
depend on the radical restructuring of emotional reproduction. 
Importantly, emotional labour shows how reproduction is intimately connected to
modes of subjectivity, as emotional labourers work on the subjectivities of others as well
as their own. I have argued that the hegemonic form of subjectivity in capitalism,
possessive or affective individualism, simultaneously disavows and depends upon a
feminised subjectivity of care. In that way, both femininity and masculinity are work
functions. A radical politics of emotional labour is one which seeks to undo these gendered
forms of subjectivity. This calls for the abolition of the nuclear family as a primary site of
heterosexualised emotional reproduction, which excludes the queer and racialised modes
of reproduction that function as the constitutive outside of the normative family form. While
familial and romantic ideals of love serve to reproduce some people and some types of
life, they simultaneously make others vulnerable to violence and neglect, as well as
exclusion from access to reproductive resources such as housing and health care. I closed
the last chapter with a consideration of counter-hegemonic forms of queer sociality, which
can help us think and practice new ways of being together and reproducing each other. 
Throughout this thesis, I have emphasised that those who appear to be the
independent subjects of the labour contract, selling their capacities on the free market, are
in fact dependent on others for the maintenance of their ability to labour. Historically,
inhabiting this form of subjectivity has been the privilege of white men, whereas children,
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housewives, slaves and other colonial subjects have been excluded from the ability to sell
their own labour power. Today, women in European and North American countries are
almost as active participants in the formal labour force as men, either from a desire to
leave the domestic sphere or by the whip of economic need. Through equality feminisms
and the neoliberal reconstitution of (re)production, some women have been granted an
(always precarious and partial) access to the subjective formation of possessive/affective
individualism. This does not mean that gender has been abolished, or that the need for
housework within the family has been replaced by market-provided services. It has
entailed a partial and fragmentary reshuffling of some of the work that WFH associated
with the role of the housewife. However, it is still the case that those who appear as
independent subjects (white men and increasingly some white, bourgeois women) most
often have their needs quietly met by others, who are produced as less free subjects
through their association with the devalued labour of reproduction. 
The point of this thesis, then, is not to deny the need for emotional reproduction, or
call for its complete rejection. It is not a call to abandon forms of labour associated with
femininity, or to grant women access to “masculine” types of subjectivity. Such refusal
would be both impossible and undesirable. Rather, refusal here refers to a mode of
resistance that goes beyond the binary construction of gendered subjectivity, seeking to
repurpose outlawed emotions, needs, and desires in order to find new ways of being. Such
refusal might utilise potentials existing in the present, including aspects of traditionally
feminine subjectivity, but in ways that do not support the reproduction of the present. 
This relies on the denaturalisation of femininity – regarding it as an acquired capacity
rather than something inherent in particular subjects. In this way, we can also begin to
consider emotion not as a merely spontaneous state but as a type of skilful work. The
concept of emotional labour helps us rethink both emotion, often regarded as passive, and
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labour, which tends to be constructed as conscious activity. In this thesis, I have shown
that emotion is not merely passive, but neither must something be fully conscious or active
for it to be usefully considered as labour. To labour is to do something, but that something
might not always be recognisable as activity. Emotional labour is difficult to think about,
especially since the better it is done, the more it appears as non-work, both for the
labourer and for the recipient of emotional care. Some of the discomfort with the term
emotional labour, and its popularity inside and outside of academic discourse, probably
stem from this seeming conceptual mismatch. The concept’s impropriety makes it both
expansive and confusing, placing all sorts of phenomena under its banner. But this
expansiveness is part of the nature of emotional labour, and it is important to theorise it
despite its elusiveness. Otherwise we leave emotion unexamined, falling back on more
common-sense notions of emotion as natural, intimate, non-social, and spontaneous.
In its seeming passivity, emotional labour is similar to other feminised forms of work.
As I noted in chapter three, it is ironic that the labour associated with femininity is often
rendered passive, and femininity is associated with receptivity, as women do much of the
work of reproducing people. Recently, Lewis has theorised gestation as work, thus
challenging the notion that work must include conscious, mental activity, as well as the
notion that pregnancy is a passive, natural capacity of the body. Quoting Maggie Nelson’s
description of the work of birth, Lewis states: “You don’t do labor. Labor does you” (2019a:
125). Here, the notion of the individual subject’s autonomy is radically subverted in a way
that we might usefully embrace. The assertion that labour does you fits well with the WFH
perspective on femininity as a work function, and the body as a labouring machine.
Employing the term work to describe these processes is a way of creating a gap between
what we are and what we could be. If labour does you, but “you are not that work” (RPZ
16), then who we could be is a radically open question. As noted in the introduction,
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Federici states that “[w]e want to call work what is work so that eventually we might
rediscover what is love and create our sexuality, which we have never known” (RPZ 20).
Similarly, Federici and Cox write: “Who is to say who we are? All we can know now is who
we are not” (2012: 34). Marxist feminism is an essential tool for saying that we could be
more than our labour. 
This move to abolish work, and therefore current forms of subjectivity, might entail
questioning our sense of pleasure in our work and our gendered being. I have argued that
while gendered performance and emotional labour can be pleasurable, this does not entail
that they are not exploitative. The pleasures that people derive from heterosexuality and
love, in particular, need to be questioned in this context, both because they are built on the
exploitation of feminised subjects and because of the exclusions and limitations such
pleasurable reproduction creates. The point, then, is not so much about what types of work
that people do or do not enjoy, but rather about what kinds of subjects work turns us into.
As I noted in chapter two, certain types of labour might entail that labourers have a high
degree of subjective investment in them, so that labour becomes part of “what it  means to
keep on living and to look forward to being in the world” (Berlant 2006: 21). Such
investments, however, also delimit what we could be, and the types of pleasure that are
available to us. The kind of gender/work abolition that I propose takes subjective
investments and pleasures into account, but also asks what we could be if we were not
forced to make that kind of subjective investment in exploitative structures. 
We can thus consider how labour is simultaneously productive and repressive. It
delineates subjective possibilities according to a division of labour, through which subjects
come into being. Skilled performance of certain work constitutes subjectivities but also
excludes the possibilities of other subjects, who are not determined by normative modes of
labour. As I have argued, the creation of a labouring subject is not a mere reduction of
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human capacities, but rather constituting and channeling capacities in a particular
direction. This, however, serves to impoverish our ability to feel and act in ways that are
not supported by the dominant organisation of labour. The abolition of gender involves the
unlearning of some of our acquired capacities for emotion so that other capacities can be
developed. As I noted in chapter five, such un- or relearning is part and parcel of political
interventions into the organisations of social and material life. The potential for such
development, however, should not be located in notions of an eternal human nature.
Rather, just as lesbian identity appeared alongside the imposition of heterosexual love,
potentials for resistance can emerge as by-products of the organisation of labour.
Resistance arises from other forms of needs and pleasures, which are not satisfied with
the world as it is. Labour creates the immanent possibilities of its own refusal. From these
possibilities, a queer reproduction can emerge, based on the practices, needs and
pleasures of those currently most marginalised by hegemonic notions of the good life. 
In this thesis, I have argued that a useful reading of WFH is one that emphasises the
perspective’s potential to constitute an autonomous, anticapitalist feminist subject on the
basis of the experiences of performing reproductive and emotional labour. Like so many
other radical movements, WFH as an activist network dissipated after a few years due to a
combination of internal conflicts and political repression (Rousseau 2016: 228). The last
decade has seen a renewed interest in WFH as a political perspective, and this has
brought with it a renewed interest in the question of the wage. I maintain that the
usefulness of the demand for a wage cannot be determined theoretically, but rather (now
as in the 1970s) is effective as a demand to the extent that it produces the “strength and
confidence” (PWSC 53 n16) necessary to constitute a collective feminist subject. The
construction of political demands and movements, then, cannot happen solely through
disembodied intellectual labour, but must include the production of emotional and
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collective counter-hegemonic subjectivities. 
The aim of such a movement should be to make certain activities, which we today
must describe as work, into non-work. I have argued that the term “work” should be
understood as a shifting, unstable political category which is best characterised through
the link between certain activities and the imperative to satisfy one’s needs and those of
other people. Viewed in this way, there is nothing that inherently makes an activity work or
non-work, and what we regard as work is open to contestation and struggle. In this thesis,
I have argued that intimate activities such as sex and emotional expressions of love can
become work through their coercive connection to the sphere of capitalist reproduction.
This also means that they could become non-work if liberated from the forms of constraint
that characterise such reproduction. Such liberation would not take love and sex as given,
transhistorical things, but rather drastically change them so that they might not be
recognisable as the same phenomena. As I argued in the last chapter, queer and
otherwise marginalised communities are showing the way towards more playful and
liberatory potentials for emotion and desire. This might involve the re-imagination and
utilisation of supposedly bad feelings along the way. 
The WFH perspective implies using the concept of work in such a way as to loosen
work’s power over our lives and capacities. In recognising that there is nothing inevitable in
the current organisation of work, and our current capabilities, we can move towards
exploring other modes of being as well as confronting the organisation of the world that
has turned certain activities into labour. Labour is something we do to meet our needs and
those of others, not something that expresses our “authentic selves.” If work as a concept
indicates a non-voluntary aspect to activities usually taken to be natural expressions of
gendered personality, it is also something that can be resisted, rethought, and abolished,
as our needs and desires could be met differently. 
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